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Qualified Immunity: Ignorance
Excused
Barbara E. Armacost 51 Vand. L. Rev. 583 (1998)
Public officials receive qualified immunity from damages liability for
constitutional violations if they reasonably could have believed their actions
were constitutional under clearly established law. In this regard qualified
immunity is quite unusual. In most other legal contexts, failure to know the
law is virtually never excused. The only other context where notice or knowl-
edge of illegality plays any role is in criminal law, but even mistakes of penal
law are rarely excused.
In this Article, Professor Armacost uses fair notice in criminal law as
a paradigm for analyzing the role of notice in constitutional damages actions.
She argues that fair notice in the criminal context is a proxy for fault.
Whereas in most criminal cases fault inheres in the wrongfulness of the pro-
hibited conduct, notice becomes important when only an intentional violation
of a known legal duty makes the defendant blameworthy. In such cases, the
notice inquiry ensures against penal liability without fault.
Professor Armacost then applies the paradigm of notice as a proxy for
fault to qualified immunity. The animating notion behind the immunity in-
quiry is that it would be "unfair" to hold officials to rules they could not rea-
sonably have known. The objective clarity of the law acts as a surrogate for
the official's subjective state of mind: If the law governing the official's con-
duct was clear, immunity is denied because any reasonably conscientious offi-
cial would have known and obeyed the law. Conversely, an official who en-
gaged in conduct that was neither clearly prohibited nor contained indicia of
its own wrongfulness is not blameworthy and immunity will attach. In such
cases, qualified immunity's notice inquiry-whether the law was clear-acts
as a proxy for fault.
Finally, Professor Armacost argues that the fault-notice connection
borrowed from criminal law explains a puzzling feature of constitutional
damages law: The Supreme Court has repeatedly stressed the importance of
individual, fault-based liability and resisted a move toward respondeat supe-
rior liability. However, the ubiquity of indemnification of individual officials
by their governmental units means that officials rarely bear the monetary
burden of liability. Professor Armacost contends that fault-based, individual
liability-which identifies a particular official as a "constitutional wrong-
doer"--serves a moral blaming function that has significant independent
value regardless of who ultimately bears the financial responsibility.
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"A plea of ignorance or mistake of law is rarely encountered in prosecutions for
serious crimes .... [No sane defendant has pleaded ignorance that the law
forbids killing a human being or forced intercourse or taking another's prop-
erty or burning another person's house."1
"[G]overnment officials... [are] shield[ed] ... from civil damages liability as
long as their actions could reasonably have been thought consistent with the
rights they are alleged to have violated.... The contours of the right must be
sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what [she] is
doing violates the right."
2
"The majority... intimates that [Judge] Lanier could not have been aware
that sexually assaulting women in his chambers when they arrived to conduct
official business with him constituted a violation of the victims' due process
rights [because the] right to freedom from willful sexual assault at the hands
of a sitting judge has not been 'made specific' by prior court decisions. ... "3
I. INTRODUCTION
One of the primary purposes of qualified immunity in constitu-
tional damages actions is to ensure that governmental officials can
anticipate when their actions are likely to subject them to liability.
Thus, even if an official's conduct actually violated the Constitution,
she is immune from liability if a reasonable official could have be-
lieved that her actions were lawful. In other words, ignorance of the
law-at least reasonable ignorance-is excused.
In this regard qualified immunity is quite unusual. It seems to
rest on the idea that people should not be held to rules they did not
know. In most other areas of law, however, no one thinks to ask
whether people had notice of the content of the law; people are bound
by the rules and ignorance of the law is virtually never an excuse. In
tort, for example, a defendant could not prevail in a negligence suit by
arguing that she was not aware her careless behavior could constitute
legal negligence. 4 Similarly, a contract defendant would lose if her
1. JEROME HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIumNAL LAW 384 (2d ed. 1960).
2. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 638, 640 (1987).
3. United States v. Lanier, 73 F.3d 1380, 1413, 1414 (6th Cir. 1996) (Daughtrey, J.,
dissenting), vacated, 117 S. Ct. 1219 (1997).
4. See W. PAGE KEETON, ET AL., PRossER AND KEETON ON THE LAw OF TORTS § 31, at 169
(5th ed. 1984) ("Negligence is conduct, and not a state of mind.... [Ilt may... arise where the
negligent party has considered the possible consequences carefully, and has exercised his best
judgment.").
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only defense was failure to comprehend that her contractual commit-
ments were enforceable. 5 In the administrative and regulatory con-
text as well, failure to know the law is generally not an excuse, at
least as far as civil liability is concerned.6 The only other body of law,
other than qualified immunity, where notice or knowledge of the
illegality of one's behavior seems to have any importance at all is in
the criminal context. But even there, as every ordinary citizen knows,
ignorance of the law is almost never excused: A criminal defendant
very rarely succeeds by arguing that although she violated the penal
law, she should be excused because she could reasonably have be-
lieved that the law did not prohibit her behavior. By contrast, the
same argument frequently succeeds in constitutional damages ac-
tions.
Qualified immunity has most often been explained as a way of
furthering certain instrumental goals of constitutional damages liabil-
ity under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.7 One of the primary purposes of section
1983 liability is to deter unconstitutional conduct by governmental
5. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 21, at 63 (1981) ("Neither real nor appar-
ent intention that a promise be legally binding is essential to the formation of a contract, but a
manifestation of intention that a promise shall not affect legal relations may prevent the for-
mation of a contract."); JOHN D. CALAmARi & JOSEPH M. PERiLLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 2-4,
at 28 (3d ed. 1987) (stating that an agreement will be binding "even if the parties were unaware
that society offers remedies for the breach of such an agreement [unless] from the statements or
conduct of the parties or the surrounding circumstances, it appears that the parties do not in-
tend to be bound or do not intend legal consequences"); E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS
§ 3.7, at 122 (2d ed. 1990) (noting that although parties to agreements, "especially routine ones,
often fail to consider the legal consequences of the actions by which they manifest their assent[,]
[t]he fact that one gives the matter no thought does not impair the effectiveness of one's assent,
for there is no requirement that one intend or even understand the legal consequences of one's
actions").
6. For example, compare Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192 (1991) (construing
"willfully" in a criminal tax statute to require knowledge of illegality), with Domanus v. United
States, 961 F.2d 1323 (7th Cir. 1992) (construing "willfully" in the parallel civil statute as not re-
quiring knowledge of illegality and noting that construction of the statute has been adopted by
every jurisdiction to have reached the issue).
7. Section 1983 states:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of
any State, or Territory, or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected,
any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and
laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other
proper proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought against a judicial officer
for an act or omission taken in such officer's judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not
be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavail-
able. For the purposes of this section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the
District of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994).
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officials.8 It is argued, however, that too much liability could cause
officials to be overly cautious and to fail to carry out their public re-
sponsibilities "with the decisiveness and the judgment required by the
public good."9 The overdeterrence rationale for qualified immunity
posits that governmental officials are subject to skewed incentives,
which make them especially sensitive to the prospect of damages
liability. On the one hand, they are engaged in the kinds of work and
personal interactions that tend toward conflict and harm, and are
likely to lead to liability suits. On the other hand, public officials
unlike their private counterparts, cannot personally appropriate
many of the benefits of their good performance, which tend to flow to
the general public. 10 This unbalanced incentive structure may drive
officials toward inaction, underenforcement, delay and other defensive
tactics that limit their personal costs but disadvantage the public."
Under this reading, qualified immunity affords a "margin of error" for
public officials who make reasonable mistakes about the exact
boundaries of constitutional law, which in turn provides the right
balance between deterring unconstitutional actions and avoiding
overdeterrence of socially useful behavior.
Although the instrumental explanation for qualified immunity
is surely a significant part of the story, it also has some weaknesses.
For example, the instrumental rationale has largely ignored or under-
estimated the impact of indemnification. 12 If governmental officials
8. The Supreme Court has also identified compensation as an important goal of constitu-
tional damages liability. See, e.g., Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 481 (1986)
(stating that compensation is fundamental to the purpose of section 1983); Board of Regents v.
Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478, 488 (1980) (noting that two of section 1983's main purposes are
"deterrence and compensation"); Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 254 (1978) (noting that the basic
purpose of an award of damages in a section 1983 action is compensation). Many of the Court's
holdings construing section 1983, however, have limited damages awards in ways that
significantly undermine that goal. See generally John C. Jeffries, Compensation for
Constitutional Torts: Reflections on the Significance of Fault, 88 MICH. L. REv. 82, 84-90 (1989)
(discussing the limitations imposed by the Supreme Court on section 1983 compensation).
9. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 240 (1974); see Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 814
(1982) ("The[ ] social costs [of liability] include the expenses of litigation, the diversion of official
energy from pressing public issues, and the deterrence of able citizens from acceptance of public
office" as well as "the danger that fear of being sued will dampen the ardor of all but the most
resolute, or the most irresponsible [public officials], in the unflinching discharge of their duties."
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
10. See PETER H. SCHUCK, SUING GOvERNMENT 60-68 (1983).
11. See id. at 68-77 (discussing "the official's decisional calculus").
12. One possible explanation for the failure of instrumental theories to consider the effects
of indemnification is the difficulty of identifying the actual scope of entity reimbursement for
liability costs. Indemnification for costs incurred in connection with section 1983 suits is a
matter of state law, see IC MARTIN A. ScHwARTz & JOHN E. K1RKLIN, SECTION 1983 LITIGATION:
CLAIMs, DEFENSES, AND FEES § 16.24, at 338 (3d ed. 1997), and state statutes differ widely as to
the scope of coverage, extent of local autonomy over terms and conditions of reimbursement,
586 [Vol. 51:583
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do not bear the financial effects of individual liability then, as com-
pared to their private counterparts, they may simply have less to gain
or lose. In other words, given indemnification and absent some sys-
temic bias, incentives might be balanced such that officials will, in
fact, consider all the societal costs and benefits of their actions.13 If
so, governmental liability would present little or no risk of overdeter-
rence, making qualified immunity unnecessary. 14
In addition, if instrumental concerns were the whole story one
might have predicted a regime that embraced respondeat superior
liability against governmental entities-with or without a qualified
immunity defense-and eschewed individual liability altogether. 5
and limits on amounts of reimbursement. See generally, SCHUCK, supra note 10, at 85-88
(discussing the many variations among state indemnification statutes). Based largely on the
variety of state statutes and the fact that many provide for denial of reimbursement on various
grounds, Professor Schuck has concluded that 'indemnification . . . is neither certain nor
universal." Id. at 85; see William C. Mathes & Robert T. Jones, Toward a 'Scope of Official
Duty" Immunity for Police Officers in Damages Actions, 53 GEO. L.J. 889, 912 (1965) ('[Ilt
appears that the indemnity practice is so irregular that its function as a 'conduit to
governmental liability' is fortuitous at best."). But see Louis L. Jaffe, Suits Against
Governmental Officers: Damage Actions, 77 HARV. L. REV. 209, 223 (1963) (concluding that
"characteristically the [governmental] officer has been indemnified").
The more important question, but also the more difficult one, is how much indemnification
actually goes on? Based on what little empirical and anecdotal evidence is available, it appears
that indemnification of liability costs and legal fees, while not necessarily certain ex ante, is
widespread in practice. See John C. Jeffries, In Praise of the Eleventh Amendment and Section
1983, 84 VA. L. REV. 47, 50 (1998); Project, Suing the Police in Federal Court, 88 YALE L.J. 781,
811 (1979). Professor Jeffries, who has taught at the FBI Academy for nearly 20 years, reports
that he 'routinely" asks the classes of police officers if they "know personally of any case where
an officer sued under § 1983 was not defended and indemnified by his or her agency." Professor
Jeffries reports the uniform answer is "no," and "[i]f there were any real risk that police officers
would be left to defend § 1983 actions on their own, this population would know it." Jeffries,
supra, at 50 n.16.
13. See Jeffries, supra note 12, at 75.
14. Professor Jeffiies offers the tentative conclusion that even with indemnification, the
incentives of governmental actors are probably skewed, as compared to their private counter-
parts, due to certain peculiar features of government employment law and the political tendency
to overestimate costs that appear as budget items and discount costs that fall elsewhere. See id.
at 75-77.
15. Peter Schuck, who has provided the most nuanced and extensive account of the
possible instrumental effects of governmental liability, argues for a regime of respondeat
superior liability for governmental entities. See generally ScHUcK, supra note 10, at 82-121
(discussing problems with existing indemnification systems and suggesting a scheme of respon-
deat superior as an alternative). For additional arguments in favor of broader entity liability,
see Larry Kramer & Alan 0. Sykes, Municipal Liability Under § 1983: A Legal and Economic
Analysis, 1987 SuP. CT. REV. 249 (arguing for respondeat superior liability or fault-based entity
liability); Mark R. Brown, The Demise of Constitutional Prospectivity: New Life for Owen?, 79
IOWA L. REV. 273 (1994) (arguing for respondeat superior liability when the governmental agent
acts under the entity's authority); Harold S. Lewis, Jr. & Theodore Y. Blumoff, Reshaping
Section 1983's Asymmetry, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 755 (1992) (proposing a modified respondeat
superior liability for entities and fault-based liability for individual officials); Susannah M.
Mead, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Municipal Liability: The Monell Sketch Becomes a Distorted Picture, 65
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Such a regime could provide maximum incentives for governmental
entities to train and monitor their employees while mitigating overde-
terrence tendencies caused by fear of personal liability.16 The legal
regime we have 'instead has, on the one hand, rejected respondeat
superior liability,17 adopting more limited "custom or policy" liability
for municipalities and absolute immunity for states.18 On the other
hand, assuming widespread indemnification, the regime has left indi-
vidual officers legally vulnerable to damages actions within a world of
de facto entity liability.
This Article seeks neither to refute nor to defend the instru-
mental argument for qualified immunity but rather to suggest that
this explanation is only part of the story. Another important ration-
ale for qualified immunity, described by the Supreme Court as inde-
pendent from the instrumental one, is that it would be unfair to hold
governmental officials to constitutional rules they could not reason-
N.C. L. Rev. 517 (1987) (arguing that Congress intended respondeat superior liability rather
than the current liability scheme based on policy or custom); Laura Oren, Immunity and
Accountability in Civil Rights Litigation: Who Should Pay?, 50 U. PrTT. L. REV. 935 (1989)
(arguing that respondeat superior liability is the best means of providing for compensation and
deterring constitutional violations under section 1983).
16. The Supreme Court made precisely these arguments in denying qualified immunity to
municipalities. See Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 651-52 (1980) (opining that the
threat of entity liability would "encourage those in a policymaking position to institute internal
rules and programs designed to minimize the likelihood of unintentional infringements on
constitutional rights" and suggesting that individual officials would not be overdeterred by en-
tity liability).
17. It could be asserted that personal liability with indemnification would be equally as
effective in decreasing the risks of overdeterrence as respondeat superior liability. I would
argue, however, that there are important differences between the two regimes that bear on the
issue of overdeterrence: First, even if indemnification is widespread, it is not automatic. To the
extent that states and localities reserve the right to withhold indemnification on various
grounds or delay the indemnification determination until the end of the action, officials face
significant uncertainty about their individual situations. In addition, there may also be uncer-
tainty as to the extent, quality, and terms of the legal defense available to officials who find
themselves subject to suit. See generally SCHUCK, supra note 10, at 85-88 (discussing the wide
variety of indemnity statutes and the types of limits imposed by each). Finally, officials
themselves indicate significant aversion to being sued in their individual capacities, even when
they are likely to be indemnified. See Jeffries, supra note 12, at 51 n.17. In sum, the
uncertainties and anxieties that accompany personal capacity suits suggest that entity liability
would be functionally very different from the current regime of personal liability with
indemnification.
18. The Eleventh Amendment is the source of state sovereign immunity from section 1983
actions in federal court. The Supreme Court has held that Congress has the power to override
state sovereign immunity pursuant to section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment if Congress
expresses in clear statutory language its intent to do so. See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445,
456 (1976). In Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332 (1979), the Court held that section 1983 is not a
sufficiently clear expression of congressional intent to abrogate state sovereign immunity. The
Court has also held that states are not "persons" within the meaning of section 1983, precluding
suits against state entities in state court. See Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58
(1989).
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ably have known.19 The fairness rationale suggests that sometimes
notice or knowledge of the illegality of one's behavior2o may be neces-
sary for the imposition of section 1983 liability. Seeing qualified im-
munity through the lens of notice also implicates a useful comparison
between section 1983 law and criminal law, the only other legal con-
text where knowledge of the law seems to matter. At some level these
two regimes seem to treat notice of illegality very differently. In
criminal law, the requirement of fair notice has rhetorical appeal but
the operating assumption is that ignorance of the penal law is not
excused.21 By contrast, in constitutional damages actions qualified
immunity dictates that ignorance of the law-at least reasonable
ignorance-will quite often be excused.
I argue, however, that the approaches to notice in section 1983
law and criminal law are more similar than they first appear and that
we can learn much from the comparison: When it is recognized that
criminal notice is a proxy for fault, the fault/notice connection can be
exploited in the constitutional damages context with significant ex-
planatory power. Moreover, while it might appear that notice of
illegality plays a lesser role in criminal cases than in constitutional
ones, notice is important in precisely the same kinds of cases in both
contexts: where knowledge of illegality provides the element of fault
necessary to justify the imposition of liability.
The Article proceeds as follows: Part II discusses notice in the
criminal context. Although there is a well-articulated commitment to
fair notice in criminal law, in only a relatively small category of
cases-Lambert v. California= and its progeny, and a class of criminal
regulatory cases-has notice of illegality been found to be deter-
minative. That is because the requirement of notice in criminal law is
a proxy for fault, and most of the time criminal fault arises from the
19. See Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 317-22 (1975) (discussing public official's "good
faith" immunity).
20. I recognize, of course, that "notice" and "knowledge" are not the same thing. As will
become apparent, what courts mean by "notice" in the qualified immunity context is that offi-
cials knew or should have known-either because the law governing their specific conduct was
clear or because their behavior contained indicia of its own wrongfulness-that their conduct
could lead to constitutional damages liability. Thus, as this Article will make clear, "notice" in
this context means something less than actual notice, and "knowledge of illegality" includes
constructive knowledge. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 314 (6th ed. 1990) (defining constructive
knowledge as knowledge that exists if "one by exercise of reasonable care would have known a
fact").
21. See John C. Jeffries, Legality, Vagueness, and the Construction of Penal Statutes, 71
VA. L. REV. 189, 207-10 (1985) (noting the conflict between the requirement of fair notice and
the no-defense-for-ignorance rule).
22. 355 U.S. 225 (1957).
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inherent "badness" of the prohibited conduct; no one needs a criminal
statute to tell her that homicide or theft is unlawful. Notice becomes
important as an independent inquiry, however, in cases where knowl-
edge of illegality serves as the only element of blameworthiness that
would justify criminal liability. Thus, courts have required knowledge
of illegality-occasionally as a constitutional matter, but more often
as a matter of statutory construction-when nothing in the nature of
the crime or the defendant's circumstances served as an adequate
signal of possible criminal liability.23
Part III takes the analytical framework developed in the
criminal context-notice as a surrogate for fault-and applies it to
constitutional damages actions. Qualified immunity obtains unless
the law was sufficiently clear to alert a reasonable official that her
conduct was unlawful. The rationale for immunity in such cases is a
matter of fairness: Governmental officials cannot fairly be blamed for
violating rules they could not reasonably have known. My thesis is
that the "clearly established law" inquiry is a surrogate for fault in
much the same way that fair notice ensures against liability without
fault in the criminal context. In qualified immunity analysis, the
clarity of the law is a proxy for the official's subjective intent: If the
law governing her actions was clear, it may be assumed that any rea-
sonably conscientious official would have known and obeyed it,
whereas an official who acted in good faith under law that provided
inadequate guidance is not blameworthy.
Applying the paradigm from criminal law, one would expect a
defense of qualified immunity when knowledge of illegality is an es-
sential element of the wrongfulness of the defendant's conduct. Many
actions that could give rise to section 1983 suits fall into that cate-
gory. Much of constitutional law-for example, the complex rules
governing searches and seizures, the situation-specific requirements
of due process, and the regulation of speech by public employers-is
relatively unpredictable and unclear in its application to particular
circumstances. In those contexts there is frequently very little dis-
tinction between constitutional as opposed to unconstitutional con-
duct. For example, an illegal search is often not very different from a
law enforcement action that would not only be lawful, but that society
would wish to promote. Officials who make reasonable legal judg-
ments that are later adjudicated unconstitutional may not be suffi-
ciently blameworthy to warrant the imposition of constitutional dam-
ages liability. In such cases it is easy to see why a defense of qualified
23. See infra notes 102-42 and accompanying text.
590 [Vol. 51:583
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immunity-excusing a failure to know the law-would be available.
The above-described rationale for qualified immunity only holds,
however, when nothing else inherent in the defendant's conduct or
circumstances makes her behavior wrongful apart from knowledge of
illegality. This explains why qualified immunity often drops out of
the analysis when the underlying claim requires a showing of bad
intent, such as intentional racial discrimination or deliberate indiffer-
ence to a prisoner's serious medical needs. The argument that quali-
fied immunity is unnecessary in such cases, however, is not based
solely on the intentionality of the official's conduct. It also rests on
the notion that conduct such as invidious racial discrimination con-
tains indicia of its own wrongfulness: Today, discrimination against
someone because she is African-American or Hispanic is viewed as
inherently and obviously "bad" behavior, obviating the need for quali-
fied immunity in a case alleging such discrimination. By contrast, in
a case alleging intentional "benign" discrimination in college admis-
sions, where there is legal and societal uncertainty surrounding the
propriety of affirmative action, qualified immunity might be justified
and ignorance of the law excused.
Parts II and III of the Article demonstrate that there is much
to be learned by viewing qualified immunity through a lens derived
from criminal law in which notice of illegality serves as a proxy for
fault. Part IV posits that the fault/notice connection may also provide
an answer to a puzzling feature of section 1983 law and provide a
normative "link" between Parts II and III. On the one hand, the
Supreme Court has repeatedly stressed the importance and value of
individual, fault-based liability, resisting scholarly criticism of the
Court's refusal to embrace respondeat superior liability. On the other
hand, governmental employers routinely indemnify their employees
for the costs of liability, creating a de facto (if not de jure) entity liabil-
ity in which the blameworthy individual rarely bears the monetary
burden. This Part offers an explanation for the apparent incongruity
between the Court's asserted commitment to individual liability and
the functional entity liability created by indemnification. I find the
beginnings of an answer in the recent case of United States v. Lanier,
in which the Supreme Court drew an explicit parallel between quali-
fied immunity law and fair notice in criminal law.24 An important
24. 117 S. Ct. 1219, 1227 (1997). The Lanier Court contended that "the qualified immu-
nity test is simply the adaptation of the fair warning standard to give officials ... the same
protection from civil liability and its consequences that individuals have traditionally possessed
in the face of vague criminal statutes." Id. (emphasis added).
1998] 591
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rationale for eschewing penal liability without fair notice-in other
words, without fault-is that a criminal conviction entails moral
stigma, and defendants should not be subjected to societal opprobrium
and the risk of incarceration unless they are blameworthy. I argue
that constitutional damages liability also entails a level of societal
condemnation or stigma because constitutional violations are
different from, and worse than, other kinds of civil violations. I
argue, further, that fault-based, individual liability-in which a
particular official is identified as a "constitutional wrongdoer"-serves
a moral blaming function that has independent value regardless of
who ultimately bears the financial cost of liability.
II. NOTICE AND MENS REA IN CRIMINAL LAW
A. The Role of Notice
The doctrine of notice in criminal law stands for the idea that
crimes must be defined in advance so that individuals have prior
warning of what is forbidden. The notice requirement is understood
to be a matter of fundamental fairness: Citizens must be informed of
their legal obligations lest they unwittingly find themselves in viola-
tion of the law and subject to criminal punishment.25 Concerns about
notice have been invoked to justify a number of related doctrines. For
example, the principle of legality requires that crimes be defined
ahead of time by legislatures-and not created ad hoc by courts-in
order to provide advance notice of the law's demands. The vagueness
doctrine prohibits criminal statutes that do not clearly set out what is
forbidden. The rule of lenity requires that ambiguous criminal stat-
utes be construed in order to avoid an interpretation that could take
the defendant by surprise.26 As Professor Jeffries has persuasively
argued, however, the broad rhetoric of fair notice is misleading if one
is looking for a commitment to anything like "actual notice."27 For
example, the notice requirement is deemed satisfied with the mere
25. See United States v. Cardiff, 344 U.S. 174, 176 (1952) (stating that a lack of notice sets
"as much of a trap for the innocent as the ancient laws of Caligula").
26. See also Lanier, 117 S. Ct. at 1225 (listing the vagueness doctrine, the canon of strict
construction, and non-retroactivity as manifestations of the fair warning requirement). See
generally Jeffries, supra note 21, at 205-06 (discussing how notice underlies the relationship
between the principle of legality, the void for vagueness doctrine, and the rule of strict
construction).
27. See Jeffries, supra note 21, at 205-12.
592 [Vol. 51:583
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publication of the laws, no matter how inaccessible the source. 28
Moreover, concerns about notice can be cured by judicial construction,
even if the interpretation appears in very old cases or amounts to a
virtual rewriting of the statutory text.29 And perhaps most signifi-
cantly, the person who acts in honest -ignorance of the law's com-
mands is out of luck: Ignorance of the law is ordinarily not an excuse
for violating a penal statute.30
This is not to conclude, however, that ideas of notice are unim-
portant to the scope of criminal liability. The core notion behind the
requirement of fair notice is that penal sanctions should not be im-
posed for behavior 3' that the ordinary, law-abiding citizen would have
no reason to think violated the law.32 In other words, citizens should
not be subject to criminal liability-including the risk of incarceration
and moral stigma-unless the prohibited conduct would be
"blameworthy in the average member of the community." 3 As will be
explained more fully below, fair notice is a way of ensuring that
criminal liability is not imposed without fault. Most of the time
criminal fault-the measure of blameworthiness required to justify
penal sanctions-is satisfied without any separate inquiry into
whether the defendant knew that her actions could constitute a viola-
tion of criminal law.34 Notice or knowledge of illegality35 does,
28. See id. at 207.
29. See generally id. at 206-08 (arguing that the actual administration of the vagueness
doctrine often contradicts the notice rationale).
30. Some jurisdictions permit an ignorance excuse if the government has affirmatively
misled the defendant. For example, the Model Penal Code, which has been adopted with
modifications in a significant number of states, provides that mistake as to criminality is excul-
patory where the defendant:
acts in reasonable reliance upon an official statement of the law, afterward determined
to be invalid or erroneous, contained in (i) a statute or other enactment; (ii) a judicial
decision, opinion, or judgment; (iii) an administrative order or grant of permission; or
(iv) an official interpretation of the public officer or body charged by law with responsi-
bility for the interpretation, administration or enforcement of the law defining the of-
fense.
MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES § 2.04(3)(b) (Official Draft and Revised Comments
1985) [hereinafter MODEL PENAL CODE]. See generally JOSHuA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING
CRIMINAL LAW § 13.02, at 150-57 (2d ed. 1995) (describing circumstances in which mistakes of
criminal law have been permitted under common law).
31. I use the words "behavior" and "conduct" interchangeably in this Article to include all
elements of the criminal offense, including any required state of mind.
32. See Jeffries, supra note 21, at 211.
33. Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225, 229 (1957) ("A law which punished conduct which
would not be blameworthy in the average member of the community would be too severe for
that community to bear.").
34. I am using words such as "fault," "wrongdoing," and "blameworthiness" to signify legal
culpability, as in the violation of a legal norm of which the actor knew or should have known.
See generally Jeffries, supra note 8, at 96 n.49 (using "fault" and "wrongdoing" in the
conventional legal sense); Michael S. Moore, "The Moral Worth of Retribution", in
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however, become important as an independent inquiry when it serves
as the only element that makes the prohibited conduct blameworthy.
Criminal prohibitions against homicide, assault, theft, or rape,
for example, require no separate notice inquiry because "no sane
defendant [could plausibly plead] ignorance that the law forbids kill-
ing a human being or forced intercourse or taking another's property
or burning another person's house."36 There is broad societal agree-
ment about the inherent wrongfulness of such conduct and the
blameworthiness of those who engage in it. 3 Knowledge of prohibi-
RESPONSIBILITY, CHARAcTER AND THE EMOTIONS: NEW ESSAYS IN MORAL PHILOSOPHY i81 n.1
(Ferdinand Schoeman ed., 1987).
35. For a discussion of what the courts mean by "knowledge of illegality," see infra note
64.
36. HALL, supra note 1, at 384. As Professor Hall noted:
A plea of ignorance or mistake of law is rarely encountered in prosecutions for serious
crimes; it is raised almost solely in relation to minor offenses.... In the relatively few
cases of major crimes where ignorance of law was pleaded, no challenge was raised con-
cerning the validity of the moral principle generally implied, but it was claimed that the
situation in which the defendant acted was "exceptional."
Id.
37. Of course the set of behaviors that would be considered by most people to be "bad" or
"wrongful" is, at least to some degree, contingent on changes in legal and social norms. I think
it is fair to say, however-and many criminal law scholars over the years have so argued-that
much of traditional criminal law embodies basic moral principles upon which there is, and has
been over time, general and widespread agreement. Criminal prohibitions against homicide,
assault, rape, and certain kinds of theft fall into that category. See, e.g., Jerome Hall, Ignorance
and Mistake in Criminal Law, 33 IND. L.J. 1, 20, 21 (1957) (noting that "the criminal law repre-
sents certain moral principles" and that it tends to be restricted to "conduct that is plainly
immoral and widely disapproved"); Henry M. Hart, The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 401, 405 (1958) ("[Criminal conduct] is conduct which, if duly shown to have
taken place, will incur the formal and solemn pronouncement of the moral condemnation of the
community."); Moore, supra note 34, at 181 n.1 (noting that "most serious crimes are also
serious moral breaches"). On the other hand, it is surely true that what is generally understood
to be wrongful changes over time: Some conduct once thought by most people to be
blameworthy is no longer regarded with the same opprobrium. Adultery and fornication are
examples of conduct that were once more widely viewed as wrongful than they are today.
Indeed, although many states continue to keep adultery and fornication statutes on the books,
they are only rarely invoked. The notion of inherent wrongfulness is also contingent in the
other direction: As new norms of behavior are embodied in law and thus become part of the
socialization of ordinary citizens, these norms define additional behaviors that ordinary citizens
would know to be wrongful. For example, a governmental official who failed to hire based on
race or an ordinary citizen who dumped raw sewage into a river would be expected to "know
better" in light of modem legal and societal views about racial discrimination and
environmental regulation. That what is deemed "inherently wrongful" is contingent on
changing norms of behavior does not undermine the point that, at any time, some conduct is
widely regarded as wrongful. See generally Harry V. Ball & Lawrence M. Friedman, The Use of
Criminal Sanctions in the Enforcement of Economic Legislation: A Sociological View, 17 STAN.
L. REV. 197 (1965) (discussing the relationship between popular morality and the use of criminal
sanctions in regulating business practices); Susan L. Pilcher, Ignorance, Discretion, and the
Fairness of Notice: Confronting "Apparent Innocence" in the Criminal Law, 33 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 1, 35-39 (1995) (urging that the contingent nature of blameworthiness argues for inviting
defendants to raise a defense of "apparent innocence" that would be decided by a jury).
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tions against such crimes, moreover, "results not from men's learning
criminal law as amateur lawyers, but from the significance of the
public condemnation of, and imposition of punishment for, certain
highly immoral acts."8 Regardless of any knowledge of the actual
content of the written criminal law, the defendant who commits such
violations knew, or should have known, better. Thus, when it comes
to criminal offenses against persons or property that violate basic
notions of morality and civility, notice or knowledge of illegality39 can
plausibly be presumed and ignorance of the law is ordinarily not ex-
cused. In such cases the blameworthiness that inheres in the prohib-
ited behavior makes unnecessary any additional inquiry into ques-
tions of notice.
It is important to recall at this juncture that an essential com-
ponent of the blameworthiness of criminal behavior is the require-
ment of "mens rea" or a "guilty mind."40 Moreover, as I will explain
more fully below, the requirement of mens rea is closely related to
issues of notice. Mens rea involves the question of whether the defen-
dant had the requisite state of mind-defined in terms such as malice,
willfulness, intent, knowledge, recklessness, or negligence 4 --as to one
38. HALL, supra note 1, at 381; see Jeffries, supra note 21, at 211 (concluding that fair
notice is not about "whether a trained professional, given access to the appropriate sources and
the time to consider them, would have foreseen the application of the law"); Dan M. Kahan,
Ignorance of Law Is An Excuse-But Only for The Virtuous, 96 MICH. L. REV. 127, 147 (1997)
(arguing that the criminal law "embodies moral norms that have an existence independent of
the law itself').
39. It should be clear already that what courts mean by "fair notice" is something less
than actual notice and "knowlege of illegality" includes constructive knowledge. See supra note
20.
40. Since at least the 12th century it has generally been accepted that mens rea is es-
sential to the imposition of criminal liability. See RICHARD J. BONNIE ET AL., CRIMRNAL LAW 116
(1997); see also JOEL PRENTISS BISHOP, CRIMINAL LAw § 287 (9th ed. 1930) ("It is therefore a
principle of our legal system, as probably it is of any other, that the essence of an offense is the
wrongful intent, without which it cannot exist."). Early conceptions of mens rea had the flavor
of "general moral blameworthiness" which apparently entailed an "unfocused judgment about
the general character and disposition of the actor." BONNIE ETAL., supra, at 118. Over time the
requirement of mens rea in the sense of "moral guilt came to be supplanted by the requirement
of specific forms of intent evolved separately for each particular felony." Francis Bowes Sayre,
Mens Rea, 45 HARV. L. REV. 974, 1019 (1932). See generally id. at 988-94, 1017 (tracing the
historical development of mens rea and concluding that the meaning of mens rea has evolved "to
mean, not so much a mind bent on evil-doing in the sense of moral wrong... as an intent to do
that which unduly endangers social or public interests"). The vocabulary of general moral
blameworthiness, however, has continued to persist in mens rea terms such as "bad faith," "evil
intent," "evil disposition [or] wrong or unlawful purpose," and "evil heart or purpose." See
generally BONNIE ET AL., supra, at 119.
41. One of the major contributions of the Model Penal Code was its use of a limited
number of carefully defined culpability terms-purpose, knowledge, recklessness, and negli-
gence-to replace the myriad and imprecise range of mens rea terms employed by the common
law. See generally PAUL ROBINSON, CRMINAL LAW § 4.1, at 211-12 (1997).
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or more elements of the crime. The concept of mens rea includes two
distinct, but closely related ideas:42  First, the defendant must be
aware of the facts that make her conduct criminal.4s For example, a
defendant who is convicted of transporting a hazardous substance in a
manner not consistent with federal regulations must know (or have
reason to know) that she was shipping sulfuric acid and not distilled
water.44 Similarly, an individual who honestly believed that the
property she allegedly stole was not the property of another would not
be guilty of theft.45 As criminal law theorists frame it, this notion of
mens rea, often called "ignorance or mistake of fact," is a limitation on
criminality in either of two ways: It excuses in the general sense that
proof that the defendant was mistaken about a fact "demonstrates
that, despite all appearances, he acted in a morally blameless man-
ner."4s Alternatively, it exculpates in the specific sense of negating a
particular element of mens rea contained in the definition of the crime
charged.47 The other notion of mens rea is awareness of wrongdoing.
42. See generally Herbert L. Packer, Mens Rea and the Supreme Court, 1962 SUP. CT.
REv. 107, 108-09.
43. The notion that mens rea requires at least some conscious appreciation of the relevant
facts suggests a state of mind defined by intent, knowledge, or at least recklessness. All of these
terms implicate some "state of awareness" of conduct or circumstances. MODEL PENAL CODE,
supra note 30, § 2.02 cmt., at 240. Negligence, on the other hand, is exemplified by the actor
who "inadvertently creates a substantial and unjustifiable risk of which he ought to be aware."
Id. Liability for negligence attaches "if given the nature and degree of the risk, his failure to
perceive it is, considering the nature and purpose of the actor's conduct and the circumstances
known to him, a gross deviation from the care that would be exercised by a reasonable person in
his situation." Id. at 240-41. There is some debate about whether a showing of negligence as to
one or more elements of the crime is enough to justify criminal liability. See generally HALL,
supra note 1, at 133-41 (arguing that negligence should not suffice for penal liability);
GLANVILLE WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL LAW: THE GENERAL PART § 36, at 100-03 (2d ed. 1961) (arguing
that negligence does not satisfy the ordinary requirement of criminal mens rea); Packer, supra
note 42, at 143-45 (viewing "negligence as an extension of rather than a departure from the
values symbolized by the mens rea concept" and embracing occasional use of the negligence
standard in criminal law). The Model Penal Code, however, has embraced negligence as suffi-
cient to satisfy the requirement of mens rea:
[Negligence as here defined, should not be wholly rejected as a ground of culpability
that may suffice for purposes of penal law, though it should properly not generally be
deemed sufficient in the definition of specific crimes and it should often be differentiated
from conduct involving higher culpability for the purposes of sentence.
MODEL PENAL CODE, supra note 30, § 2.02 cmt., at 243-44. The Model Penal Code default rule
when no mens rea is specified for an element of the offense is recklessness. Id. § 2.02(3), at 226.
44. See United States v. International Minerals & Chem. Corp., 402 U.S. 558, 563-64
(1971).
45. See Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246 (1952).
46. DRESSLER, supra note 30, § 12.02, at 134. The defendant who transports sulfuric acid,
reasonably believing it to be distilled water, falls into this category.
47. The distinction between these two approaches depends upon whether the crime at
issue is a "general intent" crime, where courts apply the "culpability" approach to mistake of
fact, or a "specific intent" crime, where courts apply an "elemental" approach. See generally id.
§ 12.02-.03, at 134-36 (contrasting specific intent, general intent, and strict liability offenses).
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For example, does the defendant who shipped sulfuric acid know that
there is a legal rule that makes her conduct criminal? It is "hornbook
law" that although ignorance or mistake of fact 48 negates criminal
liability, ignorance or mistake of criminal law-as we have already
seen-ordinarily does not.49
It is generally accepted that some minimal level of mens rea is
essential to the imposition of criminal liability.50 Quite often, more-
over, mens rea or mental awareness as to one or more elements of the
For an example of the latter approach, consider a defendant being tried under a statute
penalizing anyone who "knowingly converts the property of another." The defendant who
honestly believed that the property she allegedly stole was her own would lack the required
mens rea of knowledge. See, e.g., Morissette, 342 U.S. at 252 (holding that conviction for
knowingly converting federal property required that the defendant know the property was not
abandoned and noting that by requiring "mental culpability" courts have "sought to protect
those who were not blameworthy in mind from conviction of infamous common-law crimes"). In
such cases, "a mistake-of-fact claim is not a true defense but simply a failure of the prosecutor to
prove an essential element of the crime." DRESSLER, supra note 30, § 12.02, at 135.
48. There has been much ink spilt in discussing and categorizing various kinds of legal
and factual mistakes. One of the difficulties is that there is not always agreement about
whether a particular mistake is one of fact or one of (non-criminal) law and sometimes the
distinction seems to be only one of characterization. For example, was the mistake in
Morissette, 342 U.S. at 246, a mistake of fact or a mistake of property law? The defendant
claimed that he believed the property he allegedly converted-spent bomb casings from military
exercises-had been abandoned. Id. at 248-49. Characterized one way, the mistake appears to
be one of fact: Morissette thought the government had discarded the bomb casings and left
them for anyone to take. Just as plausibly, however, Morissette's mistake could be described as
one of non-criminal law: He did not realize that the casings were government property. See
generally BONNIE ET AL., supra note 40, at 134 & 165. In Morissette (and other cases involving
specific intent crimes) the characterization does not matter because both mistakes of fact and
mistakes of non-criminal law excuse the defendant if the mistake negates the specific intent
required by the governing statute. As to general intent crimes, however, the usual common law
rule is that while mistakes of fact are exculpatory, analogous mistakes of non-criminal law are
not. For example, in some states a woman could be convicted under a bigamy statute for
marrying a man whose divorce turned out to be invalid (mistake of non-criminal law), see State
v. Woods, 107 Vt. 354, 357 (1935), but not for marrying a man who fraudulently represented
himself to be unmarried (mistake of fact), at least if her belief was reasonable. See State v.
Audette, 81 Vt. 400, 404 (1908). Treating these two cases differently is hard to reconcile, and
courts have not provided much in the way of rationale save for the "reflexive invocation of the
principle that 'ignorance of the law is no excuse.'" BONNIE ET AL., supra note 40, at 166; see
HALL, supra note 1, at 377 (arguing that the "crucial difference is not between fact and law, but
between what is and what is not morally significant"). The Model Penal Code quite sensibly
treats mistakes of fact and non-criminal law as equally exculpatory to the extent that either
mistake negates mens rea as to a material element of the offense. See MODEL PENAL CODE,
supra note 30, § 2.04(1), at 267; see also DRESSLER, supra note 30, § 13.02, at 157 (arguing that
"one who believes that her conduct is lawful, based on a reasonable mistake of law, has acted
without culpability as to her mistake and, therefore, should be acquitted").
49. See Packer, supra note 42, at 108-09.
50. Although there is some controversy over whether negligence is enough to justify
criminal liability, see supra note 43, most of the controversy surrounds the question whether
strict liability can be the basis for criminal sanctions. See infra note 79. Importantly, however,
while the law virtually always requires some level of mens rea as to one or more of the elements
of the crime, mens rea as to the fact of illegality is ordinarily not required.
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crime will be crucial to distinguishing blameless from blameworthy
behavior.51 As the following examples illustrate, the requirement of
mens rea is closely related to ideas of fair notice. For example, mis-
takes that negate mens rea are exculpatory because a defendant who
acts "under circumstances that make the act criminal, but... is un-
aware of those circumstances, surely... has not had fair warning
that [her] conduct is criminal."52 Similarly, one of the primary objec-
tions to "strict criminal liability"--liability without mens rea53-is
that it could cause ordinarily law-abiding citizens to stumble inno-
cently into criminal behavior. Thus statutes that impose liability
without adequate mens rea and those that provide insufficient notice
suffer from the same defect: They may describe conduct that has no
"built-in" indicia of blameworthiness.
When criminal law "faithfully reflect[s] prevalent community
standards of minimally acceptable conduct," as in prohibitions against
homicide or assault, it is not difficult to reconcile the principle that
ignorance of the law is no excuse with the notion that mens rea is
essential to justify criminal liability.55  The problem occurs in situ-
ations involving minor or regulatory offenses, many of which criminal-
ize conduct under circumstances where the fact of illegality may not
be known, or even suspected, by the ordinary, law-abiding citizen.
51. See generally BoNNIE ET AL., supra note 40, at 114-68, 173 ("One of the major functions
of the mental element in crime is to draw the line between criminal and non-criminal behav-
ior."); Francis Bowes Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses, 33 COLUM. L. REV. 55, 56 (1933) ("Acts
alone are often colorless; it is the state of mind which makes all the difference between
innocence and criminality."); Richard A. Singer, The Resurgence of Mens Rea: III-The Rise and
Fall of Strict Criminal Liability, 30 B.C. L. Rev. 337, 363-73, 380-88 (1989) (identifying a trend
in American criminal law toward a tolerance of negligent or strict liability crimes as a decline in
"criminal law's concern with moral blameworthiness"); see, e.g., Morissette, 342 U.S. at 250
("[The requirement of mens rea] is no provincial or transient notion. It is as universal and
persistent in mature systems of law as belief in freedom of the human will and a consequent
ability and duty of the normal individual to choose between good and evil.").
52. Packer, supra note 42, at 123.
53. See infra notes 71-84 and accompanying text (discussing strict liability crimes).
54. See, e.g., Amicus Curiae Brief For Appellant at 11-12, Lambert v. United States, 355
U.S. 225 (1957) (No. 47) (urging reversal of defendant's conviction for violation of a registration
statute on the ground that "neither the [defendants] status nor her conduct provided any 'built-
in' notice that she was committing a crime"). See infra notes 102-32 and accompanying text
(discussing notice objections to regulatory offenses).
55. Packer, supra note 42, at 145. As Professor Hart noted:
If the legislature does a sound job of reflecting community attitudes and needs, actual
knowledge of the wrongfulness of the prohibited conduct will usually exist. Thus almost
everyone is aware that murder and forcible rape and the obvious forms of theft are
wrong. But in any event, knowledge of the wrongfulness can fairly be assumed. For any
member of the community who does these things without knowing that they are cri-
minal is blameworthy, as much for his lack of knowledge as for his actual conduct.
Hart, supra note 37, at 413.
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This, in part, was the concern in Lambert v. California.56 In Lambert,
the defendant was convicted for violating an ordinance requiring
felons, convicted in California or elsewhere, who remained in Los
Angeles for more than five days to register with the police de-
partment. 7 The Supreme Court struck down the registration provi-
sion on the ground that the defendant lacked fair notice.58 The
problem with the ordinance was that remaining in Los Angeles
without registering was not intrinsically bad behavior,59  and
"circumstances which might [have moved the defendant] to inquire as
to the necessity of registration [were] completely lacking."60 The
Court concluded that the defendant's default was "entirely innocent"
unless she had "actual knowledge of the duty to register or proof of
the probability of such knowledge and subsequent failure to comply."61
In other words, the statute was defective because it posed a
significant risk that the average, law-abiding citizen in the
defendant's situation could inadvertently violate it.62 Only "an
56. 355 U.S. 225 (1957).
57. See id. at 226-27.
58. See id. at 229-30. There were several aspects of the registration statute that seemed
to trouble the Justices: First, the statute punished an omission-failure to register-rather
than a commission; second, it was based on the defendant's status-being a felon in Los
Angeles-rather than on an activity; and third, the offense was malum prohibitum rather than
malum in se. See id. at 228-29. Dressler suggests that Lambert could be read to require that all
three of these factors be present before a statute raises fair notice concerns. See DRESSLER,
supra note 30, § 13.02, at 153; see, e.g., University Heights v. O'Leary, 429 N.E.2d 148, 151
(Ohio 1981) (rejecting due process challenge to firearms registration statute on the ground that
the violation was active rather than passive, the nature of the activity signaled the possibility of
regulation, and the gun registration law was not "solely for the convenience of law enforcement
agencies"). The Court's lack of clarity, as well as its failure adequately to distinguish earlier
cases such as United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250 (1922), United States v. Behrman, 258 U.S.
280 (1922), and United States v. Morissette, 342 U.S. 246 (1952), has created significant
confusion about how Lambert should be read. See generally Packer, supra note 42, at 120-22,
131-136, 149-50 (discussing the conflict between Morissette and Balint and the lack of resolution
in Lambert).
59. See Lambert, 355 U.S. at 228 ("[The defendant's conduct] is unlike the commission of
acts or the failure to act under circumstances that should alert the doer to the consequences of
his deed."); see also United States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601, 608 (1971) (noting as the salient factor
in Lambert that "[b]eing in Los Angeles is not per se blameworthy").
60. Lambert, 355 U.S. at 229 (emphasis added). The Court continued:
Where a person did not know of the duty to register and where there was no proof of the
probability of such knowledge, he may not be convicted consistently with due process.
Were it otherwise, the evil would be as great as it is when the law is written in print too
fine to read or in a language foreign to the community.
Id. at 229-30.
61. Id. at 229.
62. See generally Jeffries, supra note 21, at 211-12 (stating that Lambert stands for the
proposition that criminal liability is unacceptable "where the prototypically law-abiding individ-
ual in the actor's situation would have had no reason to act otherwise"); Kahan, supra note 38,
at 147 (stating that the mistake of law defense protects persons who "make mistakes about [ I
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intention not to comply with the ordinance despite knowledge of its
contents"63 made the conduct in Lambert blameworthy; knowledge of
illegality 4 served as a proxy for fault.
It should be noted that knowledge of illegality in the criminal
context is not a "proxy" in the sense in which the term is sometimes
used: Proxy often embodies notions of agency. For example, a "proxy"
might describe an individual who represents and acts for a principal. 65
In a related use, proxy denotes a characteristic or circumstance, "A",
that is employed to indicate the likely presence of another
characteristic or circumstance, "B", because the two are thought to be
highly correlated and A is easier to identify or measure than B. In
this usage, a proxy is of interest because it is thought to be evidence of
something else that is deemed important.6  Knowledge of illegality in
duties, which involve no independent moral obligation and which aren't a matter of common
civic knowledge").
63. See Amicus Curiae Brief For Appellant at 13, Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225
(1957) (No. 47).
64. It is not always clear in the criminal cases exactly what the courts mean by "notice" or
"knowledge of illegality"-whether actual knowledge, reason to know, or something else-and
courts' definitions of notice seem to change, even within the same case. For example, in Lam-
bert, the Supreme Court asserted that "[t]he question is whether a registration act of this
character violates due process where it is applied to a person who has no actual knowledge of his
duty to register, and where no showing is made of the probability of such knowledge." 355 U.S.
at 227 (emphasis added). The same confusion between actual notice and negligent or reckless
failure to know appears in the plurality opinion in Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945),
in which the Court construed the criminal analogue of section 1983 to require knowledge of
illegality. In Screws, the Court variously described the minimum required level of mens rea as
"specific intent to deprive a person of a [clear] federal right," id. at 103 (emphasis added),
"purpose to deprive the victim of a constitutional right," id. at 107 (emphasis added), and
"act[ing] in reckless disregard of constitutional prohibitions or guarantees, id. at 106 (emphasis
added). See generally BONNIE ET AL., supra note 40, at 117-18 (noting courts' inconsistency in
construing mens rea terms in criminal statutes); Frederick M. Lawrence, Civil Rights and
Criminal Wrongs: The Mens Rea of Federal Civil Rights Crimes, 67 TUL. L. REV. 2113, 2179-93
(1993) (criticizing the plurality opinion in Screws for its imprecision in describing the level of
mens rea required to avert vagueness concerns); Packer, supra note 42, at 132 (decrying courts'
lack of clarity in discussing issues of notice and mens rea). I argue that taken together, the
criminal cases stand for the idea that the defendant must either know, or have reason to know,
that her conduct was blameworthy, a state of mind probably akin to gross negligence or
recklessness.
65. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 20, at 1126.
66. For example, race is sometimes used as a proxy for diversity. See, e.g., Eugene
Volokh, Diversity, Race as a Proxy, and Religion as a Proxy, 43 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 2059, 2059
(1996) (arguing that a "reasonable, unprejudiced decisionmaker could certainly conclude that
race can sometimes be a useful proxy for ... intellectual diversity"). Gender may be used
(rightly or wrongly) as a proxy for characteristics such as strength or sensitivity. See, e.g., Mary
Anne Case, "The Very Stereotype the Law Condemns": Constitutional Sex Discrimination Law
As a Quest for Perfect Proxies (copy on file with author) (discussing sex-respecting rules as
proxies). Also, during World War II being Japanese-American was, sadly, used as a proxy for
disloyalty. See, e.g., Reggie Oh & Frank Wu, The Evolution of Race in the Law: The Supreme
Court Moves From Approving Internment of Japanese Americans to Disapproving Affirmative
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criminal law, however, is not only evidence of fault, it actually
constitutes fault in cases where only defendant's conscious awareness
of law-breaking makes her conduct blameworthy.67 Knowledge of
illegality fulfills the same function in cases like Lambert as is fulfilled
by the inherent wrongfulness of offenses such as homicide and
assault; it satisfies the requirement of criminal fault.68
Explicit constitutional holdings relying on Lambert-like rea-
soning, it must be conceded, occur relatively infrequently.6 9 Lambert
represents the unusual case where nothing in the defendant's circum-
stances would have led her even to consider the possibility of criminal
Action for African Americans, 1 MICH. J. RACE & L. 165, 173 (1996) (noting that during World
War II "race supposedly served as a proxy for disloyalty").
67. Notice in the qualified immunity context, however, is a proxy for fault in the more
technical sense that "clearly established law" is a surrogate for subjective bad faith. See infra
notes 223-26 and accompanying text.
68. The connection between mens rea and notice is more clearly articulated in the amicus
brief filed for appellant in Lambert than it is in the Supreme Court's opinions. See Amicus
Curiae Brief For Appellant at 12-20, Lambert v. United States, 355 U.S. 225 (1957) (No. 47).
See generally Packer, supra note 42, at 129-33 (discussing Amicus Brief for Appellant in
Lambert).
69. See, e.g., Roberts v. Maine, 48 F.3d 1287, 1300 (1st Cir. 1995) (citing Lambert in over-
turning a defendant's conviction under a state statute mandating 48-hour incarceration for
refusal to take a blood/alcohol test on the ground that '[ajbsent adequate notice that particular
conduct has been criminalized, a person may not be convicted or punished for it"); Sisson v.
United States, 630 F. Supp. 1026, 1032-33 (D. Ariz. 1986) (holding that a sergeant had no rea-
sonable notice that he was in violation of an Air Force regulation requiring that officials receive
permission before engaging in off-duty income producing activities); Hermanson v. State, 604
So. 2d 775, 776 (Fla. 1992) (holding that a state statute criminalizing child abuse and its spiri-
tual treatment accommodation provision are, when taken together, ambiguous and result in a
denial of due process because a "person of ordinary intelligence cannot be expected to under-
stand the extent to which reliance on spiritual healing is permitted and the point at which this
reliance constitutes a criminal offense"); State v. McKown, 461 N.W.2d 720, 723 (Minn. Ct. App.
1990) (affirming the dismissal of a manslaughter charge in the death of a child whose parents
failed to obtain medical care on religious grounds because "[tjhe manslaughter statute gives no
notice of when its broad proscription might override the seemingly contradictory permission
given by the child neglect statute to treat the child by such spiritual means"); State v.
Winkelman, 442 N.E.2d 811, 816 (Ohio Ct. App. 1981) (citing Lambert in overturning defen-
dant's conviction under a state law prohibiting anyone who has been indicted for or convicted of
a felony to possess a firearm on the ground that due process required notice of the defendant's
inclusion in the class of persons covered by the statute). But see, e.g., University Heights v.
Seay, 718 F.2d 1279, 1284-86 (4th Cir. 1983) (upholding the conviction for defrauding the
government of a federal beneficiary who failed to disclose her common law marriage when she
was asked whether she had remarried); Walker v. Superior Court, 763 P.2d 852, 872 (Cal. 1988)
(denying a due process challenge to a conviction for child abuse of parents who failed to obtain
medical help for their child on the ground that "persons relying on prayer treatment must
estimate rightly.., the point at which their course of conduct becomes criminally negligent");
Hall v. State, 493 N.E.2d 433, 435 (Ind. 1986) (rejecting a due process challenge); Common-
wealth v. Barnhart, 497 A.2d 616, 621, 627-28 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985) (same); State v. Drum-
monds, 334 N.E.2d 538, 540-42 (Ohio Ct. App. 1975) (distinguishing Lambert and upholding the
conviction under a statute prohibiting the possession of firearms by convicted felons because the
statute required "knowing possession" and its purpose was to protect health and safety).
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liability. Courts, however, often self-consciously construe criminal
statutes and decide criminal cases so as to avoid criminalizing inno-
cent conduct: conduct that a law-abiding citizen would have had no
reason to suspect was unlawful. Thus, although constitutional hold-
ings of lack of notice are relatively rare, the requirement of criminal
fault and the connection reflected in Lambert between fault and notice
are familiar and influential parts of the criminal landscape. 70
Consider, in that regard, a category of crimes that have been
labeled "public welfare"71 or "regulatory" offenses. Unlike most tra-
ditional crimes, regulatory crimes frequently involve conduct that is
not intrinsically wrongful, at least in the sense that homicide or as-
sault is wrongful. 72 When public welfare offenses began to appear in
American law in the early- to mid-nineteenth century,73 some courts
were willing to uphold criminal convictions under them without proof
that the defendant knew or should have known the facts that made
the conduct criminal. 74 Without the requirement of mens rea, the
defendant in such cases lacked the blameworthiness ordinarily re-
70. See generally Rollin M. Perkins, Criminal Liability Without Fault: A Disquieting
Trend, 68 IOWA L. REV. 1067, 1072 (1983) (discussing cases that reflect courts' "reluctance to
criminally punish a person before fault has been established"); Sayre, supra note 51, at 55
(noting the "almost unbroken line of authorit[y]" that "the essence of an offense is the wrongful
intent, without which it cannot exist"); Singer, supra note 51, at 372-73 (arguing that the
Supreme Court has never explicitly held that criminality without mens rea is constitutional).
71. The term "public welfare offenses" was given currency in an article of the same name
by Professor Sayre in 1933. See Sayre, supra note 51, at 55. Although a number of scholars had
recognized the trend toward criminal regulatory liability, Sayre's article was the first to suggest
that "a new kind of criminal offense might have been established." See Singer, supra note 51, at
373 (arguing that Sayre's article was "enormously influential" and that "its own mistakes were
perpetuated for many years to come").
72. This distinction is reflected in the labels "malum in se"-describing behavior that is
wrong in itself-and "malum prohibitum"--describing acts that are wrong because they are
prohibited. See generally HALL, supra note 1, at 337-42 (discussing the origins and historical
development of the distinction); Perkins, supra note 70, at 1072-77 (same).
73. The earliest examples of criminal regulation in American law were state and local
penal sanctions involving the sale of liquor and adulterated milk. See generally Sayre, supra
note 51, at 63-65 (discussing early criminal regulation).
74. For example, in a number of states, selling liquor to a minor could lead to criminal
liability-no matter how careful or reasonable the defendant had been-if the buyer turned out
to be underage. See Singer, supra note 51, at 365. By the mid- to late-nineteenth century some
courts had extended criminal regulatory enforcement without proof of mens rea from liquor and
adulterated milk to other kinds of police regulations. See Sayre, supra note 51, at 66 n.43.
Sayre argues that the growth of the criminal "public welfare offense" came about at a time
when:
the demands of the increasingly complex social order required additional regulation of
the administrative character unrelated to questions of personal guilt.... [T~he new
emphasis being laid upon the protection of social interests fostered the growth of a
specialized type of regulatory offense involving a social injury so direct and widespread
and a penalty so light that in such exceptional cases courts could safely override the
interests of the innocent individual defendants and punish without proof of guilty intent.
Id. at 67-68.
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quired to justify criminal liability.75 The advent and proliferation of
criminal liability in this class of cases 76-sometimes called "strict
liability" crimes 77-was met with unease in the courts78 and contro-
versy in the literature. 79 The dispute over criminalization of regula-
tory misbehavior, though often framed in terms of mens rea, impli-
75. See Sayre, supra note 51, at 67 (noting that public welfare offenses used the machin-
ery of criminal law to enforce "a new type of twentieth century regulatory measure involving no
moral delinquency").
76. See infra notes 80-82 (suggesting that strict liability crimes were not as prevalent as
some scholars argue).
77. As a number of commentators and courts have pointed out, much of what is called
"strict liability" is not actually liability without any mens rea: "Indeed, there is no such thing as
a 'strict liability' offense except in terms of a partial rather than a complete discarding of mens
rea, since there is always some element of any offense with respect to which a mental element is
attached." Packer, supra note 42, at 140. For example, bigamy and statutory rape are often
regarded as examples of strict criminal liability. But in both cases, it is the exclusion of mens
rea as to a circumstance element-in the bigamy context, the circumstance that one or both
parties is still legally married to someone else, and as to statutory rape, the circumstance that
the alleged victim is under the age of consent-that results in the strict liability characteriza-
tion. Two other important examples of strict liability for "real crimes" as opposed to regulatory
crimes, are felony-murder and misdemeanor-manslaughter statutes. These statutes impose
liability for homicide without evidence of mens rea as to the result, i.e., the death of the victim.
See, e.g., Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 607 n.3 (1994) (noting that "the term 'strict
liability' is really a misnomer" as applied to offenses construed to require the defendant to know,
for example, that he is "dealing with some dangerous or deleterious substance"). See generally
BONNIE ET AL., supra note 40, at 199-202; Packer, supra note 42, at 140-42 (discussing felony-
murder and misdemeanor-manslaughter rules). Real strict liability would mean that the "sole
question put to the jury is whether the jury believes the defendant to have committed the act
proscribed by the statute." Richard A. Wasserstrom, Strict Liability in Criminal Law, 12 STAN.
L. REV. 731, 733 (1960).
78. See, e.g., Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246,256 (1952) (noting that courts have
had "misgivings" about enforcing criminal liability without fault for public welfare offenses);
People ex rel. Price v. Sheffield Farms-Slawson-Decker Co., 121 N.E. 474, 476-77 (N.Y. 1918)
(Cardozo, J.) (justifying conviction for mala prohibita violations only because they were punish-
able by moderate fine and no imprisonment); MODEL PENAL CODE, supra note 30, § 1.04 cmt., at
72 (noting that imprisonment is never appropriate for malum prohibitum offenses).
79. See, e.g., Perkins, supra note 70, at 1081 (arguing that the "modern trend," even as to
mala prohibita offenses, is to require mens rea and that strict liability for crimes malum in se
"catapult[s] us back to the dark ages"). Among the literature discussing strict liability, see, for
example, HALL, supra note 1, at 342-59 (refuting arguments for strict criminal liability);
WILLIAMS, supra note 43, at § 89, at 255-61 (discussing arguments for and against strict
criminal liability); Hart, supra note 37, at 422-25 (arguing against strict liability); Gerhard 0.
W. Mueller, Mens Rea and the Law Without It, 58 W. VA. L. REV. 34 (1955) (analyzing mens rea
and mala prohibita crimes); Ingeborg Paulus, Strict Liability: Its Place in Public Welfare
Offenses, 20 CRIM. L.Q. 445 (1978) (defending the use of strict liability for public welfare
offenses); G. L. Peiris, Strict Liability in Commonwealth Criminal Law, 3 LEGAL STUD. 117
(1983) (comparing strict liability doctrines in Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Asia, and
Africa); Sayre, supra note 40, at 974 (tracing the development of the mens rea requirement);
Singer, supra note 51, at 389-407 (responding to the arguments in favor of strict liability);
W.T.S. Stallybrass, The Eclipse ofMens Rea, 52 LAW. Q. REV. 60 (1932) (discussing mens rea
requirements and strict liability); James E. Starrs, The Regulatory Offense in Historical
Perspective, in ESSAYS IN CRIUMINAL SCIENCE 235 (Gerhard O.W. Mueller ed., 1961) (arguing
against strict liability for regulatory offenses); Wasserstrom, supra note 77, at 731 (rejecting the
argument that all strict liability is unjustifiable).
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cates precisely the kinds of concerns raised in Lambert: Defendants
who violate regulatory statutes that do not require proof of mens rea
as to particular elements of the defendant's conduct or circumstances
may have no reason to think they are acting unlawfully. In other
words, they may be wholly innocent of criminal wrongdoing.
While strict criminal liability was apparently tolerated to some
degree by state courts in the mid-nineteenth and into the twentieth
century, it remained controversial. Strict liability was also less com-
mon than was once thought 8° and it was largely limited to particular
contexts.8' Moreover, for precisely the reasons outlined above, courts
frequently found ways to avoid enforcing regulatory crimes without
mens rea 2 and, in more recent times, the drafters of the Model Penal
Code have taken a strong position against the imposition of strict
criminal liability.s
80. In an exhaustive review of the history of public welfare offenses, Singer disputes the
conclusions of Sayre and others as to the widespread proliferation of strict criminal liability in
the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. See generally Singer, supra note 51, at 363-88. Singer
argues that the majority of strict liability offenses in the late nineteenth century dealt with the
control of liquor and the protection of minors and not with public health or welfare. See id. In
addition, he argues that many courts continued to require a showing of guilty knowledge in such
cases and many allowed a defense of reasonable mistake. See id. Singer concludes that the so-
called "explosion' of strict liability during the latter part of the nineteenth century is
exaggerated, at best." Id. at 363. In the last 30 years of the twentieth century, as well, Singer
observes a "marked movement away from strict liability criminality" highlighted by the Model
Penal Code's rejection of strict liability crimes. Id. at 374.
81. Singer points out that of the cases cited by Sayre in support of his conclusion that
strict liability in the nineteenth century was widespread, 30% involved the regulation of liquor
and another 10% concerned either the transportation of liquor or the corruption of minors. See
id. at 368. Far from supporting the conclusion that "the nineteenth century blossomed in strict
liability criminal statutes," according to Singer, "a fairer reading of the cases shows that, [only]
in a few isolated areas, almost all of which were the obvious targets of specialized political forces
(what today would be called one-issue interest groups), there were decisions favoring the
imposition of criminal liability without requiring mens rea." Id. at 372.
82. See generally Packer, supra note 42, at 149 (noting as "encouraging evidence" that
state courts are paying more attention to the "centrality of mens rea" and that state courts are
willing to invalidate legislation that is construed to dispense with mens rea and are less willing
to assume the "dogma that legislatures mean to dispense with mens rea by failing explicitly to
provide for it"); Perkins, supra note 70, at 1078-79 (arguing that mala prohibita crimes are not
generally enforced on the basis of liability without fault because, although fault is presumed,
the defendant can introduce exculpatory evidence to establish the lack of fault); Singer, supra
note 51, at 363-73, 380-89 (citing instances in which courts mitigated strict liability by requiring
knowledge or by permitting reasonable mistake as a defense).
83. The drafters of the Model Penal Code rejected strict liability crimes, permitting only
strict liability "violations," which are punishable by fine, forfeiture, or other civil penalty and
conviction of which does not give rise to the disabilities that accompany a criminal conviction.
See MODEL PENAL CODE, supra note 30, §§ 1.04(5) & 2.05, at 66 & 281. The drafters opted for
negligence as the minimal requirement of criminal intent with a default rule of recklessness
where the statute is silent on mens rea as to any particular element of the crime. See id. § 2.02,
at 225-26. See generally Singer, supra note 51, at 380-89 (discussing the influence of the Model
Penal Code in the debate over strict liability).
QUALIFIED IMMUNITY
In a series of modern federal regulatory cases, which I discuss
below, the courts have again confronted instances of criminal liability
in which defendants may lack the degree of culpability ordinarily
required to support penal sanctions. In these cases notice of illegal-
ity-mens rea as to the content of the law-has served as a lightning
rod for concerns about criminalizing innocent behavior.M
B. Notice as a Proxy for Fault
In a series of cases construing federal criminal regulatory
statutes, the Supreme Court has taken two seemingly conflicting
approaches to issues of notice: In one group of cases involving so-
called "public welfare offenses"-for example, possessing unregistered
hand grenades,8 shipping mislabeled drugs or chemicals,86 or
transporting dangerous chemicals through congested, metropolitan
areas87-the Court has taken a "traditional crimes" approach, up-
holding criminal sanctions with no explicit inquiry into the
defendant's knowledge of illegality. By contrast, in another group of
cases-involving, for example, tax offenses, 88 unauthorized use of food
stamps, 9 and structuring of currency transactions0the Court has
required proof that the defendant knew her conduct was illegal. The
difference between the Court's approaches in the two groups of cases
rests on the connection between fault and notice.
The statutes at issue in these cases are problematic to the
extent they target conduct that is not inherently wrongful. If nothing
in the nature of the prohibited conduct, even if done intentionally or
knowingly, would signal the defendant that her behavior was subject
to regulation and might be illegal,91 even a requirement of mens rea as
to the elements of the crime may not ensure that the defendant is
blameworthy. These cases are formally couched in terms of statutory
84. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Does 'Unlawful" Mean Criminal?: Reflections on the Disap-
pearing Tort/Crime Distinction in American Law, 71 B.U. L. REV. 193, 207 (1991) (noting that
criminalizing behavior that is not inherently culpable raises fair notice concerns).
85. See United States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601, 607 (1971).
86. See United States v. International Minerals & Chem. Corp., 402 U.S. 558, 565 (1971).
87. See Boyce Motor Lines, Inc. v. United States, 342 U.S. 337, 340 (1952).
88. See Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 194 (1991).
89. See Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 425 (1985).
90. See Ratzlafv. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 137 (1994).
91. LaFave and Scott make this point in discussing notice issues raised by statutory
vagueness. They argue that the requirement of scienter does not necessarily cure vagueness
concerns because "it is possible willfully to bring about certain results and yet be without fair
warning that such conduct is proscribed." WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. Scott, JR., 1
SUBSTANTIVE CRM4INAL LAW § 2.3, at 130-31 (1986) (emphasis added).
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construction: The Court purports to ask whether Congress intended
the statutes at issue to require knowledge of illegality. The inquiry
that explains the results in these cases, however, is whether, apart
from such knowledge, the defendant can be deemed blameworthy. In
other words, is there something about the violation or the defendant's
circumstances that should have alerted her to the probability of
regulation or is knowledge of illegality the only element of
blameworthiness in the definition of the crime?
The group of cases involving so-called "public welfare offenses"
is illustrated by United States v. Freed.92 The defendant in Freed was
convicted under a federal statute making it unlawful for any person
"to receive or possess a firearm which is not registered to him."93 The
defendant tried to overturn his conviction by arguing that he did not
know the hand grenades at issue were unregistered. The Court held
that the only knowledge required to be proven was that the
instrument possessed was a grenade, which fell within the statutory
definition of "firearm."94 The Court rejected the defendant's argument
that the statute should be construed to require knowledge that
possessing an unregistered grenade was illegal.95 The Court reasoned
that "one would hardly be surprised to learn that possession of hand
grenades is not an innocent act."96 Unlike the conduct at issue in
Lambert, possession of hand grenades is sufficiently unusual and
dangerous that it cannot be said that "circumstances which might
move one to inquire as to the necessity of registration are completely
lacking."97 As the Court explained in United States v. International
Minerals & Chemical Corp. ,98 a case involving the transportation of
92. 401 U.S. 601 (1971).
93. 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d) (1968, Supp. V), quoted in Freed, 401 U.S. at 607.
94. See Freed, 401 U.S. at 607 (concluding that the district court should not have dis-
missed the indictment for lack of an allegation of scienter).
95. See id.
96. Id. at 609. Many of the firearms covered by the act were "major weapons" of a sort not
generally used or possessed by ordinary citizens such as "machine guns and sawed-off shotguns;
deceptive weapons such as flashlight guns and fountain pen guns; and major destructive devices
such as bombs, grenades, mines, rockets and large caliber weapons including mortars, anti-tank
guns, and bazookas." Id. at 616 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment).
97. Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225, 229 (1957).
98. 402 U.S. 558 (1971). In International Minerals, the defendant, a manufacturer of acid,
was convicted of shipping sulfuric acid in interstate commerce in violation of federal regulations
requiring certain information to appear on the shipping documents. The Court held that actual
knowledge of the regulation was not required, reasoning that where "dangerous or deleterious
devices or products or obnoxious waste materials are involved, the probability of regulation is so
great that anyone who is aware that he is in possession of them or dealing with them must be
presumed to be aware of the regulation." Id. at 564-65. Criminal liability of this sort against
shippers of hazardous chemicals-sophisticated repeat players who are required by law to be
conversant with legal regulations governing their trade-raises no concerns about criminalizing
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sulfuric acid, regulation of hazardous materials or instrumentalities
is not like regulation of "[p]encils, dental floss, [or] paper clips" which
"may be the type of products [that] might raise substantial due
process questions if Congress did not require... 'mens rea' as to each
ingredient of the offense."9
Criminal liability can be defended in cases like Freed and
International Minerals on the ground that those who handle items
which by their very nature pose an obvious risk to public safety
should not be surprised to find those items are subject to regulation.
The defendants in these cases were not in a position analogous to the
defendant in Lambert, who had no reason even to inquire about the
possibility of legal regulation of her mere presence in Los Angeles.
Rather, the potential dangerousness of the defendant's product or
activity was enough to signal the likelihood of legal obligations in
connection with those products and activities. Under such circum-
stances the failure to know the applicable legal rules itself entailed
some degree of fault.1°° In these cases notice is important in that the
innocent behavior. See also United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250 (1922) (upholding a conviction
for selling narcotics against defendant's claim that he did not know the drugs were covered by
the federal act).
99. International Minerals, 402 U.S. at 564, 565. The Supreme Court's holding in Staples
v. United States, 511 U.S. 600 (1994), is not to the contrary. In Staples, the defendant was
convicted for possessing an unregistered firearm in violation of the same statute at issue in
Freed. The weapon was a semi-automatic model that would not have required registration
except that it had been modified-allegedly unbeknownst to the defendant-to enable it to fire
automatically. See id. at 603-04. The Court held that the statute required knowledge of the
automatic character of the weapon just as in Freed where the defendant had to "know" the item
he possessed was a hand grenade and in International Minerals where the defendant had to
know that he was transporting sulfuric acid rather than distilled water. See id. at 619. The
Court reasoned that "there is a long tradition of widespread lawful gun ownership by private
individuals in this country" which "did not apply to the possession of hand grenades." Id. at 610.
Thus, without knowledge of the automatic nature of the weapon the statute would "impose
criminal sanctions on a class of persons whose mental state-ignorance of the characteristics of
weapons in their possession-makes their actions entirely innocent." Id. at 614-15. The Court
continued:
Of course, we might surely classify certain categories of guns-no doubt including the
machineguns, sawed-off shotguns, and artillery pieces that Congress has subjected to
regulation-as items the ownership of which would have the same quasi-suspect charac-
ter we attributed to owning hand grenades in Freed. But precisely because guns falling
outside those categories traditionally have been widely accepted as lawful possessions,
their destructive potential [alone] cannot be said to put gun owners sufficiently on notice
of the likelihood of regulation to justify interpreting [the statute] as not requiring proof
of knowledge of a weapon's characteristics.
Id. at 611-12. Although Staples could be considered a case of mistake of fact rather than law,
the point is that the Court read the statute to require a showing that the defendant knew
something that would have alerted him to the likelihood that his weapon would be regulated;
that was especially important where the penalty for violating the statute was 10 years in prison.
100. Defendants who commit regulatory offenses are at fault in the sense that there is a
"conscious intent to engage in... [an] activity... which the defendant knew or should have
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defendant had to know something, if only the likely existence of the
regulatory statute or "sufficient facts to alert [her] to the probability
of regulation of [her] potentially dangerous conduct."1 l Once it is
established, however, that the defendant had reason to know her ac-
tivities were subject to regulation, the defendant will not be heard to
argue that she lacked fair notice. No separate inquiry into whether
the defendant actually knew the legal rules is required.
In the second group of regulatory cases, however, the require-
ment of blameworthiness has been deemed to require actual knowl-
edge of illegality. The Supreme Court reached that conclusion in a
line of tax cases involving federal criminal prosecutions for "willfully"
failing to pay income tax, file a return, keep certain records, or
provide required information.0 2 As noted above, it is ordinarily
sufficient to satisfy the requirement of criminal blameworthiness that
the prohibited acts were done with scienter, regardless of whether the
defendant knew the acts were illegal.1o 3 In the tax context, however,
the Court concluded that blameworthiness required "voluntary,
intentional violation of a known legal duty."1°4 In other words, only
knowledge of the illegality of defendant's actions satisfied the
requirement of criminal fault. The Court reasoned that the
complexity of the tax laws created a trap for the innocent taxpayer
who was seeking in good faith to comply.10 5 Requiring knowledge of
illegality would ensure that only blameworthy rather than merely
known to be subject to criminal sanctions if certain consequences ensued." Wasserstrom, supra
note 77, at 743. The Supreme Court explained in Staples that:
In... situations [involving public welfare statutes] we have reasoned that as long as a
defendant knows that he is dealing with a dangerous device of a character that places
him "in responsible relation to a public danger," he should be alerted to the possibility of
strict regulation, and... the defendant [must] "ascertain at his peril whether [his con-
duct] comes within the inhibition of the statute."
511 U.S. at 607-08 & n.3; see also Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 256 (1952) ("The
accused, if he does not will the violation [of a public welfare offense], usually is in a position to
prevent it with no more care than society might reasonably expect and no more exertion than it
might reasonably exact from one who assumed his responsibilities."). It must be conceded that
the fault being described here is that of failing to know the law; the defendant is being punished
because she should have known better. See generally Hart, supra note 37, at 419 (arguing that
"the crime of ignorance of the statutes or their interpretation" involves "blame of a very
distinctive kind" that is "largely unrelated, in gravity or any other respect, to the external
conduct itself, or its consequences, for which the actor is purportedly convicted"); Jeffries, supra
note 21, at 209 (noting that if ignorance of the law is justified on the grounds that it creates an
incentive to know the law, the "unawareness of illegality is itself the wrong" that is being
punished).
101. Posters WN Things, Ltd. v. United States, 511 U.S. 513, 522 (1994).
102. The first case in the series was United States v. Murdock, 290 U.S. 389 (1933).
103. See supra notes 36-39 and accompanying text.
104. United States v. Bishop, 412 U.S. 346, 360 (1973).
105. See id. at 360-61.
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inadvertent violators would be subject to penal sanctions. 06 The
Court solidly reaffirmed this view more recently in Cheek v. United
States,'07 in which the defendant was convicted under statutory
provisions imposing criminal liability on anyone who "willfully
attempts in any manner to evade or defeat any tax imposed by [Title
261" or who "fails to... make... a return."'08 The defendant in Cheek
claimed that based on "indoctrination" he had received from attending
seminars by anti-tax advocates (including lawyers giving advice on
the constitutionality of the income tax) and, based on his own study,
he sincerely believed that the tax laws were being unconstitutionally
enforced and that his behavior was lawful.'0 9 The Court reaffirmed
that the tax laws "carv[e] out an exception to the traditional rule" that
ignorance of the law is not an excuse.110 The Court explained that:
[t]he proliferation of statutes and regulations has sometimes made it difficult
for the average citizen to know and comprehend the extent of the duties and
obligations imposed by the tax laws. Congress has accordingly softened the
impact of the common-law presumption by making specific intent to violate the
law an element of certain federal criminal tax offenses."'
Significantly, the defendant in Cheek was not excused to the extent
that his failure to comply resulted from his views about the
constitutional validity of the tax laws rather than an honest mistake
106. The Court explained that its "consistent interpretation of the word 'willfully' to require
an element of mens rea implements the pervasive intent of Congress to construct penalties that
separate the purposeful tax violator from the well-meaning, but easily confused, mass of tax-
payers." Id. at 361. See generally United States v. Pomponio, 429 U.S. 10 (1976) (per curiam)
(citing Bishop in requiring a voluntary and intentional violation of the law, but clarifying that
evil motive is nothing more than specific intent).
107. 498 U.S. 192, 193-94 (1991).
108. 26 U.S.C. §§ 7201, 7203 (1994).
109. See Cheek, 498 U.S. at 195-96.
110. Id. at 200.
111. Id. at 199-200. The Court held that it is enough to negate the willfulness requirement
if the defendant honestly believed she was acting lawfully, regardless of whether the belief was
reasonable. See id. at 200. The Court purported merely to be construing the statute; however,
it is clear that the impulse for the holding was the desire'to avoid criminalizing innocent behav-
ior. See also United States v. Harris, 942 F.2d 1125, 1131-32 (7th Cir. 1991) (overturning cri-
minal tax convictions where issue was sufficiently unsettled in the law that defendants "could
not have ascertained the legal standards applicable to their conduct"); United States v. Mallas,
762 F.2d 361, 363 (4th Cir. 1985) (reversing defendant's conviction for tax evasion because the
prosecution's theory was "far too tenuous and competing interpretations of the applicable law
far too reasonable to justify [the] conviction[]"); United States v. Garber, 607 F.2d 92, 100 (5th
Cir. 1979) (reversing the conviction for failure to report income gained by selling blood plasma
because "the tax question was completely novel and unsettled by any clearly relevant
precedent"). But see United States v. MacKenzie, 777 F.2d 811, 816-17 (2d Cir. 1985) (upholding
the conviction for tax evasion and conspiracy on the ground that the statute requiring
employers to withhold taxes from employee wages was not impermissibly vague).
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arising from the complexity of the tax code. On the constitutional
issue, he acted with "full knowledge of the provisions at issue and a
studied conclusion, however wrong, that those provisions are invalid
and unenforceable.""2 Thus, the concerns about lack of blamewor-
thiness that gave rise to the ignorance of law defense in the tax
context were not implicated."3
The Court's approach in a number of recent cases outside of
the tax context can also be attributed to concerns about criminaliza-
tion without fault. In these cases, the Court again construed words
requiring scienter, such as "knowingly" or "willfully," to require not
only knowledge or willfulness as to conduct or circumstances, but
knowledge or willfulness as to the illegality of the prohibited conduct.
The offenses at issue in these cases did not involve dangerous
activities or instrumentalities that could have provided the necessary
signal of likely regulation. Accordingly, the Court required knowledge
of illegality as a proxy for fault because dispensing with the
knowledge requirement would have eliminated the "only morally
blameworthy element in the definition of the crime.""4 For example,
in Liparota v. United States,1 5 the defendant, a restaurant owner not
authorized to receive food stamps, was convicted under a statute that
subjects to criminal penalties anyone who "knowingly uses, transfers,
acquires, alters, or possesses [food stamps] in any manner not
authorized by [law and regulations]." 1 6 The government urged that
the statute was satisfied if the defendant knew he was possessing or
using food stamps regardless of whether he knew that such
112. Cheek, 498 U.S. at 205-06.
113. A defendant's success in raising an ignorance of law defense does not, of course,
guarantee acquittal. The jury can infer knowledge of the law from the circumstances
surrounding the alleged offense as well as from the defendant's education and experience. See,
e.g., Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 615 n.11 (1994) (noting that knowledge of the
automatic nature of a firearm could be inferred from "circumstantial evidence, including
external indications signaling the nature of the weapon"); Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S.
419, 434 (1985) (holding that the '[g]overnment may prove by reference to facts and
circumstances surrounding the case that [the defendant] knew that his conduct was
unauthorized").
114. Liparota, 471 U.S. at 423.
115. Id. at 419.
116. 7 U.S.C. § 2024(b)(1) (1994). The statute provides in relevant part:
[W]hoever knowingly uses, transfers, acquires, alters, or possesses coupons or authori-
zation cards in any manner not authorized by this chapter or the regulations issued pur-
suant to this chapter shall, if such coupons or authorization cards are of a value of $100
or more, be guilty of a felony and shall, upon the first conviction thereof, be fined not
more than $10,000 or imprisoned for not more than five years, or both.
Id. The issue in the case was whether the defendant had to "know" that his use of food stamps
was not authorized. See Liparota, 471 U.S. at 420-21.
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possession or use was unlawful. 117 The Court disagreed, reasoning
that criminal regulation of food stamps risked prosecution of "third
parties who may well have had no opportunity to acquaint themselves
with the rules."118 The Court noted that the government's reading was
a plausible one but ultimately rejected it largely to avoid
"criminaliz[ing] a broad range of apparently innocent conduct."119 For
example, without the requirement of knowledge of illegality, a person
could be convicted for purchasing food stamps from a store that,
unbeknownst to her, charged higher than normal prices to food-stamp
users. 120
Most recently, in Ratzlaf v. United States,121 the Court con-
strued criminal statutes prohibiting individuals from "structuring a
transaction"--breaking a single transaction into multiple transac-
tions---"for the purpose of evading" a financial institution's obligation
to report cash transactions of more than $10,000.122 The defendant
argued that the statute required proof not only that he knew his be-
havior would avoid the bank's reporting requirement but also that he
knew it was illegal to do so.12 The Court agreed, reasoning that the
conduct being regulated was not "inevitably nefarious" apart from
knowledge of illegality. The Court found that there are myriad rea-
sons why a person might structure transactions of various sorts to
avoid the effects of taxes or regulations that are unrelated to the
kinds of criminal activities, such as laundering of drug money and tax
117. See Liparota, 471 U.S. at 423.
118. Id. at 430.
119. Id. at 426. The Court noted the connection between the background assumption that
mens rea is required and the avoidance of criminalizing innocent behavior. See id. at 425-26.
120. See id. at 426. The dissent argued that the food-stamp user who was overcharged
could not be convicted unless she knew the "circumstances of the transaction that made it
illegal," presumably the fact that the storeowner was price discriminating. Id. at 437 (White, J.,
dissenting). Awareness of the fact of the overcharge, however, would not be enough to answer
the majority's objection because such awareness would provide no signal to the ordinary food-
stamp user that she was acting unlawfully.
121. 510 U.S. 135 (1994).
122. 31 U.S.C. §§ 5311-25 (1994). The statute provides in relevant part:
No person shall for the purpose of evading the reporting requirements of section 5313(a)
[requiring financial institutions to report certain transactions]
(3) structure or assist in structuring, or attempt to structure or assist in structur-
ing, any transaction with one or more domestic financial institutions.
Id. § 5324. The criminal enforcement provision at issue provides in relevant part:
A person willfully violating this subchapter [31 U.S.C. § 5311-25] or a regulation
prescribed under this subehapter... shall be fined not more than $250,000, or impris-
oned for not more than five years, or both.
Id. § 5322(a).
123. SeeRatzlaf, 510 U.S. at 138.
1998] 611
612 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 51:583
evasion, that Congress sought to check through the legislation at
issue.124
The lower courts have followed the Supreme Court's lead,
construing a number of other federal statutes to require knowledge of
illegality, for example, in criminal prosecutions for interstate wager-
ing,12 5 violations of the Bank Secrecy Act, 12s violations of the Trading
124. See id. at 144 & n.11. Similar concerns also help to explain the Court's decision in
United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64 (1994). In X-Citement Video the defendant
challenged his conviction for "knowingly... ship[ping] in interstate... commerce... any
visual depiction... involv[ing] the use of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct." See id.
at 65-68 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2252(1)(A)). The issue was whether the statute should be
construed to require knowledge of either or both the nature of the materials and the fact that
the performer was a minor. The most natural reading, according to the Ninth Circuit, was to
apply "knowingly" to neither of those two elements. The Supreme Court rejected that reading,
requiring knowledge as to both elements, based on the presumption that a scienter requirement
"should apply to each of the statutory elements which criminalize otherwise innocent conduct."
Id. at 72 (emphasis added). Against the background of First Amendment protection of non-
obscene, sexually explicit materials involving adults, the Court concluded that "one would
reasonably expect to be free from regulation when trafficking in [protected materials]" and
"[tiherefore, the age of the performers is the crucial element separating legal innocence from
wrongful conduct." Id.; see also Posters ' Things, Ltd. v. United States, 511 U.S. 513, 521-22
(1994) (refusing to dispense with intent requirement in a statute criminalizing the use of the
mail to sell "any equipment ... which is primarily intended... for use with illegal drugs" but
construing "primarily intended" to refer to the equipment's likely use rather than to the
defendant's subjective state of mind).
125. See, e.g., Cohen v. United States, 378 F.2d 751, 756 (9th Cir. 1967) (construing 18
U.S.C. § 1084(a) (1964) to require knowledge of illegality because in the defendant's state "the
conduct prohibited [using the telephone to transmit bets or wagers] ... would be a neutral act,
free of culpability unless the actor were aware of the statutory prohibition"). Although the
Tenth Circuit came to the contrary conclusion in United States v. Blair, 54 F.3d 639, 641 (10th
Cir. 1995), construing section 1804(a) not to require knowledge of illegality, Richard Murphy
and Erin O'Hara speculate that the difference in the cases is explained by the fact that
gambling is generally illegal in all of the states in the Tenth Circuit but not in Nevada, where
the events at issue in Cohen took place. See Richard S. Murphy & Erin A. O'Hara, Mistake of
Federal Criminal Law: A Study of Coalitions and Costly Information, 5 Sup. CT. ECON. REV.
217, 264-65 n.117 (1997) (explaining the difference between the cases in terms of information
costs). Thus, unlike in Cohen, the court in Blair would have had no reason to worry that
knowledge of illegality provided the only element of blameworthiness in the definition of the
offense.
126. In United States v. San Juan, 545 F.2d 314 (2d Cir. 1976), the defendant was con-
victed under 31 U.S.C. § 1058, which makes it a crime "willfully" to violate a provision requiring
anyone who transports into the United States monetary instruments exceeding $5,000 to file a
report with the U.S. Customs Service. The court overturned defendant's conviction because
"[w]ithout proof of any knowledge of, or notice to, Mrs. San Juan of the reporting requirements,
a jury could not determine beyond a reasonable doubt that she had the requisite willful intent."
Id. at 318. The court noted that because the reporting provisions "require the registration of an
otherwise innocent item.., on which a duty is not generally collected.., the Government
should make some effort to bring the reporting requirement to the traveler's attention." Id. at
319. The court reasoned similarly in United States v. Granda, overturning a conviction under
the Bank Secrecy Act:
The isolated act of bringing money in excess of $5,000 into the country is not illegal or
even immoral. What is required is merely a filing of a proper form. Proof of the requi-
site knowledge and willfulness, therefore, is almost impossible unless affirmative steps
are taken by the government to make the laws' requirements known.
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With the Enemy Act,127 violations of the Arms Export Control Act,128
and violations of registration requirements under the Narcotics
Control Act.129 In addition, several recent cases have invoked
RatzlaP30 in construing federal statutes involving firearms's' and
federal elections law to require knowledge of illegality.132
565 F.2d 922, 926 (5th Cir. 1978); see also United States v. Schnaiderman, 568 F.2d 1208, 1211
n.8 (5th Cir. 1978) ("In a case [under the Bank Secrecy Act] the proper instruction would include
some discussion of the defendant's ignorance of the law since the defendant's alleged ignorance
of the reporting requirements goes to the heart of his or her denial of the specific intent neces-
sary to commit the crime."); cf. United States v. Dichne, 612 F.2d 632, 637-38 (2d Cir. 1979)
(holding that there was sufficient evidence to support a finding that the defendant had
knowledge of the reporting requirement where the government had placed a number of large
posters in the airport and given verbal warnings over the public address system in the airport
terminal, co-conspirator statements indicated efforts to avoid reporting, and defendant was a
knowledgeable import-export broker).
127. In United States v. Frade, 709 F.2d 1387, 1392 (11th Cir. 1983), the court held that
conviction for "willful" violation of the Trading With the Enemy Act, 50 U.S.C., App. § 5(b), and
regulations promulgated thereunder, required proof that the defendants knew the "necessity for
obtaining, and the possibility of obtaining [the required] license." The defendants' convictions
resulted from their actions in connection with the 1980 Mariel boatlift of refugees from Cuba.
The court reasoned that the regulation under which defendants were convicted "criminalized
behavior (travel to, from, and within Cuba), which previously had been expressly authorized in
[a] published regulation... and which, in fact, remained lawful, except when done in connection
with the transportation of Cuban nationals, an activity which also is not generally criminal."
Frade, 709 F.2d at 1391; cf. United States v. Macko, 994 F.2d 1526, 1533-35 (11th Cir. 1993)
(holding that there was sufficient circumstantial evidence-based on defendants' efforts to
conceal their activities, their possession of brochures outlining the applicable regulations, and
their experience in the import-export business-to sustain the jury's conclusion that defendants
knew they were violating Cuban trade embargo regulations under the Trading With the Enemy
Act).
128. See, e.g., United States v. Golitschek, 808 F.2d 195, 197 (2d Cir. 1986) (reversing the
conviction of an Austrian citizen who was the subject of an undercover "sting" operation con-
ducted by the U.S. Customs Service on the ground that there was insufficient evidence of a
"willful" violation, which required a showing of knowledge of illegality); cf United States v.
Murphy, 852 F.2d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 1988) (holding evidence was sufficient to support the jury's
conclusion that defendant violated a known legal duty); United States v. Durrani, 835 F.2d 410,
423 (2d Cir. 1987) (same).
129. In United States v. Mancuso, 420 F.2d 556, 558 (2d Cir. 1970), the court reversed the
defendant's conviction under the Narcotics Control Act for failing to register his prior narcotics
conviction upon either his departure on an overseas flight or his return to the United States.
The court, construing the statute to require knowledge of illegality, reasoned that this con-
struction would avoid serious constitutional (due process) concerns and would best comport with
traditional notions of mens rea. See id. (citing Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246 (1952));
cf. United States v. Juzwiak, 258 F.2d 844, 847 (2d Cir. 1958) (upholding a conviction under the
Narcotics Control Act where there was a showing of the probability that the defendant had
knowledge of the duty to register).
130. In response to the Supreme Court's opinion in Ratzlaf, Congress amended 31 U.S.C.§ 5324, the anti-structuring provision, to eliminate the willfulness requirement. Ratzlaf had
held that the willfulness language contained in section 5322, the general criminal enforcement
provision, required knowledge of illegality for prosecutions under section 5324. The amendment
removed the anti-structuring provision from section 5322 and created a new criminal liability
subsection applicable only to section 5324 violations. See Money Laundering Suppression Act of
1994, H.R. 3474, 103d Cong., Title IV, § 411 (1994). The Conference Report states that under
amended section 5324, knowledge of illegality-i.e., knowledge that it is illegal to evade the
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The Court's sensitivity to issues of notice and fault also in-
creases with the level of potential criminal sanctions to which the
defendant is exposed.131 For example, the defendant in Liparota was
subject to a fine of up to $10,000 or imprisonment for up to five years,
bank's reporting requirement-is not required but "a person who innocently or inadvertently
structures"-is unaware of the bank's obligation to report-would not be criminally liable. H.R.
CONF. REP. No. 103-652, 103d Cong. 194 (1994). The amendment also modified the civil penalty
provision so that it could be imposed on a person who technically satisfied the requirements for
criminal prosecution but who did not know that structuring was illegal. See id. at 195. The
Report's explanation that the amended civil penalty provision can apply to violators who
mistake the lawfulness of structuring suggests that Congress intended prosecutors to "weed
out" less blameworthy violators. Moreover, the solution chosen by Congress leaves in place the
Court's construction of "wilful" in 31 U.S.C. § 5322. Thus, Congress's response does not call
into question lower court decisions relying on the Court's reasoning in Ratzlaf.
131. See United States v. Obiechie, 38 F.3d 309, 316 (7th Cir. 1994) (holding that the
conviction for "willfully" violating a prohibition against dealing in firearms without a license in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(1)(A) requires knowledge of the licensing requirement); United
States v. Hem, 926 F.2d 764, 767 (8th Cir. 1991) (construing "willfully" in statute regulating the
sale of firearms to require the "intentional violation of a known legal duty"). The legislative
history surrounding the Firearms Owners' Protection Act suggests that Congress added mens
rea requirements such as the word "willfully" in the provisions at issue in Obiechie and Hem in
order to ensure that "law-abiding citizens would not be subject to severe criminal penalties for
unintentional missteps." Obiechie, 38 F.3d at 312. See generally David T. Hardy, The Firearms
Owners' Protection Act: A Historical and Legal Perspective, 17 CUMB. L. REV. 585, 604-07 (1987)
(discussing the enactment of the Firearms Owners' Protection Act). But see United States v.
Langley, 62 F.3d 602, 606 (4th Cir. 1995) (holding that a conviction for knowing possession of a
firearm by a convicted felon does not require that the defendant had knowledge that he was a
convicted felon); United States v. Collins, 957 F.2d 72, 76 (2d Cir. 1992) (construing willfulness
in firearms statute to require a showing that the defendant intended to commit an act which the
law forbids).
132. See United States v. Curran, 20 F.3d 560, 570-71 (3d Cir. 1994). The court in Curran
held that a conviction for causing election campaign treasurers to submit false reports to the
Federal Election Commission in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2(b) & 1001 required proof that the
defendant was aware that the campaign treasurers were required accurately to report the
actual source of contributions to the Commission, that the defendant's actions were intended to
cause the treasurers to submit an inaccurate report, and that the defendant knew his actions
were unlawful. See id.
133. In the controversy over strict criminal liability a number of scholars have argued that
criminal liability for public welfare offenses is justified because the sanctions are ordinarily less
severe-fines instead of incarceration-and conviction of such offenses is nominally criminal but
does not carry the same stigma as conviction of a traditional crime. See Staples v. United
States, 511 U.S. 600, 616 (1994) (noting that "the penalty imposed.., has been a significant
consideration in determining whether the statute should be construed as dispensing with mens
rea" and observing that public welfare offenses "almost uniformly involved statutes that
provided for only light penalties such as fines or short jail sentences, not imprisonment in the
state penitentiary" (citations omitted)); Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 256 (1952)
("[Plenalties [for public welfare offenses] commonly are relatively small, and conviction does no
grave damage to an offender's reputation."). Conversely, the more serious the sanction the more
vehement the criticism of strict liability criminality. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE, supra note
30, § 1.04, at 72 (taking the view that imprisonment is never appropriate for strict liability
offenses); Perkins, supra note 70, at 1080 (noting with disapproval that some strict liability,
mala prohibita crimes are punishable by imprisonment); see also Singer, supra note 51, at 394-
96 (rejecting the argument that small penalties justify strict criminal liability).
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or both.134 Similarly, violation of the statute at issue in Ratzlaf could
result in a fine of up to $250,000 or five years in prison, or both.135 By
contrast, in International Minerals, where the criminal sanction was
less onerous-a fine of not more than $1,000 and/or imprisonment of
not more than one year-the Court declined to read the statute to
require knowledge of illegality."36 In cases involving relatively small
fines and minimal incarceration, the courts have been more willing to
trust prosecutors, judges, and juries to make sure that only
blameworthy defendants are prosecuted and convicted,"37  thus
mediating against the risk of overcriminalization.38
134. See Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419,420 n.1 (1985).
135. See Ratzlaf, 510 U.S. at 140; see also United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S.
64, 72 (1994) (noting concerns about harsh penalties where violation of child pornography
statute carried penalty of up to 10 years in prison as well as substantial fines and forfeiture);
United States v. Frade, 709 F.2d 1387, 1392 (11th Cir. 1983) (requiring knowledge of illegality
where violation of regulations pursuant to Trading With the Enemy Act was punishable by a
fine of $50,000 or imprisonment for 10 years or both); Cohen v. United States, 378 F.2d 751, 757
(9th Cir. 1967) (requiring knowledge of illegality for violation of prohibition against interstate
wagering punishable as a felony subject to two years in prison and a fine of $10,000).
136. See United States v. International Minerals & Chem. Corp., 402 U.S. 558, 565 (1971)
(Stewart, J., dissenting); see also Boyce Motor Lines, Inc. v. United States, 342 U.S. 337, 343
(1952) (upholding conviction for "knowing violation" of a regulation requiring transporters of
explosives and flammable liquids to "avoid, so far as practicable ... driving into or through"
certain congested areas without knowledge of illegality where violation was punishable by fine
of up to $1,000 and/or up to one year of imprisonment); United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S.
277, 285 (1943) (upholding misdemeanor conviction and fine of $500 against president of a
pharmaceutical company for shipping misbranded and adulterated drugs without a showing
that the defendant knew the drugs were misbranded or adulterated). But see United States v.
Yermian, 468 U.S. 63, 69-70 (1984) (holding that a statute criminalizing the making of false
statements "in any matter within the jurisdiction of [a federal agency]" did not require actual
knowledge of the agency jurisdiction). The statute at issue in Yermian carried a significant
maximum penalty: a $10,000 fine or imprisonment for not more than five years. See id. at 64
n.1. The majority was apparently not convinced that the "intentional and deliberate lies
prohibited by the statute (and manifest in [the defendant's conduct])" could be characterized as
"wholly innocent" or as a "trap for the unwary." Id. at 74, 75. Yermian, whose conviction rested
on statements in an official Defense Department questionnaire that itself warned that false
representations could subject him to criminal liability, did not present the Court with facts
tending to support his innocence. See id. at 65 (describing the defendant's actions).
137. See Dotterweich, 320 U.S. at 285 (expressing willingness to trust "the good sense of
prosecutors, the wise guidance of trial judges, and the ultimate judgment of juries" to avoid
overcriminalization even when defendant would face some risk of incarceration). A number of
scholars have argued that relying on prosecutors and juries to avoid overcriminalization is
problematic. See, e.g., Richard J. Lazarus, Meeting the Demands of Integration in the Evolution
of Environmental Law: Reforming Environmental Criminal Law, 83 GEO. L.J. 2407, 2488-89
(1995) (arguing that prosecutorial discretion cannot be trusted to mitigate overcriminalization
in the environmental context because charging decisions are inherently subjective and the
politics of environmental regulation could lead to the perception, if not the reality, of prosecuto-
rial abuse); Pilcher, supra note 37, at 5 (rejecting as solutions to the risk of overcriminalization
in the regulatory context, prosecutorial discretion, sentencing discretion, jury nullification, and
executive clemency and proposing that juries are the only institution that is "competent to bring
contemporary community expectations to bear on questions of criminal liability for 'apparently
innocent' conduct"); Katherine H. Setness, Statutory Interpretation of Clean Water Act Section
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The federal criminal cases described above are formally statu-
tory construction cases. In Liparota and Ratzlaf, for example, the
Court apparently assumed that Congress could, as a constitutional
matter, pass a statute that did not require knowledge of illegality.139
The Court's application of mens rea to the fact of illegality in these
cases is not, however, fully explained by resort to traditional tools of
statutory construction.140 In addition to textual and other statutory
considerations, the Court was also strongly influenced by a presump-
tion that statutes should be construed to avoid criminalizing conduct
likely to be engaged in by law-abiding citizens, at least in the absence
of clear legislative signals to the contrary.'4' Thus, although knowl-
edge of illegality was apparently not constitutionally required in cases
such as Liparota and Ratzlaf, ideas of notice and blameworthiness
1319(c)(2)(A)'s Knowledge Requirement: Reconciling the Needs of Environmental and Criminal
Law, 23 ECOLOGY L.Q. 447, 487-88 (1996) (arguing that political pressure may lead prosecutors
to charge individuals who are "blameless offenders"); Michael Vitiello, Does Culpability Matter?:
Statutory Construction Under 42 U.S.C. § 6928, 6 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 187, 253 (1993) (arguing
that prosecutors and juries cannot be trusted to avoid convicting individuals who are ignorant
that their conduct was in violation of federal environmental regulations); cf. Sharon M. Tomao,
Note, The Cultural Defense: Traditional or Formal?, 10 GEO. IMmIGR. L.J. 241, 249-50 (1996)
(claiming that prosecutors take into account immigrants' ignorance of the law when deciding
whether to prosecute).
138. The Supreme Court's dispositions in Freed and Staples are illustrative of the Court's
sensitivity to the level of sanctions facing the defendant. Both cases involved criminal prosecu-
tion under the National Firearms Act, 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d), which makes it a crime, punishable
by up to ten years in prison, for any person to possess a firearm that is not properly registered.
Recall that in Freed the Court rejected the defendant's argument that the statute should be con-
strued to require knowledge that failure to register a hand grenade was illegal. In Staples, the
defendant alleged that he knew he possessed a firearm but not that it was an automatic
weapon. The government, relying on the opinion in Freed, urged that the defendant need only
to have known that he possessed a "firearm" within the meaning of the statute but not that it
was an automatic weapon-for which registration was required-as opposed to a semi-
automatic weapon-for which no registration would be required. The Court rejected the
government's argument because in a world with "a long tradition of widespread lawful gun
ownership by private individuals," Staples, 511 U.S. at 610, dispensing with mens rea as to the
nature of the weapon would "criminalize a broad range of apparently innocent conduct." Id.
When considering a statute that could result in a sentence of up to 10 years in prison, the Court
was careful to choose a construction the Court believed necessary to separate blameworthy
conduct-possession of a hand grenade-from conduct more likely to be innocent-possession of
a regulated firearm that was difficult to distinguish from an unregulated one.
139. See, e.g., Liparota, 471 U.S. at 424 n.6 ("Of course, Congress must act within any
applicable constitutional constraints in defining criminal offenses. In this case, there is no
allegation that the statute would be unconstitutional [if mens rea as to illegality were not
required].").
140. See, e.g., id. at 424-25 ("Either interpretation would accord with ordinary usage" and
"the legislative history contains nothing that would clarify the congressional purpose on this
point").
141. See Packer, supra note 42, at 149 (noting that state courts are increasingly unwilling
to presume that legislatures intend to dispense with mens rea when they fail explicitly to
provide for it in criminal statutes).
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have considerable force in explaining the scope of criminal liability
prescribed by the courts.4 2
III. QUALIFIED IMMUNITY, FAULT, AND NOTICE
Part II began by noting that most of the time people are pre-
sumed to know the criminal law and there is no separate inquiry into
whether they had notice of the rules under which their behavior
would be judged. That presumption is reflected in the maxim
"ignorance of the law is no excuse." Concerns about fair notice are
prominent-and failure to know the criminal law is excused-only
when notice of illegality is the only element that makes the defen-
dant's conduct blameworthy. In qualified immunity analysis,
however, concerns about notice are front and center: A primary
purpose of qualified immunity is to make it possible for officials
"reasonably [to] anticipate when their conduct may give rise to
liability for damages."143 As courts have framed it, immunity obtains
unless the right allegedly violated was "sufficiently particularized to
put potential defendants on notice that their conduct probably [was]
unlawful."1 Qualified immunity, by starting from the premise of
non-liability for officials who could have believed they were acting
lawfully, seems to turn what is the exception in the criminal context
into the rule in constitutional cases.
A. Qualified Immunity: The Notice Inquiry
Actions under section 1983 can involve any one or more of a
dizzying array of constitutional claims 45 including illegal searches
and seizures, retaliatory discharges, cruel and unusual treatment of
142. Richard Singer argues that the Supreme Court has never actually upheld as constitu-
tional a strict liability statute. See Singer, supra note 51, at 398-407 (discussing cases). He
asserts that none of the cases that have been held up as examples of such a holding "actually
sustains liability, although several contain language strongly supportive of the idea." Id. at 398.
143. Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183, 195 (1984).
144. Azeez v. Fairman, 795 F.2d 1296, 1301 (7th Cir. 1986).
145. By its terms, section 1983 provides a cause of action for statutory violations as well as
for constitutional ones. See Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 4 (1980). However, the largest and
most important category, by far, of section 1983 cases involves constitutional claims. In recent
years, moreover, the Supreme Court has substantially curtailed the applicability of section 1983
to statutory claims. See generally PETER W. Low & JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR., CIVIL RIGHTS
ACTIONS: SECTION 1983 AND RELATED STATUTES 237-61 (2d ed. 1994). It is fair to say, then,
that the scope of section 1983 liability has been shaped almost exclusively in suits alleging
constitutional violations.
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prisoners, and deprivations of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law to name only a few. These claims can be brought
against an equally broad range of governmental officials, including
police officers, parole officers, social workers, school teachers, and
governors.146 The variety of claims and defendants notwithstanding,
the Supreme Court has articulated a one-size-fits-all test for
determining whether any particular executive official 47 is entitled to
receive a qualified immunity from suit.1"
Qualified immunity was first recognized as a defense to consti-
tutional damages liability in Pierson v. Ray, a Fourth Amendment
suit by black ministers against police officers who arrested them for
using segregated facilities.'4 9 The Supreme Court adopted the state
common law rule granting immunity to arresting officers who act in
good faith and with probable cause, even if the innocence of the arres-
tee is later proven. 50 In Pierson and the cases immediately following,
the qualified immunity analysis was described as having both an
objective and a subjective prong. The official was not immune from
suit if she "knew or reasonably should have known that the action
[slhe took within [her] sphere of official responsibility would
violate... constitutional rights.., or if [s]he took the action with the
malicious intention to cause a deprivation of constitutional rights."15
In these early cases, the Court also suggested that the scope of
qualified immunity in section 1983 actions would vary with the range
146. In Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), the Supreme
Court recognized an implied cause of action for damages and injunctive relief against federal
officials that parallels the section 1983 cause of action against state and local officials. The
jurisprudence applicable to section 1983 actions-rules about qualified immunity, absolute
immunity, or damages-has been understood to apply equally to Bivens cases and vice versa.
See, e.g., Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 504 (1978) ('[It would be] untenable to draw a
distinction for purposes of immunity law between suits brought against state officials under
§ 1983 and suits brought directly under the Constitution against federal officials.").
147. Judges, prosecutors, and legislators who are performing judicial, prosecutorial, or
legislative functions, respectively, have absolute immunity from damages liability. See gener-
ally Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976) (discussing prosecutorial immunity); Pierson v.
Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967) (discussing judicial immunity); Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367
(1951) (discussing legislative immunity). Qualified immunity is the default rule for such offi-
cials when they are denied absolute immunity under the functional analysis. See generally
SHELDON H. NAHMOD, CIvL RIGHTS AND CIvIL LIBERTIES LITIGATION: THE LAW OF SECTION
1983, § 8.01, at 104 (3d ed. 1991) (discussing the functional approach to immunities).
148. The difficulty of trying to apply a unified qualified immunity standard to the broad
range of possible section 1983 claims reflects a problem that is endemic to section 1983 analysis:
the problem of how to adapt the many and varied shapes and sizes of constitutional (and
statutory) claims to the one-size-fits-all structure of the section 1983 cause of action and its
defenses.
149. 386 U.S. 547 (1967).
150. Id. at 555.
151. Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 322 (1975).
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of duties and discretion exercised by the particular governmental
defendant and with the context in which the official functioned. 152
The Court has subsequently moved toward an increasingly
abstract and objective formulation of qualified immunity. In Harlow
v. Fitzgerald, the Court significantly blunted the power of the subjec-
tive prong by requiring the plaintiff to allege more than "bare allega-
tions of malice" in order to defeat a claim of qualified immunity.153
The Court virtually abandoned the subjective prong in Anderson v.
Creighton, opining that "subjective beliefs are irrelevant" to the quali-
fied immunity analysis,154 and repudiated its earlier suggestion that
the scope of qualified immunity would be context specific.155 The
modern test for qualified immunity, applicable to virtually all execu-
tive officials 156 across the range of constitutional claims,157 holds that
"government officials.., are shielded from liability for civil damages
insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory
or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have
known."158
In order for the law to be "clearly established" for purposes of
qualified immunity, moreover, the "contours of the right must be
sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that
152. See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232,247-48 (1974).
153. 457 U.S. 800, 817-18 (1982).
154. 483 U.S. 635, 641 (1987). Although it is not entirely clear from the context, lower
courts have interpreted this statement to mean that motive is irrelevant to the qualified
immunity standard rather than simply to the Fourth Amendment probable cause standard. See
generally 1B SCHWARTZ & KnuKLIN, supra note 12, § 9.16, at 358 n.626 (citing cases). Compare
Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 517 (1985) (describing Harlow as having "purged qualified
immunity doctrine of its subjective components"), with Jeffries, supra note 8, at 86 n.22
(speculating that the Supreme Court would hear allegations of bad faith if they were "plausible
and concrete" rather than "broad and unsubstantiated").
155. See Anderson, 483 U.S. at 642-43 (stating that qualified immunity analysis should not
turn on precise duties or rights); see also Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555, 562-63 (1978)
(stating that reasonableness under the circumstances is determinative). As this Part of the
Article will demonstrate, however, the way qualified immunity actually works out in practice is
highly context specific. See Low & JEFFRIES, JR., supra note 145, at 49-50 (noting that there
has developed a "law of qualified immunity for police officers, a law of qualified immunity for
school board officials, a law of qualified immunity for prison guards, and so forth").
156. See Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 340 (1986) ("Our cases also make plain that 'for
executive officers in general ... qualified immunity represents the norm.'" (quoting Harlow,
457 U.S. at 809)). Prosecutors have absolute immunity from section 1983 damages liability. See
supra note 147.
157. See Anderson, 483 U.S. at 645 ("Harlow clearly expressed the understanding that the
general principle of qualified immunity it established would be applied 'across the board.' ").
158. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818 (emphasis added). See generally 1B SCHWARTZ & KIKN,
supra note 12, § 9.17, at 361-62 (criticizing the lower courts for complicating the analysis with
"two-, and three-part tests" when the "controlling inquiry is [simply] whether the official
violated clearly established federal law").
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what [s]he is doing violates that right."159 It is not enough, in other
words, that the broadly defined right to be free from unreasonable
searches or cruel and unusual punishment is clear; the right allegedly
violated must be described at a particularized level in factually analo-
gous case law that would have provided more concrete guidance for
the official's conduct. 60 The line between liability and immunity is
"not to be found in abstractions-to act reasonably, to act with prob-
able cause, and so forth-but in studying how these abstractions have
been applied in concrete circumstances."161 The question for qualified
immunity, as one court has framed it, is:
whether the right was reasonably well settled at the time of the challenged
conduct and whether the manner in which the right related to the conduct was
apparent.... [Courts may neither require that state actors faultlessly
anticipate the future trajectory of the law nor permit claims of qualified
immunity to turn on the eventual outcome of a hitherto problematic
constitutional analysis.
162
Thus, when "in the light of pre-existing law" the unlawfulness of the
conduct would not have been "apparent" to a reasonable official, im-
munity will obtain. 163 Conversely, if courts have ruled similar conduct
unlawful under analogous (though not factually identical) cir-
159. Anderson, 483 U.S. at 640 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted) (emphasis
added).
160. See, e.g., id. at 639 ("[T]he right the official is alleged to have violated must have been
'clearly established' in a more particularized, and hence more relevant, sense: The contours of
the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is
doing violates that right.").
161. Adams v. St. Lucie County Sheriffs Dep't, 962 F.2d 1563, 1578 (11th Cir. 1992)
(Edmondson, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted), adopted by 998
F.2d 923 (11th Cir. 1993); see Henderson v. DeRobertis, 940 F.2d 1055, 1058-59 (7th Cir. 1991)
(opining that the law is not clear until "a particular constitutional right has been stated so that
reasonably competent officers would agree on its application to a given set of facts"); Lojuk v.
Johnson, 770 F.2d 619, 628 (7th Cir. 1985) ("While cases involving the exact fact pattern at bar
are unnecessary, case law in a closely analogous area is crucial to permit us to conclude that
reasonably diligent government officials would have known of the case law, related it to the
situation at hand, and molded their conduct accordingly.").
162. Martinez v. Colon, 54 F.3d 980, 988 (1st Cir. 1995) (citations omitted).
163. Anderson, 483 U.S. at 640. Although a finding of clarity does not require unanimity
among authorities, one or two holdings that support the right asserted by the plaintiff may not
be enough. See, e.g., Hilliard v. City and County of Denver, 930 F.2d 1516, 1519-21 (10th Cir.
1991) (holding that the two circuit court opinions identified by the plaintiff did not render the
law "clearly established" given the inconsistent approaches of other courts). Genuine
disagreement among authorities will result in a finding that the law is not clearly established.
See, e.g., Singer v. Maine, 49 F.3d 837, 847-48 (1st Cir. 1995) ("In view of the divergence of
opinion among the circuits with respect to the various issues ... the law in this area was
unsettled at the time of these events."); Richardson v. Selsky, 5 F.3d 616, 621-24 (2d Cir. 1993)
(noting that divergent treatment of a prisoner's claimed due process right by different circuits
showed that the law was not clearly established).
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cumstances, then "government officials will be deemed 'on notice'" of
that clear law and qualified immunity will likely be denied. 164
The prominence of notice in the qualified immunity analysis165
is striking compared to the relatively more limited (although by no
means unimportant) role of notice in criminal law. Moreover, while
criminal law begins with the assumption that "every person... is
bound to know the law"166 and ignorance of the law is no excuse,
governmental officials are immune from constitutional damages
liability as long as their actions "could reasonably have been thought
164. Melton v. City of Oklahoma City, 879 F.2d 706, 729 n.36 (10th Cir. 1989), rev'd in part
on other grounds, 928 F.2d 920 (10th Cir. 1991) (en banc); see Calhoun v. Gaines, 982 F.2d 1470,
1475 (10th Cir. 1992) (stating that the qualified immunity standard requires that "there be
some, but not necessarily precise, factual correspondence between previous cases and the case
at bar" and in order to escape liability officials must "know well developed legal principles and..
. relate and apply them to analogous factual situations"). Courts have deemed the law clear if
there is a "universe of authority" pointing to the existence of the right, Elder v. Holloway, 975
F.2d 1388, 1392 (9th Cir. 1992), rev'd on other grounds, 510 U.S. 510 (1994), or there exist
"fairly analogous precedents" that tend to establish the relevant constitutional rule, Horta v.
Sullivan, 4 F.3d 2, 13 (1st Cir. 1993). Some courts look only to Supreme Court precedent and to
precedent from their own jurisdictions to establish the boundaries of clear law. The Second
Circuit appears to have taken that approach. See Russell v. Scully, 15 F.3d 219, 223 (2d Cir.
1994). Other courts find the law sufficiently clear if the "weight of authority" from other circuits
supports the constitutional rule urged by the plaintiff, Medina v. City and County of Denver,
960 F.2d 1493 (10th Cir. 1992), or if there is "such a clear trend in the caselaw that [the court]
can say with fair assurance that the recognition of the right by a controlling precedent was
merely a question of time." Donovan v. City of Milwaukee, 17 F.3d 944, 952 (7th Cir. 1994); see
also Ohio Civil Service Employees Ass'n v. Seiter, 858 F.2d 1171, 1177 (6th Cir. 1988) ("For the
decisions of other courts to provide such 'clearly established law,' these decisions must both
point unmistakably to the unconstitutionality of the conduct complained of and be so clearly
foreshadowed by applicable direct authority as to leave no doubt in the mind of a reasonable
officer that his conduct.., would be found wanting.").
165. The notice aspect of qualified immunity is underlined by the fact that courts consider
not only the extent of factual similarity between extant case law and the defendant's circum-
stances but also other factors that bear on whether the defendant could reasonably have been
aware of that law. For example, one court has listed as factors to be considered: the jurisdiction
from which the authority arose, its geographical proximity to the forum of the allegedly uncon-
stitutional conduct, the timing of the precedent in-comparison to the events at issue, the level of
dissemination of information within the pertinent profession, and the frequency of similar
litigation. See Johnson-El v. Schoemehl, 878 F.2d 1043, 1049 (8th Cir. 1989). The timing of the
case law that declared defendant's conduct unlawful may also be important. See, e.g., Lintz v.
Skipski, 25 F.3d 304, 306 (6th Cir. 1994) (opining that officials must be allowed some "time to
adjust" to new judge-made law, particularly if the ruling "changed the direction of law in th[e]
circuit"); Robinson v. Bibb, 840 F.2d 349, 350 (6th Cir. 1988) (suggesting that a short time frame
between decisions clearly establishing the law and defendant's conduct could be an
"extraordinary circumstance," which under Harlow might allow the defendant to show that he
should not be imputed knowledge of the right); Schlothauer v. Robinson, 757 F.2d 196 (8th Cir.
1985) (holding the law not clearly established by an Eighth Circuit opinion handed down only 11
days before the incident giving rise to the suit). See generally 1B ScHwARTz & KMKLIN, supra
note 12, § 9.23, at 388-89 (discussing the body of case law on this issue).
166. 1 MATrHEW HALE, PLEAS OF THE CROWN 42 (1680), quoted in Livingston Hall & Selig
J. Seligman, Mistake of Law and Mens Rea, 8 U. Cmi. L. REV. 641, 645 (1941).
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consistent with the rights they are alleged to have violated."167 What
accounts for this apparent difference?
There are a number of "easy"-but in my view ultimately
wrong-answers that might be offered in response to the puzzle posed
above. First, it might be argued that criminal law is more likely than
constitutional law to prohibit the kinds of conduct that everyone
should know are wrongful: Whereas our moral intuitions68 should
tell us that homicide or robbery is wrongful behavior, the notion that
street-level officials have clear moral intuitions about the complex
judicially articulated rules governing the Fourth Amendment warrant
requirement or defining the requisites of due process is less persua-
sive. But distinguishing criminal and constitutional law on the basis
of moral intuitions is ultimately unsuccessful. As Part II of the
Article demonstrated, there are many criminal regulatory prohibi-
tions that may not closely track our moral intuitions about right and
wrong. On the other hand, some constitutional violations, such as
deliberately ignoring a seriously ill prisoner's need for medical care,
using excessive force to subdue an unarmed and handcuffed arrestee,
or firing a person because of race, correlate fairly closely with intui-
tions about what constitutes bad behavior. Thus, both constitutional
law and criminal law include rules that are more or less closely corre-
lated with intuitive notions of wrongfulness; these two areas of law do
not divide neatly on that ground.
Another possible answer is that criminal law is "clearer" and
more accessible than constitutional law and thus the boundaries of
criminal law are easier to know. That explanation is, again, true in
some instances and not in others. Prohibitions against homicide and
theft are relatively clear and understandable to the ordinary citizen:
"Thou shalt not kill" and "Thou shalt not steal" are not difficult to
comprehend. On the other hand, some criminal statutes are quite
intricate and their boundaries difficult to ascertain.69 To make
167. Anderson, 483 U.S. at 638 (emphasis added); see also Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335,
341 (1986) (qualified immunity protects "all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly
violate the law"); id. at 344-45 (stating that police officers applying for warrants are immune if a
reasonable officer "could have believed" that there was probable cause to support the applica-
tion); Collins v. Marina-Martinez, 894 F.2d 474,478 (1st Cir. 1990) ([A] plaintiff who is entitled
to prevail on the merits is not necessarily entitled to prevail on the issue of qualified immu-
nity.").
168. By the term "moral intuitions" I mean the sense ordinary people have of the bounda-
ries of acceptable behavior, whether that judgment is a matter of conscience, socialization,
education, or some combination of factors. I recognize that moral intuitions are to some degree
contingent and subject to change. See supra note 37.
169. For example, compare United States v. Margiotta, 688 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1982), with
McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350 (1987), which disagree on whether the mail fraud
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matters worse, it is well-settled that an unclear statute can be "cured"
by judicial construction. Thus, the meaning of a particular criminal
statute might be discoverable only by sifting through the case law
interpreting the statute, a process which "[flor the trained profes-
sional... is time-consuming and tricky" and "for the average citizen,
it is next to impossible."170 Similarly, while much of constitutional law
is not clearly defined as to its application in particular circumstances,
in other contexts governmental officials are able to predict with some
accuracy how the rules will apply. Much of search and seizure law,
where law enforcement officials are repeat players in applying and
litigating the boundaries of the Fourth Amendment, illustrates that
phenomenon.'Y' Again, both constitutional law and criminal law fall
along a continuum of clarity and accessibility.
Finally, it might be argued that criminal law is more stable
than constitutional law and thus more easily known. This generaliza-
tion, however, also fails. The extensive proliferation of modem regu-
latory statutes, often requiring teams of lawyers to keep their clients
abreast of changes in the law, belies the notion that criminal law is
stable and predictable. 172  Similarly, constitutional law varies from
contexts in which the law is rapidly changing-affirmative action in
college admissions is a modem example-to those in which the law is
really quite stable or changes only incrementally. 173
What is interesting and useful about these "easy" answers is
exactly that constitutional law and criminal law are not easily distin-
guishable along the lines suggested above: Some constitutional rules
are less intuitive, less accessible, and regulate behavior that is less
obviously blameworthy than much of traditional criminal law.
Others, however, look very much like traditional criminal prohibi-
tions: They proscribe conduct that seems inherently wrongful. These
similarities between constitutional law and criminal law suggest that
the connection between fault and notice in criminal law can teach us
something about the role of notice in constitutional cases.
statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1994), proscribes schemes to defraud citizens of their intangible rights
to honest and impartial government.
170. Jeffries, supra note 21, at 208.
171. See infra notes 200-05 and accompanying text.
172. See generally Pilcher, supra note 37, at 32 (noting estimates of over 300,000 federal
regulations that are punishable by criminal penalties and asserting that in the area of
traditional substantive criminal law Congress regularly enacts new provisions and enhances
existing ones).
173. See infra note 195 (discussing the Supreme Court's jurisprudence of "new rules").
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My thesis is that qualified immunity-like fair notice in cri-
minal law-employs notice or knowledge of illegality as a proxy for
fault. I argue, moreover, that notice serves that function in the con-
stitutional damages context in precisely the same kinds of cases in
which knowledge of illegality would be required in the criminal con-
text: where only knowledge that the relevant conduct is forbidden
makes the defendant's actions blameworthy. The notice inquiry
seems more pervasive in section 1983 actions precisely because con-
stitutional claims are more likely to involve conduct of the sort that is
prohibited by criminal regulation, where persons might reasonably be
ignorant of the law, and less likely to entail inherently blameworthy
conduct, where reasonable people would (or should) know what the
law demands.
B. When Ignorance is Excused-Fourth Amendment Claims
Another important rationale for qualified immunity, in addi-
tion to the instrumental one, is that qualified immunity avoids the
unfairness that would result if governmental officials were subject to
liability for violating rules they did not or could not reasonably have
known.174 Under that view, qualified immunity ensures that public
officials will not be penalized for conduct which, given the state of the
case law, even a conscientious, law-abiding official could reasonably
174. In Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974), the Supreme Court identified as rationales
for official immunity:
(1) the injustice, particularly in the absence of bad faith, of subjecting to liability an offi-
cer who is required, by the legal obligations of his position, to exercise discretion; [and]
(2) the danger that the threat of such liability would deter his willingness to execute his
office with the decisiveness and judgment required by the public good.
Id. at 240; see Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183, 196 (1984) ("Nor is it always fair... to demand
official compliance with statute and regulation on pain of money damages" where officials are
"subject to a plethora of rules, 'often so voluminous, ambiguous, and contradictory, and in such
flux that officials can only comply with or enforce them selectively'" (quoting SCHUCK, supra
note 10, at 64)); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982) ("[Ain official.., could [not]
fairly be said to 'know' that the law forbade conduct not previously identified as unlawful.");
Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 669 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting) (urging qualified
immunity for municipalities on the ground that "basic fairness" requires that officials acting in
good faith should not be exposed to liability "unless there was notice that a constitutional right
was at risk"); Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 319 (1975) (arguing that liability for "every
action which is found subsequently to have been violative of a [citizen's] constitutional rights
and to have caused compensable injury would unfairly impose upon the [official] the burden of
mistakes made in good faith in the course of exercising his discretion within the scope of his
official duties"). See generally Alan Y, Chen, The Ultimate Standard: Qualified Immunity in the
Age of Constitutional Balancing Tests, 81 IowA L. REv. 261, 273-75 (1995) ("The fairness
argument rests on the assumption that holding government officials accountable for actions that
are not clearly unconstitutional is unjust, especially in light of the sometimes elusive character
of constitutional rights.").
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have believed to be lawful. 175 Thus, the logic behind the fairness
argument for qualified immunity echoes ideas of fair notice in
criminal law: If the law did not clearly prohibit the defendant's con-
duct-and indeed any reasonable official acting in good faith could
have done what the defendant did-then the defendant is not blame-
worthy.7 6
In order to flesh out the connection between notice and fault
suggested by the fairness rationale, I turn to a discussion of qualifiedimmunity in Fourth Amendment search and seizure cases, the context
in which the qualified immunity analysis has been most clearly and
specifically articulated. In Malley v. Briggs, the Supreme Court held
that police officers who search pursuant to a warrant are entitled to
qualified immunity unless "no reasonably competent officer would
have concluded" that the information offered in the warrant applica-
tion established probable cause.77 In other words, "if officers of
reasonable competence could disagree on this issue, immunity should
be recognized." 78  The parallel standard for warrantless searches,
announced in Anderson v. Creighton, affords immunity if a reasonable
official "could have believed" that the particular circumstances con-
fronting the officer constituted probable cause and exigent circum-
stances. 7 9
The Anderson dissent argued that qualified immunity is un-
necessary in the Fourth Amendment context because the underlying
constitutional standard-"probable cause"--already embodies a rea-
sonableness inquiry. 80  The dissenting justices complained that
extending qualified immunity to Fourth Amendment violators would
apply "a double standard of reasonableness" that "affords a law en-
forcement official two layers of insulation from liability." 8' This
175. See Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224 (1991) (stating that qualified immunity is
appropriate if a reasonable official "could have believed" her actions were lawful); Anderson v.
Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 638 (1987) (stating that qualified immunity shields officials from
liability "as long as their actions could reasonably have been thought consistent with the rights
they are alleged to have violated"); Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 528 (1985) (stating that
governmental officials are immune unless "the law clearly proscribed the actions" they took).
176. See, e.g., Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225 (1957) (holding that behavior that would
be engaged in by the ordinary law-abiding citizen cannot be the grounds of criminal conviction
absent knowledge of illegality).
177. 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986).
178. Id. (emphasis added).
179. 483 U.S. at 641.
180. Id. at 661 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
181. Id. at 659 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see Llaguno v. Mingey, 763 F.2d 1560, 1569 (7th
Cir. 1985) (en banc) (Posner, J.) (complaining that qualified immunity on top of probable cause
gives defendants "two bites at the apple").
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objection is partly a matter of semantics: Had an "equally serviceable
term, such as 'undue' searches and seizures been employed, what
might be termed the 'reasonably unreasonable' argument [against
qualified immunity] would not be available."182 But the dissenters'
criticism goes deeper. Their argument is that qualified immunity in
the Fourth Amendment context is unjustified because it provides a
defense against two levels of fault: It immunizes not only the official
who reasonably, but inaccurately, believed that her search would
uncover evidence of crime-a mistake about the circumstances sur-
rounding the search-but also the official who reasonably, but errone-
ously, believed that she had satisfied the Fourth Amendment prob-
able cause standard-a mistake about the meaning of constitutional
law.'8
What explains a rule that immunizes governmental officials
for mistakes of constitutional law? To answer that question, I turn to
my thesis that qualified immunity employs notice as a proxy for fault.
My criminal law paradigm predicts that notice of illegality comes into
play when the conduct at issue carries no indicia of its own wrongful-
ness, in other words, when it involves the kinds of actions that a rea-
sonable, law-abiding official might have taken.'8 It might be argued,
however, that any violation of the Constitution entails blameworthy
conduct.'8 As the Anderson dissent argued in the Fourth Amendment
context, an official who conducts an unconstitutional (unreasonable)
search is, by definition, engaging in conduct that a reasonable official
would have avoided. There are, however, persuasive arguments for
the contrary view that officials who act unconstitutionally are not
necessarily blameworthy.186
To take the clearest example of Fourth Amendment illegality
without fault, suppose a damages action invokes a "new" constitu-
tional rule87 that was only recognized after the events occurred that
182. Anderson, 483 U.S. at 643.
183. See id. at 661 (Stevens, J., dissenting). As Justice Stevens argued:
[I]t is worth emphasizing that the probable-cause standard itself recognizes the fair lee-
way that law enforcement officers must have in carrying out their dangerous work. The
concept of probable cause leaves room for mistakes, provided always that they are mis-
takes that could have been made by a reasonable officer.
Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
184. See supra notes 56-64, 102-32 and accompanying text.
185. See, e.g., Sheldon Nahmod, Constitutional Damages and Corrective Justice: A
Different View, 76 VA. L. REV. 997, 1009 (1990) (arguing that wrongdoing is a "social construct
that does not necessarily include states of mind or fault").
186. See generally Jeffries, supra note 8, at 99-101 (rejecting the view that fault is inherent
in unconstitutionality).
187. See infra note 195 (discussing the Supreme Court's "new rules" jurisprudence).
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gave rise to the constitutional damages suit. For example, in
Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, police officers were found to have acted
unconstitutionally when they neglected to obtain a search warrant to
enter a private medical clinic in order to execute an arrest warrant for
a third person.188 The rule establishing the requirement of a search
warrant under those circumstances, however, was recognized four
years after the events in question. 189 Although their conduct was
found to have been unconstitutional, it is hard to argue that the police
officers in Pembaur were "at fault," as their only error was in failing
to predict the direction of constitutional law. In the words of the
Harlow Court: "If the law at [the time the events occurred] was not
clearly established, an official could not reasonably be expected to
anticipate subsequent legal developments, nor could [she] fairly be
said to 'know' that the law forbade conduct not previously identified
as unlawful."90 Qualified immunity attaches in such cases because,
in the absence of notice or knowledge of what the Constitution re-
quires, governmental officials who act unconstitutionally are not
blameworthy.
The "new rule" problem occurs in the Fourth Amendment con-
text, despite the fault-like language of the constitutional text'9' and
the probable cause standard.192 That is because much of Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence is couched in the form of prophylactic rules
which involve most significantly the complex set of judicial holdings
that define the contours of the warrant requirement. 193 The new rule
188. See 475 U.S. 469,484(1986).
189. See Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204 (1981) (finding that the arrest warrant for
a third party did not protect the petitioner's Fourth Amendment interest in being free from
unreasonable searches of his home).
190. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982); see Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511,
535 (1985) (stating that an official does not forfeit her immunity because she "gambled and lost
on the resolution of [an] open question"); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 557 (1967) (stating that
governmental officials are not "charged with predicting the future course of constitutional law");
see also David Rudovsky, The Qualified Immunity Doctrine in the Supreme Court: Judicial
Activism and the Restriction of Constitutional Rights, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 23, 77 (1989) (arguing
that qualified immunity is justified when a section 1983 claim invokes changed law or "when
prior development did not foreshadow the constitutional principle").
191. The Fourth Amendment protects the right to be free from "unreasonable searches and
seizures." U.S. CoNST. amend. IV (emphasis added).
192. See, e.g., Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175-76 (1949) ("[P]robable cause
exists where the Tacts and circumstances within [the officers'] knowledge and of which they had
reasonably trustworthy information [are] sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of
reasonable caution in the belief that' an offense has been or is being committed." (quoting
Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925) (emphasis added))).
193. See Jeffries, supra note 8, at 97 n.54 (noting that "[als the case law [on the warrant
requirement] has actually developed, it is perfectly possible to be reasonably mistaken about the
requirements of [F]ourth [Almendment reasonableness").
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phenomenon, moreover, is by no means limited to Fourth Amendment
cases. 94 The notion that some constitutional rulings are new and
unpredictable is salient across the range of constitutional claims as
evidenced by the Supreme Court's retroactivity jurisprudence and its
holdings disallowing habeas corpus relief based on "new rules."195 In
damages cases invoking new rules, qualified immunity's notice in-
quiry ensures against liability without fault.
The fairness rationale, however, argues for qualified immunity
in other contexts beyond those involving new rules. Even when
Fourth Amendment analysis resembles a less rule-like, more unstruc-
tured inquiry into the "reasonableness" of the official's actions, a find-
ing that the official acted without probable cause does not obviate the
need for a notice inquiry. To see why, it is necessary to appreciate
both the kinds of situations faced by law enforcement officials and the
nature of the legal standards they are required to apply. On the one
hand, law enforcement officials are faced with the difficult task of
conforming their conduct-in a virtually infinite variety of factual
circumstances-to a set of imprecise constitutional standards, the
parameters of which are unclear even to trained lawyers. Law en-
forcement requires the exercise of significant discretion, "often on
inadequate information in situations bordering on emergency."96
Moreover, police officers are subject to vague constitutional standards
such as "reasonable suspicion" and "probable cause," 97 which provide
only limited guidance for their actions. As "[tlhe numerous dissents,
concurrences and reversals [in Fourth Amendment cases] indi-
cate.., even learned and experienced jurists have had difficulty in
defining the rules that govern a determination of probable cause,"198
194. See, e.g., Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622 (1980) (rejecting qualified im-
munity for municipalities based upon the good faith of its officers and applying retroactively a
rule requiring a "name clearing" hearing for employee discharges accompanied by reputational
harm).
195. The Supreme Court has expressly recognized in a number of contexts that somejudicial holdings are new rules, in the sense that they represent a significant break from past
precedent. See generally Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law, Non-Retroactiv-
ity, and Constitutional Remedies, 104 HARv. L. REV. 1733 (1991) (arguing that a number of
doctrines involving new rules raise issues that are best analyzed as involving the law of
constitutional remedies); Kit Kinports, Habeas Corpus, Qualified Immunity, and Crystal Balls:
Predicting the Course of Constitutional Law, 33 ARIZ. L. REv. 115 (1991) (noting that qualified
immunity, the law of habeas corpus, and the retroactivity doctrine all revolve around the notion
of new rules and urging a unified analysis of these three areas).
196. Jeffries, supra note 12, at 77.
197. The governing definition of "probable cause" is a "fair probability" of criminal activ-
ity-to justify an arrest-or evidence-to justify a search-under all the circumstances. Illinois
v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983).
198. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 456 F.2d 1339,
1348 (2d Cir. 1972).
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let alone street-level officials acting in situations that do not afford
them the luxury of unhurried consideration of fact and law. The
Fourth Amendment standard, in other words, "retains an irreducible
element of subjectivity, so that there will be situations where officers
must simply guess at whether a judge would find the standard satis-
fied."1'9
On the other hand, although the Fourth Amendment standard
is, at some level, unavoidably subjective and indeterminate, it would
be inaccurate to conclude that it is no more clearly defined-at least
for those who are called upon to apply it-than the command to act
"reasonably." Fact patterns that give rise to probable cause judg-
ments tend to repeat themselves with minor variations in facts and
circumstances.00 Police officers, moreover, are "frequent litigants"
who are likely to see hundreds of such determinations by magistrates
and trial judges 20' over the courses of their careers.20 2 In addition,
199. William J. Stuntz, Warrants and Fourth Amendment Remedies, 77 VA. L. REv. 881,
897 (1991) (emphasis added). See SCHUCK, supra note 10, at 66 ("[In many situations in which
police officers must act quickly. . . 'no guidelines can do much more than restate the law and
urge officials to obey that law and, in the gray areas, to use their judgment.'" (quoting J.Q.
WILSON, THE INVESTIGATORS 83 (1978))). As the Court explained in Anderson v. Creighton, "We
have frequently observed, and our many cases on the point amply demonstrate, the difficulty of
determining whether particular searches or seizures comport with the Fourth Amendment."
483 U.S. 635, 644 (1987) (citation omitted).
200. As Professor Stuntz has noted: "A police officer... will see hundreds of probable
cause judgments over the course of his career .... And those judgments are not all sui generis:
there is a good deal of repetition, so that particular fact patterns may, in slightly different
guises, crop up again and again." Stuntz, supra note 199, at 896. Examples of repeated fact
patterns in the Fourth Amendment context include airport search cases, see Florida v. Royer,
460 U.S. 491 (1983), and the informant tip cases, see Gates, 462 U.S. at 213; Stuntz, supra note
199, at 896 n.30.
201. See generally Stuntz, supra note 199, at 896. When issues involving suppression of
evidence are litigated in suppression motions or at trial, police officers routinely testify and are
thereby exposed to the intricacies of constitutional criminal procedure. In a survey of police
knowledge of criminal procedure, police officers reported that having their own evidence sup-
pressed or observing cases in which evidence collected by fellow officers was suppressed was the
most significant way in which they learned about changes in Fourth Amendment search and
seizure law. See Myron W. Orfield, Jr., Comment, The Exclusionary Rule and Deterrence: An
Empirical Study of Chicago Narcotics Officers, 54 U. CI. L. REv. 1016, 1036 (1987) (citing
survey responses that indicate police officers' beliefs that in-court experiences teach them the
most about changes in search-and-seizure law); see also RICHARD VAN DUIZEND ET AL., THE
SEARCH WARRANT PROCESS: PRECONCEPTIONS, PERCEPTIONS, PRACTICES 88 (1984) (reporting
similar responses from police officers in a number of different cities).
202. In addition, police officers in both the state and federal system have extensive inter-
actions with prosecutors, who are obviously well-schooled in the details of the criminal consti-
tutional decisions applicable to police investigative activities. Prosecutors have the legal exper-
tise as well as the incentives to make sure that police officers are well aware of constitutional
constraints on their activities. Indeed, the decision whether to bring charges, the ability to
defeat defendants' motions to suppress evidence, and the success of any subsequent indictment
and trial may depend on assuring that police work conforms to constitutional requirements. See
Carol S. Steiker, Counter-Revolution in Constitutional Procedure? Two Audiences, Two
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officials are often subject to detailed and comprehensive training in
Fourth Amendment law, both when they join the force and at regular
intervals thereafter. 203 This extensive and repeated exposure to the
details of Fourth Amendment law2°4 as applied to similar facts and
circumstances provides law enforcement officials with a certain
amount of proficiency "in giving content to [the probable cause stan-
dard], or at least in predicting how the courts will give content to
it."205
The courts' approach to qualified immunity in Fourth
Amendment cases appreciates both the lack of concrete guidance
provided by constitutional standards such as "probable cause," and
the fact that an otherwise vague constitutional standard can provide
relatively clear guidance through repeated applications of the stan-
dard under similar circumstances: Courts have acknowledged-and
their immunity determinations reflect-that in many cases, existing
precedent will provide only very general guidance for the officer's
conduct in her particular circumstances. As the Supreme Court ex-
plained, "because the mosaic which is analyzed for a reasonable-sus-
picion or probable-cause inquiry is multi-faceted [a] determination [in
one case] will seldom be useful precedent for another."2°6 In addition,
many (if not most) Fourth Amendment claims-with the possible
exception of excessive force claims 20 7 -do not contain indicia of
wrongdoing that would signal officials of the likelihood that their
Answers, 94 MICH. L. REV. 2466, 2536-37 (1996) (noting the close collaboration between
prosecutors and police officers in investigating suspects, deciding whether to charge, defending
suppression motions, and taking cases to trial).
203. Federal and state law enforcement officers are trained in "academies" that offer
detailed instruction about all aspects of policing, including constitutional criminal procedure.
See generally id. at 2535 (citing National Association of State Directors of Law Enforcement
Training 1978 Survey, reproduced in JoHN D. FERRY & MARJoRiE KRAVITZ, POLICE TRAINING: A
SELECTED BmLIOGRAPHY (National Criminal Justice Reference Service of the U.S. Dep't of
Justice, 1980)). Importantly, these officers also receive updating in the form of "continuing
education classes and periodic dissemination of written material[s]" containing judicial opinions
relevant to police work. Id. Steiker reports that "F.B.I. agents are required to attend an annual
legal training session" in which they are informed of "all relevant federal constitutional
decisions [from] the previous year." Id. at 2535 n.331 (setting forth information obtained in a
telephone conversation with the chief counsel of the Boston Division of the F.B.I.). At least one
F.B.I. chief counsel reported that he prepares a written analysis of any federal case that is of
immediate importance and distributes it to all the agents in his division. See id.
204. Fourth Amendment case law that is formulated in criminal cases is, of course, appli-
cable to Fourth Amendment suits under section 1983.
205. Stuntz, supra note 199, at 896.
206. Ornelas v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 1657, 1662 (1996) (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted).
207. See infra Part III.E.
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conduct was unlawful.20 8 Indeed, quite often there is very little
difference between unconstitutional conduct and actions that are "not
only legally permissible, but socially desirable, even essential to
maintaining adequate order and security."209 Qualified immunity will
attach under such circumstances because an official who is found
after the fact to have engaged in unconstitutional conduct that carried
no signal of wrongdoing-and whose only "fault" consisted in her
failure to predict whether a court would agree with her assessment
that a particular set of facts constituted probable cause210-is not
blameworthy.21'
Courts have also recognized, however, that here as in the cri-
minal context, when prohibited actions carry no indicia of their own
wrongfulness, such actions are blameworthy if the actor has actual or
constructive "knowledge that the relevant conduct is legally forbid-
den."212 In many Fourth Amendment cases, knowledge (or reason to
know) that the conduct is probably unconstitutional is an "essential
element" of its wrongfulness.213 The question for qualified immunity
in such cases is whether existing case law was sufficiently clear to
have put a reasonable official on notice of the likely unconsti-
tutionality of her action because only the violation of a clear legal
duty makes her conduct blameworthy. Moreover, in order to provide
the requisite notice, the law must be clear in a "particularized" sense.
Only if the constitutional rule has been fleshed out in circumstances
sufficiently analogous to enable "a reasonable official [to appreciate]
that what [she] is doing violates [a constitutional] right" is an official
who violates that right subject to damages liability.214
208. See infra Parts I.C (introduction), m.C.1, lH.C.3, llI.D.2, and notes 370-73 and
accompanying text for a discussion of qualified immunity as applied to claims such as excessive
force that may involve inherently wrongful conduct.
209. Jeffries, supra note 12, at 78. As Professor Jeffries frames it: "An unconstitutional
search and seizure may differ only slightly from good police work." Id.
210. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 456 F.2d
1339, 1348 (2d Cir. 1972) (Lombard, J., concurring).
211. See Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 641 (1987) ("We have recognized that it is
inevitable that law enforcement officials will in some cases reasonably but mistakenly conclude
that probable cause is present, and we have indicated that in such cases those officials . ..
should not be held personally liable.").
212. Hall, supra note 37, at 36. Professor Hall argues that knowledge of illegality is a
requirement of blameworthiness in malum prohibitum crimes where "normal conscience (moral
attitudes) and understanding cannot be relied upon to avoid the forbidden conduct...." Id.
213. Cf id. at 35 (discussing knowledge in the criminal context as an "essential element" of
the immorality of certain "minor offenses, newly created ones, and those regulating certain
businesses").
214. Anderson, 483 U.S. at 640 (emphasis added); see Melton v. Oklahoma City, 879 F.2d
706, 731 (10th Cir. 1989), overruled in part on other grounds, 928 F.2d 920 (10th Cir. 1991) (en
banc) ("[W]here the law is clearly established, there is no justification for excusing individuals
1998]
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In a general sense, the right to be free from unreasonable
searches is quite "clearly established" by the Fourth Amendment.
Thus, one could argue that every action that violates that Amendment
violates a clearly established right, "no matter how unclear it may
have been that the particular action is a violation."215 But, "if the test
of 'clearly established law' were to be applied at [that] level of
generality, it would bear no relationship" to the relevant inquiry:
whether the law is clear enough that "officials [can] reasonably
anticipate when their conduct may give rise to liability for
damages."216 For that purpose, the right allegedly violated must have
been "clearly established" at a fact-specific level that would have
enabled a reasonable official to appreciate that the situation she
confronted fit within the prohibited category.217 This does not mean
that there is immunity unless "the very action in question has
previously been held unlawful," but it does mean that "in the light of
pre-existing law the unlawfulness must be apparent."218
The qualified immunity regime described above closely resem-
bles my earlier analysis of fair notice in the criminal regulatory con-
text. Recall that regulatory offenses raise notice concerns because,
quite often, the prohibited conduct is not inherently blameworthy.
When conduct subject to criminal sanctions contains no indicia of
wrongdoing, the courts have addressed issues of fault by inquiring
whether the defendant could be expected to have appreciated the
unlawfulness of her actions. 219 Individuals who handle or transport
hazardous materials or who engage in dangerous activities can rea-
sonably be expected to know that such activities are likely to be regu-
lated; thus, ignorance of the law under those circumstances is not an
excuse. When, however, nothing about a defendant's conduct or cir-
cumstances would have signaled the likelihood of criminal regulation,
actual notice of illegality may be required.
The Fourth Amendment context carries similar expectations
for law enforcement officials: Because these officials are repeat
players and frequent litigants in Fourth Amendment cases, they
either know or should know the contours of Fourth Amendment law,
from liability for their actions .... [Officials are presumed to know and abide by clearly
established law.").
215. Anderson, 483 U.S. at 639.
216. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
217. Id. at 640 (emphasis added); see also Azeez v. Fairman, 795 F.2d 1296, 1301 (7th Cir.
1986) (noting that "[tihe right must be sufficiently particularized to put potential defendants on
notice that their [particular] conduct probably is unlawful").
218. Anderson, 483 U.S. at 640.
219. See supra notes 102-32 and accompanying text.
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at least to the extent that it has been made concrete in cases involving
analogous circumstances.220 If the law governing the defendant's
actions under similar circumstances was clear, the official should
have known and applied it. Thus, law enforcement personnel will not
be entitled to qualified immunity if their conduct was proscribed in
analogous, factually-similar cases221 or, as will be explained in more
detail below, if their actions were inherently wrongful.2 2 Officers
will, however, be entitled to qualified immunity when liability is
premised on the invocation of a "new" rule or when no factually-
analogous case provided clear guidance and the defendant's only error
was in failing accurately to predict the court's after-the-fact probable
cause judgment.
It should be observed that unlike notice in criminal law, notice
in qualified immunity analysis serves as a proxy for fault in the more
technical sense:223 The objective clarity of the law24 applicable to the
official's actions is a surrogate for the official's subjective state of
mind. (Indeed, the Supreme Court moved to an objective standard
precisely in order to avoid litigating subjective bad faith and to facili-
tate summary disposition of qualified immunity claims.225) The
animating notion for using clear law as a surrogate for subjective
fault is that no reasonably conscientious and competent official would
fail to recognize and eschew conduct that is clearly unconstitutional
under analogous precedent. Thus, the existence of factually-analo-
gous case law clear enough to have provided notice of illegality is a
220. Unlike in the regulatory context, however, it is not enough that police officers knew or
should have known that they are subject to regulation if they could not reasonably have appreci-
ated what that regulation required.
221. See, e.g., Lassiter v. Alabama A & M Univ., 28 F.3d 1146, 1150 (11th Cir. 1994)
(stating that "[tihe most common error" in qualified immunity analysis is that plaintiffs refer "to
general rules and to the violation of abstract 'rights'" but qualified immunity is lost only if
preexisting law dictatef[s1... the conclusion for every like-situated, reasonable government
agent that what [the] defendant is doing violates federal law in the circumstances").
222. See Erwin v. Daley, 92 F.3d 521, 525 (7th Cir. 1996) ("A plaintiff can [rebut a claim of
qualified immunity] either by showing that a closely analogous case has already established
both the right at issue and its application to the factual situation at hand, or by showing that
the violation was so obvious that a reasonable person would necessarily have known about it.")
(citations omitted), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 958 (1997).
223. See supra notes 65-68 and accompanying text.
224. The clarity of the law is a purely legal question. See Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S.
635, 641 (1987) (stating that the defendant should be permitted as a matter of law to argue that
the law was unclear); Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 228 (1991) (stating that 'the court should
ask whether the agent acted reasonably under settled law").
225. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982) (discussing the benefits of an
objective standard for judicial efficiency).
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proxy for the offending official's bad faith.2 6  Conversely, when the
law governing an official's conduct did not clearly prohibit her actions,
she cannot be presumed to have acted in bad faith and qualified im-
munity will attach.
C. Qualified Immunity and "Bad" Conduct
I began my analysis of qualified immunity by demonstrating
how the fault/notice connection makes sense of immunity in Fourth
Amendment cases.227  The Supreme Court has held that qualified
immunity is a unitary defense, presumptively intended to apply to the
full range of constitutional claims.228 But constitutional provisions
vary greatly, both in the nature of the conduct they prohibit-from
searches without probable cause, to deliberate indifference to a pris-
oner's serious medical needs, to police brutality-and in the level of
226. See id. at 818-19 ("If the law was clearly established, the immunity defense ordinarily
should fail, since a reasonably competent public official should know the law governing his
conduct."); Alvarado v. Zayas, 816 F.2d 818, 820 (1st Cir. 1987) (stating that qualified immunity
is a question of objective reasonableness and the analysis "is not affected by the defendant's
particular state of knowledge about the law"). This analysis appears to hold "police officers to
the same standard as judges" in assessing the contours of constitutional law. See Harris v.
District of Columbia, 932 F.2d 10, 16 (D.C. Cir. 1991). As one court has framed it, "[Olfficials
are charged with knowledge of constitutional developments at the time of the alleged constitu-
tional violation, including all available case law." Lum v. Jensen, 876 F.2d 1385, 1387 (9th Cir.
1989). In the Fourth Amendment context, however, this expectation is by no means unrealistic
given the special circumstances that provide law enforcement officers with extensive exposure
to the law of search and seizure. See supra notes 200-05 and accompanying text. My colleague,
Anne Coughlin, who teaches criminal procedure and "rode" with police officers on a number of
occasions when she was living in Nashville, Tennessee, reports that police officers tended to
know the relevant constitutional precedents-both state and federal-by case name as well as
by facts and holding! Similarly, Craig Wood, a Charlottesville attorney who frequently repre-
sents local and state law enforcement officers in section 1983 actions indicated that law
enforcement officials tend to know the precedents that apply to the kinds of situations that they
are likely to face repeatedly. For example, officers who routinely plan or execute roadblocks in
carrying out their duties would be conscious of cases from their own and other jurisdictions
describing the specific constitutional limitations on the use of such devices.
227. Any plausible descriptive theory must be able to explain qualified immunity in the
Fourth Amendment context, in which the defense has received its most detailed and practical
elaboration. The Supreme Court's qualified immunity analysis in Fourth Amendment cases has
served as the model for applying qualified immunity to other kinds of constitutional damages
claims: Anderson and Malley-both Fourth Amendment cases-along with Harlow are by far
the cases most often cited or quoted in laying out the doctrine and application of qualified im-
munity.
228. See Anderson, 483 U.S. at 642-43 (stating that an immunity that varied according to
right would not sufficiently protect conscientious officials). I say "presumptively" because on
occasion the Supreme Court has left open the question of whether or how qualified immunity
might apply in a particular context. See, e.g., Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 399 n.12 (1989)
(expressly declining to address the "proper application [of qualified immunity] in excessive force
cases").
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mens rea required to make out a claim-from unreasonable,29 to
"more than negligent,"mo to intentional.3' These variations have
important implications for qualified immunity analysis: If qualifiedimmunity is about notice as a proxy for fault, constitutional violations
that are inherently wrongful should be treated differently from ones
that are not. Specifically, if the unconstitutional conduct carries its
own indicia of fault, qualified immunity would be expected to "drop
out" of the analysis. In such cases, the requirement of blameworthi-
ness would be fully satisfied by the inherent wrongfulness of the un-
lawful conduct and no additional notice inquiry should be required.
The effect of constitutional intent requirements on the qualified im-
munity analysis is more complicated. As will be explained more fully
below, the fact that a constitutional claim requires a showing of
willfulness-for example, "deliberate indifference" for Eighth
Amendment claims or "intent" for race discrimination claims-does
not necessarily obviate the need for qualified immunity. If prohibited
conduct carries no indicia of its own wrongfulness and the law
governing that conduct is unsettled, the fact that it is done willfully or
intentionally addresses neither the defendant's lack of
blameworthiness nor her lack of notice of the likely illegality of her
actions.
1. Inherently Wrongful Conduct
First, to explore the effect on qualified immunity analysis of
the inherent "badness" of the prohibited conduct, consider a claim of
racial discrimination in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Today there is widespread legal and societal consensus that govern-
ment-sanctioned, intentional racial discrimination is bad behavior.232
When governmental officials make invidious distinctions based on
race, no one pauses to ask whether they had notice of the rules gov-
229. The Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures. See U.S.
CONST. amend. IV.
230. Deprivations of life, liberty, or property without due process of law are cognizable only
if the deprivation was more than simply negligent. See Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 330-
31 (1986) (suggesting that allowing claims for due process based on negligent acts would trivial-
ize the constitutional right). The Supreme Court left open the question of "whether something
less than intentional conduct"-for example, recklessness or gross negligence-would "trigger
due process protections." Id. at 334 n.3.
231. The Fourteenth Amendment, for example, has been construed to require a showing of
intentional discrimination in order to make out an equal protection claim. See Washington v.
Davis, 426 U.S. 229,239 (1976).
232. For a discussion of the contingent nature of what is deemed inherently wrongful
conduct, see supra note 37.
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erning their conduct. The widely-accepted wrongfulness of inten-
tional discrimination makes any additional judicial inquiry into actual
knowledge of illegality unnecessary, or even redundant, because the
character of the behavior itself is inconsistent with any reasonable
belief in its lawfulness.233 In Fourteenth Amendment discrimination
cases, courts routinely presume knowledge of the law-and deny
qualified immunity-based on precisely that reasoning.2m  For ex-
ample, in Wade v. Hegner, the plaintiff (a black parent) sued the
white principal of an all-white Chicago public school for allegedly
denying admission to the plaintiffs six children.2 5 The principal, who
had reassured white parents that the school would remain
segregated, had been informed by his predecessor that black students
could successfully be excluded by describing to their parents the racial
hatred that would result from enrollment at the school.26 The
principal told the plaintiff that enrollment of his children "wo[uldln't
work" and that the principal could not protect plaintiffs children from
potential violence in or out of school. The principal gave the plaintiff
the names of several (predominantly black) alternative schools and
did not offer any help in dealing with the hostile community reaction
he predicted would occur if the plaintiff sent his children to the all-
white school. The court of appeals affirmed the denial of qualified
immunity on the ground that no reasonable principal could have
failed to realize it was "unconstitutional to intentionally discourage a
black parent from registering his children by threatening the parent
with the possible dangers that might ensue."27 The court reasoned
that "[i]t is inconceivable that fifteen years [after the Supreme Court
expressed its impatience over delays in implementing Brown v. Board
233. See generally Jefflies, supra note 8, at 98 n.57 (noting that a governmental defendant's
claim not to have known the law prohibiting racial discrimination would be "legally irrelevant
because it is factually incredible").
234. As one scholar notes:
There are cases in which the constitutional right allegedly violated is so clearly settled
in its application to wide-ranging fact situations that the finding of a constitutional
violation in a particular case dictates a finding as a matter of law that the defendant
violated clearly settled law as well. This is often the case with equal protection viola-
tions [involving race].
2 NAHMOD, supra note 147, at 132; see Erwin v. Daley, 92 F.3d 521, 525 (7th Cir. 1996) ("A
plaintiff can [rebut a claim of qualified immunity] either by showing that a closely analogous
case has already established both the right at issue and its application to the factual situation at
hand, or by showing that the violation was so obvious that a reasonable person would necessar-
ly have known about it.").
235. 804 F.2d 67 (7th Cir. 1986).
236. See id. at 68.
237. Id. at 71. The court rejected defendant's qualified immunity argument that "the law
was not clearly established because 'none of the cases cited by the trial court or [the plaintiff] is
closely analogous to the fact pattern here.'" Id. (citing Defendant's Brief at 19).
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of Education] a school official could express surprise that frightening
a black family out of the all-white Cicero school system would violate"
the Constitution.28 In cases like Wade, courts have not inquired
whether defendants had adequate notice that their conduct was likely
to be unconstitutional nor have they searched the federal reporters for
factually-analogous case law. When the unconstitutional conduct
would engender widespread condemnation in the current societal and
legal environment-in other words, the conduct carries indicia of its
own wrongfulness-knowledge of illegality is unnecessary to ensure
against liability without fault and qualified immunity will be de-
nied.39
It must be noted, however, that to satisfy the requirement of
fault, and avoid a defense of qualified immunity, it is not enough that
the defendant knew or should have known that her conduct was prob-
ably unlawful in some general sense. For example, a defendant is not
deprived of qualified immunity on the ground that she knowingly
violated an applicable state regulation.O Similarly, not every illegal
act that may constitute a tort241 or even a crime242 will give rise to a
238. Id. at 72.
239. See Smith v. Lomax, 45 F.3d 402, 407 (11th Cir. 1995) (holding that "[gliven the clear
state of the law prohibiting racial discrimination in public employment . . . no reasonable
[official]... would have believed" it was lawful to replace a white employee with a black em-
ployee on the basis of race); Bator v. Hawaii, 39 F.3d 1021, 1027, 1028-29 (9th Cir. 1994)
(denying qualified immunity on the ground that a reasonable official would have understood
that subjecting a woman to "persistent and unwelcome physical and verbal abuse" based on her
gender "is exactly the kind of sex discrimination prohibited by the Equal Protection Clause");
Auriemma v. Rice, 910 F.2d 1449, 1457 (7th Cir. 1990) (holding that no reasonable superinten-
dent of a major city police department could reasonably have concluded it was lawful to reorgan-
ize the department by demoting (only) white officers and promoting (only) black officers, all in
the absence of any affirmative action plan or justification); Goodwin v. Circuit Court, 729 F.2d
541, 546 (8th Cir. 1984) (rejecting qualified immunity as a defense in cases alleging
discrimination on the basis of sex); Flores v. Pierce, 617 F.2d 1386, 1392 (9th Cir. 1980) (holding
that "[t]he constitutional right to be free from such invidious [racial] discrimination is so well
established and so essential to the preservation of our constitutional order that all public
officials must be charged with knowledge of it"); Antia v. Thurman, 914 F. Supp. 256, 258 (N.D.
IM. 1996) (holding that a police officer who detained and harassed plaintiff based on her race
would not be entitled to qualified immunity on her equal protection claim because the "right to
be free from intentional discrimination on the basis of race or sex in the enforcement of criminal
laws is clearly established"); Oona R.-S. by Kate S. v. Santa Rosa City Schools, 890 F. Supp.
1452, 1472 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (denying qualified immunity because a reasonable school official
"would have known that her failure to properly train, supervise, or control a student teacher
engaged in intentional discrimination against female students on the basis of their sex would
violate the statutory and constitutional rights of those students").
240. See Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183, 193-96 (1984) (declining to adopt a rule that viola-
tion of a statute or regulation by a state official is per se unreasonable conduct that would deny
the official qualified immunity).
241. See Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 543 (1981) (denying petitioner relief under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 for injury resulting from the negligent acts of a state official), overruled on other
grounds, Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986).
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constitutional claim or result in a denial of qualified immunity.
Individual liability for constitutional violations obtains only if "in
light of pre-existing law the unlawfulness under the [Clonstitution is
apparent."243 Thus, the issue is not whether an official would have
realized that her conduct was wrong but whether she would have
appreciated that her conduct involved the special kind of unlawful-
ness against which constitutional damages liability is directed:2" The
"misuse of power, possessed by virtue of state law and made possible
only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state
law."245 It is "immaterial," however, for purposes of notice that the
"defendant[ ]may not have been thinking in constitutional terms."246
As the Court explained in Screws v. United States, "willful violators of
constitutional requirements, which have been [made specific by ex-
press terms of the Constitution or decisions interpreting them,] cer-
tainly are in no position to say that they had no adequate advance
notice that they would be visited with [liability]." 247 Governmental
defendants whose official behavior is so far off the mark that it consti-
tutes an obvious abuse of power cannot complain they lacked notice
of illegality any more than the criminal defendant who commits homi-
cide or burglary.
To provide an example of the distinction described above, con-
sider the recent case of United States v. Lanier.5  In Lanier, a state
judge was prosecuted under 18 U.S.C. § 242,249 the criminal analogue
of section 1983, and the Due Process Clause for allegedly raping or
sexually assaulting in his chambers five women who were either
242. See Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 108 (1945) (discussing 18 U.S.C. § 242, the
criminal analogue of 42 U.S.C. § 1983).
243. United States v. Lanier, 117 S. Ct. 1219, 1228 (1997) (quoting Anderson v. Creighton,
483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987) (internal brackets omitted) (emphasis added)).
244. See Martinez v. Colon, 54 F.3d 980, 988 (1st Cir. 1995) ("[Cllearly established ...
denotes that at the time the challenged conduct occurred the contours of the right were suffi-
ciently plain that a reasonably prudent state actor would have realized not merely that his
conduct might be wrong, but that it violated a particular constitutional right."); Estate of
Sinthasomphone v. City of Milwaukee, 838 F. Supp. 1320, 1327 (E.D. Wis. 1993) ("The issue...
is not whether [the defendants] were good or bad cops in general or [on the day in question]...
[but] whether under clearly established constitutional doctrine, the officers were required to
know [their actions] would have dire consequences.").
245. Screws, 325 U.S. at 109.
246. Id. at 106.
247. Id. at 105.
248. 117 S. Ct. 1219 (1997).
249. Section 242 provides, in relevant part:
Whoever, under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom, willfully
subjects any peron in any State... to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or im-
munities secured or protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States... shall
be fined... or imprisoned not more than one year, or both....
18 U.S.C. § 242 (1994).
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seeking employment or had cases pending before his court. The
"constitutional notice "25o question was not whether a reasonable judge
should have known that sexual assault and rape is unlawful-the fair
notice question in ordinary criminal cases-but whether he should
have known that constitutional principles "forbid a sitting judge, in
his chambers, and in some cases while in his judicial robes, from
fondling and raping women with business before his court."251 The
question, it seems to me, answers itself. 2
2. The Effect of Subjective Intent
It might be tempting to conclude that all constitutional claims
requiring a showing of intentional conduct automatically fall into a
category of cases in which qualified immunity is not justified.253 To
the contrary, however, the argument for blameworthiness apart from
notice of illegality depends not so much on the intentionality of the
behavior but on the notion that reasonable officials would know that
such behavior is wrongful. It is true that actions performed inten-
tionally or knowingly are generally thought to be more culpable than
actions that are, for example, merely reckless. Scienter as to conduct,
however, in the sense of intending to do certain acts or bring about
250. The Lanier Court held that the standard for adequate notice in 18 U.S.C. § 242 cases
is the same as the standard for qualified immunity in section 1983 cases. 117 S. Ct. at 1227 &
1228. See infra notes 387-400 and accompanying text.
251. United States v. Lanier, 73 F.3d 1380, 1410 (6th Cir. 1996) (Daughtrey, J., dissenting),
vacated, 117 S. Ct. 1219 (1997). Judge Daughtrey criticized the majority for "intimat[ing] that
[Judge] Lanier could not have been aware that sexually assaulting women in his chambers
when they arrived to conduct official business with him constituted a violation of the victim's
due process rights." Id. at 1413.
252. The Court in Screws came to a similar conclusion. The defendants in that case were
law enforcement officers who apparently held a grudge against the victim, a young black man.
They arrested him late at night-allegedly for stealing a tire-handcuffed him and took him by
car to the courthouse square, beat him with their fists and a solid-bar blackjack for 20-30
minutes until he was unconscious, "dragged [him] feet first through the courthouse yard into
the jail and threw him on the floor dying." Screws, 325 U.S. at 92-93. The victim was later
removed to a hospital where he died within the hour and without regaining consciousness. Id.
at 93. In considering a fair notice challenge to the conviction, the Court opined that while not
every prisoner who is "assaulted, injured, or even murdered by state officials" has a
constitutional claim, "[t]hose who decide to take the law into their own hands and act as
prosecutor, jury, judge, and executioner plainly act to deprive a prisoner of a trial which due
process of law guarantees him." Id. at 106, 108. The Court further explained that "in
determining whether that requisite bad purpose was present, the jury would be entitled to
consider all the attendant circumstances-the malice of petitioners, the weapons used in the
assault, its character and duration, the provocation, if any, and the like." Id. at 107.
253. For other scholarly articles that have addressed the interaction between qualified
immunity and constitutional intent standards, see Chen, supra note 174; Rudovsky, supra note
190.
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certain results, is not necessarily incompatible with a reasonable
belief in the lawfulness of one's actions. As has been argued in the
criminal context, while mens rea often defines the difference between
"innocence and criminality,"254 it is also "possible willfully to bring
about certain results and yet be without fair warning that such con-
duct is proscribed."255  Similarly, a requirement of willful conduct
cannot make definite constitutional requirements which are unde-
fined;25 6 it does not provide any better notice to be told that one must
do something "willfully" if one is not told what that something is.257
Imagine, for example, a Fourteenth Amendment claim involv-
ing intentional "benign" racial discrimination in the current, rapidly
changing legal environment of college admissions. Affirmative action
for the purpose of addressing the effects of past racial discrimination
does not have the indicia of wrongfulness that inheres in invidious
racial discrimination. Moreover, the law governing affirmative action
in education is uncertain and there is, as yet, no clear legal consen-
sus258-let alone societal consensus-of what is forbidden and what is
permitted. When the boundary between legality and illegality is
uncertain, an official acting in good faith who strays across the consti-
tutional line is not blameworthy. In such cases, qualified immunity
254. Sayre, supra note 51, at 56.
255. LAFAvE & SCOT, JR., supra note 91, § 2.3, at 131.
256. Screws, 365 U.S. at 104, 105. As the majority in Screws explained:
The requirement that the act must be willful or purposeful may not render certain, for
all purposes, a statutory definition of the crime which is in some respects uncertain....
[However,] a requirement of a specific intent to deprive a person of a federal right made
definite by decision or other rule of law saves the Act from any charge of unconstitu-
tionality on the grounds of vagueness.
Id. at 102-03; see Jeffries, supra note 12, at 56 (pointing out that an employer could inten-
tionally fire a government worker in the "reasonable (but mistaken) belief that the procedures
accompanying that discharge accorded with constitutional standards").
257. See also Screws, 325 U.S. at 154 (Roberts, J., dissenting) ("'Willfully' doing something
that is forbidden when that something is not sufficiently defined according to the general
conceptions of requisite certainty in our criminal law, is not rendered sufficiently definite by
that unknowable having been done 'willfuly.' "); see generally Packer, supra note 42, at 123
(discussing Screws).
258. Compare Podberesky v. Kirwan, 38 F.3d 147, 161 (4th Cir. 1994) (invalidating the
University of Maryland's Banneker scholarship program, which was reserved exclusively for
African-Americans on the ground that the program was not narrowly tailored to remedy past
discrimination) and Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 962 (5th Cir. 1994) (holding that diversity
was not a sufficient justification for the University of Texas School of Law to use race as a factor
in making admissions decisions), with Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 320
(1978) (holding that race may be taken into account as one factor in promoting diversity in
college admissions).
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functions to ensure against liability without fault by immunizing offi-
cials who lacked notice of the likely illegality of their actions.259
3. Wrongful Conduct and Intent in Eighth Amendment Cases
Like invidious race discrimination claims, Eighth Amendment
claims by prisoners alleging "deliberate indifference" to a serious
medical condition or risk of injury2o also appear to fall into the
category of cases in which qualified immunity arguably should drop
out of the analysis: Officials who deliberately ignore a prisoner's
obvious, significant need for medical attention or who fail to address a
known risk of injury are engaging in seriously culpable behavior.261
259. The law governing affirmative action is significantly more settled in contexts other
than education after the Supreme Court's holdings in City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488
U.S. 469 (1989), and Adarand Construction, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995). Prior to these
holdings the courts tended to grant qualified immunity in cases challenging affirmative action.
See, e.g., Harrison & Burrowes Bridge Constructors, Inc. v. Cuomo, 981 F.2d 50, 61-62 (2d Cir.
1992) (affirming grant of qualified immunity on the ground that a state law providing for
minority business set-asides for state-funded highway construction projects was not clearly
unconstitutional); Cygnar v. City of Chicago, 865 F.2d 827, 846 (7th Cir. 1989) (affirming grant
of qualified immunity for alleged racial discrimination where defendant's actions arose from a
good faith affirmative action plan that was not clearly illegal under current law); see also Jantz
v. Muci, 976 F.2d 623, 628-30 (10th Cir. 1992) (affirming grant of qualified immunity for alleged
employment discrimination based on sexual orientation because government classifications
based on sexual orientation were neither inherently suspect nor quasi-suspect under clear law).
After Croson and Adarand, courts have tended to deny qualified immunity in cases chal-
lenging affirmative action in areas such as employment and contracting. For example, in
Alexander v. Estepp, 95 F.3d 312, 317-18 (4th Cir. 1996), cert. denied sub nom. Prince George's
County v. Alexander, 117 S. Ct. 1425 (1997), the Fourth Circuit denied qualified immunity,
citing case law that should have led county officials to conclude that their affirmative action
program would not satisfy the strict scrutiny requirements of the Equal Protection Clause. By
contrast, in Erwin v. Daley, 92 F.3d 521, 528 (7th Cir. 1996), also a post-Croson case, the Sev-
enth Circuit held that the use of out-of-rank-order promotions and standardization techniques
did not preclude a finding of qualified immunity. The court reasoned that in neither Croson nor
Adarand had a majority of the Supreme Court concluded that affirmative action was never
constitutional. Id. at 526-27. The court noted that in Adarand, the Supreme Court cited with
approval United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149 (1987), which had upheld an affirmative action
program that involved "exactly the same kind of remedial measure" that was at issue in Erwin.
92 F.3d at 527. The court also cited a number of post-Croson cases in which lower courts had
upheld affirmative action programs using out-of-rank-order promotions. Id.
260. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994) (holding that deliberate indifference
requires that "the official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety;
the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a sub-
stantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference"); Estelle v. Gamble,
429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976) (holding that "deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prison-
ers constitutes the 'unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain' ... proscribed by the Eighth
Amendment." (citation omitted)).
261. In DeShaney v. Winnebago County, 489 U.S. 189 (1989), the Supreme Court explained
the rationale for the government's duty under the Due Process Clause to protect those in
custody from certain risks of harm:
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Of course, there may be factual issues as to whether officials knew
about the risk of illness or injury or whether they could reasonably
have believed that the alleged risk was not sufficiently serious to
warrant intervention.262 But, assuming the necessary factual show-
ing, an official who ignores obvious signs of a serious medical problem
or risk of injury or disease has acted badly; she can hardly argue that
she didn't realize her actions could be unconstitutional. For example,
in McCord v. Maggio, a prisoner brought suit against prison officials
alleging that he was required to live and sleep in a roach-infested,
windowless, unlighted cell that was flooded with foul water and
sewage.263 The court reasoned that prison officials could not plausibly
claim it was "unclear" whether forcing prisoners to sleep "on a bare
mattress in filthy water contaminated with human waste" violated
the Eighth Amendment. 264 Similarly, in Munz v. Michael, the court
concluded that "prison officials reasonably should have
understood.., that they were violating a prisoner's Eighth
Amendment rights if they beat him while he was bound hand and foot
in a padded cell."26 5 Likewise, the courts have denied qualified
immunity under the following circumstances on the ground that
"prison officials who deliberately ignore the serious medical needs of
inmates cannot claim that it was not apparent to a reasonable person
that such actions violated the law:"266 where officials knowingly failed
to obtain medical care for an arrestee who was bleeding, six months
pregnant, and under a doctor's care for pregnancy-related
complications; 267 where a paraplegic was forced to live in squalor
[W]hen the State by the affirmative exercise of its power so restrains an individual's lib-
erty that it renders him unable to care for himself, and at the same time fails to provide
for his basic human needs--e.g., food clothing, shelter, medical care, and reasonable
safety-it transgresses the substantive limits on state action set by the Eighth
Amendment and the Due Process Clause.
Id. at 200.
The DeShaney Court held that there is no duty to protect in noncustodial settings or in situ-
ations where the State was aware of particular dangers but "it played no part in their creation,
nor did it do anything to render [the plaintiff] more vulnerable to them." Id. at 201. The Court
explicitly left open the question whether a duty to protect is triggered in contexts that are
analogous to custody, such as foster care. See id. at 201 n.9.
262. See Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298-99 (1991) (holding that deliberate indifference
requires that the deprivation was sufficiently serious and that the official acted with a suffi-
ciently culpable state of mind).
263. 927 F.2d 844 (5th Cir. 1991).
264. Id. at 846, 848.
265. 28 F.3d 795, 800 (8th Cir. 1994).
266. Hamilton v. Endell, 981 F.2d 1062, 1066 (9th Cir. 1992) (citation omitted).
267. See Boswell v. Sherburne County, 849 F.2d 1117, 1119-23 (8th Cir. 1988). The plain-
tiff, Wanda Boswell, was arrested for operating a motor vehicle under the influence of alcohol.
Shortly after being incarcerated, Boswell notified prison personnel that she was bleeding. Over
the next 10 hours the bleeding worsened and Boswell experienced increasingly severe cramping
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because he was denied the use of a wheelchair;268 where a prison
pharmacist arbitrarily refused to fill an inmate's bona fide prescrip-
tion for anti-seizure medication;269 and where prison officials forced an
inmate to travel by plane in contravention of his treating physician's
specific orders, resulting in permanent and irreparable damage to his
hearing.270 In such cases the courts have found it unnecessary to ask
whether officials had notice that their conduct would likely violate the
Constitution or to scour precedent for analogous cases.271 When
officials engage in conduct that is clearly unconstitutional, qualified
immunity drops out of the analysis.272
and pain. Prison personnel refused to notify Boswell's physician or to obtain medical assistance.
Boswell finally was transported to the hospital at the insistence of an off-duty police officer with
emergency medical training, where her baby was born and died only 34 minutes later. See id. at
1119-20. The court concluded that "a pretrial detainee's right to emergency medical care was
both clearly established and clearly contoured... when the incident Boswell complains of took
place." Id. at 1121.
268. See Weeks v. Chaboudy, 984 F.2d 185 (6th Cir. 1993). Defendant Weeks was unable to
care for his person, shower himself, clean his cell, or take advantage of his limited out-of-cell
time because he was denied the use of a wheelchair. See id. at 187. The court concluded that
"the squalor in which Weeks was forced to live as a result of being denied a wheelchair was
clearly foreseeable by [prison officials]" and that 'jail employees should have been aware...
that their deliberate indifference to the medical needs of paraplegic inmates constituted an
Eighth Amendment violation." Id. at 188.
269. See Johnson v. Hay, 931 F.2d 456 (8th Cir. 1991). The defendant/pharmacist claimed
that he had refused to fill the plaintiff's prescriptions because they were "inappropriate." Id. at
458. The defendant, however, made this determination without seeing plaintiffs medical
records prior to incarceration, without personally examining the plaintiff or requesting a prison
doctor to examine him, without contacting the prescribing physician or notifying any physician
that he intended to withhold the prescribed medication, and without contacting the physician
who had diagnosed the seizure disorder. See id. at 461; see also Cummings v. Roberts, 628 F.2d
1065, 1067-68 (8th Cir. 1980) (denying qualified immunity where prison officials deliberately
denied access to medical care and refused to carry out treatment prescribed by physicians).
270. See Hamilton, 981 F.2d at 1064-67. Officials transported plaintiff to another prison by
airplane after he had undergone two surgeries on his ear and in contravention of his surgeon's
specific order that plaintiff not be forced or permitted to fly until his medical condition had
stabilized. See id. at 1064. The court denied qualified immunity. For a discussion of the court's
reasoning, see supra text accompanying note 266. See also White v. Napoleon, 897 F.2d 103,
106-10 (3d Cir. 1990) (denying qualified immunity where defendant used painful ineffectual
treatments which had serious accompanying risks); Hunt v. Dental Dep't, 865 F.2d 198, 201 (9th
Cir. 1989) (holding that prison officials are "deliberately indifferent to a prisoner's serious
medical needs when they deny, delay, or intentionally interfere with medical treatment").
271. See Scher v. Engelke, 943 F.2d 921, 925 (8th Cir. 1991) ("[Tlhe fact that previously no
court has held that [retaliatory] searches constitute an eighth amendment violation is irrelevant
[if] in light of preexisting law the unlawfulness [is] apparent.'") (quoting Anderson v. Creighton,
483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987))).
272. See Nelson v. Overberg, 999 F.2d 162, 165-66 (6th Cir. 1993) (denying qualified im-
munity to prison officials who failed even to investigate an inmate's claim that he had been
threatened with violence by other inmates); Taylor v. Bowers, 966 F.2d 417, 422-23 (8th Cir.
1992) (denying qualified immunity to a prison physician who delayed surgical intervention to
prisoner later found to have an acute appendicitis in order to prompt the defendant to confess
that he had swallowed drug-filled balloons); Heflin v. Stewart County, 958 F.2d 709, 717-18 (6th
Cir. 1992) (denying qualified immunity to prison officials who took no steps to try to save the life
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Like Fourteenth Amendment benign discrimination claims,
many Eighth Amendment violations, while meeting the formal re-
quirement of "deliberate indifference," do not carry their own indicia
of fault. When such indicia do not exist, notice of illegality in the form
of analogous precedent is necessary to ensure that only culpable offi-
cials are exposed to liability. For example, in Williams v. Anderson
an inmate who became violent in the prison psychiatric unit sued
medical personnel who administered a prescribed antipsychotic drug
against his will.273 The court affirmed a finding of qualified immunity
on the ground that neither Supreme Court nor lower court cases had
clearly addressed the issue of whether an inmate has a right to refuse
antipsychotic drugs beyond the right to have a doctor's examination
and to have the medication administered as treatment and not as
punishment.274 Similarly, in Gibson v. Matthews, the court affirmed a
finding of qualified immunity for prison officials who allegedly failed
to grant a pregnant prisoner's request for an abortion.275 The court
reasoned that at the time these events took place there were "no
reported cases regarding the abortion rights of prisoners" and there
was "no ruling or consensus on the issue of whether prison officials
were required to furnish or arrange abortions for inmates."276 A third
of a prisoner who had attempted suicide by hanging himself); Henderson v. DeRobertis, 940
F.2d 1055, 1057-58, 1060-61 (7th Cir. 1991) (denying qualified immunity to prison officials who
during a four-day period forced prisoners to remain in an unheated cellblock despite outdoor
temperatures of 22 degrees below zero); Cleveland-Perdue v. Brutsche, 881 F.2d 427, 431-32
(7th Cir. 1989) (denying qualified immunity to prison officials whose failure to remedy alleged
inadequacies constituted deliberate indifference to inmates' medical needs); Duckworth v.
Frazen, 780 F.2d 645, 653 (7th Cir. 1985) (denying qualified immunity to prison officials for
injuries to prisoners sustained when transporting bus caught fire).
273. 959 F.2d 1411, 1412-13 (7th Cir. 1992).
274. Id. at 1414-17 ("[Alt the time the defendants acted, it was not clearly established that
their actions violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Nor was it
established that their actions amounted to the sort of 'deliberate indifference' or 'unnecessary
and wanton infliction of pain' independently proscribed by the Eighth Amendment."). In 1990,
well after the events at issue in Williams, the Supreme Court clarified the rights of prisoners to
refuse antipsychotic drugs. See Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 221-22 (1990) (holding
that an inmate has a "significant liberty interest in avoiding the unwanted administration of
anti-psychotic drugs" under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
275. 926 F.2d 532, 535 (6th Cir. 1991).
276. Id. The only other federal case that has considered this issue is Monmouth County
Correctional Institutional Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326 (3d Cir. 1987). In Monmouth the
Third Circuit affirmed with modification a preliminary injunction prohibiting prison officials
from requiring inmates to obtain a court order to obtain an elective, nontherapeutic abortion.
The court held that the release requirement violated prisoners' fundamental right to choose to
terminate their pregnancies in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment and constituted
"deliberate indifference" to a serious medical need in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Id at
351. The court further held that, "in the absence of alternative methods of funding, the County
must assume the cost of providing inmates with elective, nontherapeutic abortions." Id
Because the plaintiffs in Monmouth sought injunctive relief rather than damages, qualified
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example is McKinney v. Anderson, in which the plaintiff/inmate
claimed that placing him in a cell with a five-pack-per-day smoker
constituted deliberate indifference because it posed an unreasonable
risk of future injury to his health.277 The court agreed, reasoning that
scientific evidence had "rapidly accumulated... regarding the
adverse health effects resulting from exposure to ETS [environmental
tobacco smoke]" and noting that the health consequences of ETS are
magnified in the prison setting due to the high number of smokers
and the lack of segregation of smokers from nonsmokers.278 The court
concluded that given society's increasingly negative attitude toward
smoking-embodied in federal, state, and local antismoking
statutes--"it violates current standards of decency to expose unwilling
prisoners to ETS levels that pose an unreasonable risk of [future]
harm to their health."279  Importantly, however, the court granted
injunctive relief8 but held that prison officials were immune from
damages liability because "at the time the defendants acted, there
was no clearly established liability for exposing prisoners to ETS."281
immunity was not at issue. For a discussion of the inapplicability of qualified immunity in suits
for injunctive relief, see infra note 410.
277. See 924 F.2d 1500, 1502 (9th Cir. 1991), affid sub nom. Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S.
25 (1993). The prisoner also alleged that prison officials were deliberately indifferent to
evidence of current medical problems caused by his exposure to passive cigarette smoke. Id.
The Ninth Circuit had previously held that exposure to environmental tobacco smoke by those
who are sensitive to such exposure because of a preexisting condition may state a claim under
the Eighth Amendment. See Franklin v. Oregon, 662 F.2d 1337, 1346-47 (9th Cir. 1981). The
magistrate concluded that the plaintiff had failed to make the factual showing necessary to
support that claim, leaving only the risk of future injury claim. See McKinney, 924 F.2d at
1503; see also McKinney, 509 U.S. at 27-30 (discussing the procedural history of this case).
278. McKinney, 924 F.2d at 1505.
279. Id. at 1505-08, 1508; see Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 346 (1981) (stating that
the standard for assessing an Eighth Amendment claim "must draw its meaning from the
evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society").
280. For a discussion of the rationale for the unavailability of qualified immunity in suits
for injunctive relief, see infra note 410.
281. McKinney, 924 F.2d at 1509. Compare Avery v. Powell, 695 F. Supp. 632, 640 (D.N.H.
1988) (holding that the risk of future injury from exposure to ETS may amount to a violation of
the Eighth Amendment), with Clemmons v. Bohannon, 956 F.2d 1523, 1527 (10th Cir. 1992) (en
banc) (dismissing claim based on exposure to ETS because the Eighth Amendment "does not
sweep so broadly as to include possible latent harms to health"). See also Caldwell v. Quinlan,
729 F. Supp. 4, 7 (D.D.C. 1990) (holding that there is no constitutional right to a smoke-free
environment); Gorman v. Moody, 710 F. Supp. 1256, 1262 (N.D. Ind. 1989) (same). In Helling v.
McKinney, 509 U.S. at 36, the Supreme Court held that deliberate indifference to a future
serious health problem (such as exposure to ETS) could constitute a violation of the Eighth
Amendment if on remand the court found that
society considers the risk that the prisoner complains of to be so grave that it violates
contemporary standards of decency to expose anyone unwillingly to such a risk. In other
words, the prisoner must show that the risk of which he complains is not one that
today's society chooses to tolerate.
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As these cases illustrate, qualified immunity is justified when an
official would have no reason to think that failing to address a
particular risk of harm or injury would later be judged by a court to
constitute deliberate indifference within the meaning of the Eighth
Amendment. In such cases the official's only fault is her failure to
anticipate the direction of constitutional law.
D. Qualified Immunity and Balancing Tests
Many constitutional rights have been described by the courts
in terms of balancing tests, which seek to accommodate two or more
important but opposing interests .2 2  When a constitutional right
involves case-by-case balancing, qualified immunity is a particularly
powerful defense against damages liability.2 3 Viewing qualified
immunity through the lens of the fault/notice connection helps to
explain why this is so.
1. Qualified Immunity in First Amendment Cases
Consider, for example, the role of qualified immunity in First
Amendment retaliation claims against governmental employers. The
Supreme Court has held that while a public employer may not retali-
ate against an employee for exercising her right to freedom of
282. In Anderson v. Creighton, the Supreme Court noted that "[tihe fact is that, regardless
of the terminology used, the precise content of most of the Constitution's civil-liberties
guarantees rests upon an assessment of what accommodation between governmental need and
individual freedom is reasonable..." 483 U.S. 635, 643-44 (1987).
Professor Aleinikoff has argued that "balancing now dominates major areas of constitutional
law." T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE L.J. 943,
965-71 (1987). He cites the following examples of contexts in which balancing tests have been
employed by the Court: Fourth Amendment search and seizure, Dormant Commerce Clause,
First Amendment, Fourteenth Amendment equal protection and substantive due process, the
Contract Clause, the privileges and immunities clause, the Fifth Amendment's protections
against self-incrimination and double jeopardy, the Sixth Amendment's guarantees of a jury
trial and a public trial, the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment, the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause in criminal proceedings, separa-
tion of powers, and the right to travel. See id.
283. I do not discuss the Fourth Amendment probable cause standard as a balancing test,
although in some sense it is: Probable cause requires a balancing of the need to "safeguard
citizens from rash and unreasonable interferences with privacy and from unfounded charges of
crime" with the need to "give [police officers] fair leeway for enforcing the law in the commu-
nity's protection." Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176 (1949). As noted above, how-
ever, the Fourth Amendment often (though not always) has a rule-like quality both because of
the large number of rules governing the use of warrants and because of the tendency for similar
fact patterns to recur. See supra notes 200-05 and accompanying text. That makes the Fourth
Amendment different from the Due Process and First Amendment standards I discuss in this
section, at least for purposes of qualified immunity.
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speech, 28 the First Amendment rights of governmental employees are
not absolute.28 The threshold inquiry is whether the speech at issue
touches a matter of "public concern" or involves only a matter of
"personal interest."28 This determination, in turn, depends upon a
number of factors, including the content and form of the speech and
the context in which the statements were made.2 7 If the speech is
deemed to involve a matter of public concern, the determination of
whether the employee was properly dismissed or disciplined 288 for
engaging in that speech requires a "balance between the interests of
the [employee], as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public
concern" and "the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting
the efficiency of the public services it performs through its
employees."29
284. See Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593, 598 (1972); Pickering v. Board of Education,
391 U.S. 563, 574 (1968).
285. The government is understood to have a "freer hand in regulating the speech of its
employees than it has in regulating the speech of the public at large." Waters v. Churchill, 511
U.S. 661, 671 (1994). This extra governmental power to regulate speech comes from the
government's legal obligation to perform certain tasks as "effectively and efficiently as possible."
Id. at 675.
286. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147 (1983). The Court in Connick noted that
when a public employee speaks not as a citizen upon matters of public concern, but
instead as an employee upon matters only of personal interest, absent the most unusual
circumstances, a federal court is not the appropriate forum in which to review the
wisdom of a personnel decision taken by a public agency allegedly in reaction to the
employee's behavior.
Id. (emphasis added); see United States v. National Treasury Employees Union, 513 U.S. 454,
466 (1995) ("[Plrivate speech that involves nothing more than a complaint about a change in the
employee's own duties may give rise to discipline without imposing any special burden of
justification on the governmental employer.").
287. See Connick, 461 U.S. at 149; see also Smith v. Fruin, 28 F.3d 646, 651 (7th Cir. 1994)
(noting that the public concern inquiry "must... take into account the point of the speech in
question" and determine whether it was the employee's "point" to raise an issue because it was a
matter of public concern rather than one of merely private interest); Koch v. City of Hutchinson,
847 F.2d 1436, 1443-49 (10th Cir. 1988) (en banc) (listing the factors courts have considered in
deciding whether speech touches a matter of public concern).
288. The Supreme Court has held that the First Amendment prohibits patronage promo-
tions, transfers, and recalls, as well as firings. See Rutan v. Republican Party, 497 U.S. 62
(1990). In Pierce v. Texas Department of Criminal Justice, 37 F.3d 1146 (5th Cir. 1994), the
Fifth Circuit applied Rutan to cases alleging speech-related retaliation. The court held that
"retaliation" encompasses "discharges, demotions, refusals to hire, refusals to promote, and
reprimands." Id. at 1149.
289. Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968). If the plaintiffs speech is found
to have been on a matter of public concern and the Pickering balance is determined in the
plaintiffs favor, the plaintiff must also prove that the protected speech was a "motivating factor"
in the detrimental employment decision. Mt. Healthy v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977). The
burden then shifts to the employer to show by a preponderance of the evidence that it would
have reached the same decision apart from the protected speech. See Melton v. City of
Oklahoma City, 879 F.2d 706, 713 (10th Cir. 1989), overruled on other grounds, 928 F.2d 920
(10th Cir. 1989).
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In adopting the Pickering balancing test, the Court reasoned
that the "enormous variety of fact situations" in which statements by
employees might be thought by their public employers to justify dis-
missal made the formulation of a bright-line rule neither
"appropriate" nor "feasible."290 The only guidance the Court was able
to offer was to describe the "general lines along which an analysis of
the controlling interests should run," including whether the
statements undermined discipline by superiors or harmony among co-
workers, whether the statements had a detrimental impact on close
working relationships for which loyalty and confidence are especially
required, and whether the statements had an adverse effect on the
workplace.291
Under Pickering's case-by-case approach, disciplining or firing
an employee for statements thought to be disruptive to the
workplace-unlike, for example, a dismissal based on race-is not per
se unconstitutional. 292 The government as employer is charged not
only with respecting an employee's right to speak, but also with doing
particular tasks, and doing them "as effectively and efficiently as
possible."293 Thus, when a public employee acts or speaks in a way
that undermines the effective operation of the workplace, her em-
ployer "must have some power to restrain her."2 94 While the gov-
ernment cannot regulate the speech of ordinary citizens "in the name
of efficiency," when the government employs someone "for the very
purpose of effectively achieving its goals, such restrictions may well
be appropriate."295 Retaliation based on an employee's speech reaches
constitutional dimensions only when the interests of the employee in
speaking outweigh the employer's interest in the effective functioning
of the workplace. Thus, public employers are permitted to penalize
speech that is unduly disruptive, or involves the employee's private
affairs, unless the penalty is inordinately burdensome to the public
interest.296 Moreover, the level of potential or actual disruption of the
workplace required to justify retaliation depends upon the nature and
importance of the employee's particular statements; the more the
employee's speech touches a matter of great public concern, the
290. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 569.
291. Id. at 569-70.
292. See Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 668-75 (1994).
293. Id. at 675.
294. Id.
295. Id.
296. The Court has held that the context in which the statements were made as well as the
time, place, and manner of the employee's speech are also relevant to the balance. See Connick
v. Meyers, 461 U.S. 138, 152 (1983).
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greater the showing of disruption required by the government. 297 The
balance of interests also varies with the nature of the employee's
responsibilities within the governmental agency.298 For example,
when "close working relationships are essential to fulfilling public
responsibilities, a wide degree of deference to the employer's
judgment is appropriate."29
The problem created by this case-by-case approach is that
reasonable public officials "knowing only that they must not infringe
on employee free speech rights would not necessarily know just what
conduct was prohibited."3°° As one federal judge has expressed it:
Any balancing approach is hard to administer and invites consideration of
many factors.... The farther we depart from bright line rules, the more
common error becomes. Have defendants gone "too far"? Questions of degree
cannot be answered reliably, which means that taking any action is risky to a
potential defendant.30 1
When the boundaries of constitutional law are defined by this kind of
"sliding scale" analysis, involving "questions that lack right, or at
297. See id. at 150 & n.9. As the Supreme Court has noted, this situation-specific
balancing is difficult even for judges, let alone for public employers trying to anticipate when
their actions could result in liability. Id. at 150.
298. See Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 390 (1987).
299. Connick, 461 U.S. at 151-52. Courts have held that in certain contexts, such as judges'
chambers, see Gregorich v. Lund, 54 F.3d 410, 416 (7th Cir. 1995), and police departments, see
Hughes v. Whitmer, 714 F.2d 1407 (8th Cir. 1983), close working relationships are essential and
employers must be given more leeway to insist upon confidentiality, loyalty, and cooperation.
See, e.g., Gregorich, 54 F.3d at 416 ("Among the countervailing governmental interests that
have been recognized is the practical reality of governance that those with policy-making
responsibilities must have faithful agents."); McDaniel v. Woodard, 886 F.2d 311, 315 (11th Cir.
1989) (noting that "[c]ourts are reluctant to prevent public employees from firing confidential
employees because it seems self-evident that you cannot run a government with officials who
are forced to keep their enemies as their confidential secretaries"); Meeks v. Grimes, 779 F.2d
417, 423 (7th Cir. 1985) (noting that a judge's chambers is perhaps the "paradigm example" in
which close working relationships are essential to the successful performance of the public
function); Hughes, 714 F.2d at 1419 (stating that "[mIore so than the typical governmental
employer, the [police department] has a significant government interest in regulating the
speech activities of its officers... [and] should be accorded much wider latitude than the normal
government employer in dealing with dissension within its ranks" (citations omitted)).
300. Noyola v. Texas Dep't of Human Resources, 846 F.2d 1021, 1025 (5th Cir. 1988); see
Benson v. Allphin, 786 F.2d 268, 276 (7th Cir. 1986) (stating that while every public official
should know that a citizen "does not forfeit his First Amendment rights entirely when he
becomes a public employee, the scope of those rights in any given factual situation has not been
well defined") (emphasis added).
301. Walsh v. Ward, 991 F.2d 1344, 1346 (7th Cir. 1993) (Easterbrook, J.). In Walsh the
plaintiff alleged that he had been promoted to battalion chief-a job that paid more and had
shorter, more regular hours, but prevented plaintiff from operating a private business-in
retaliation for his speech. See id. at 1345. The court held that it was not clearly established
that a promotion, at plaintiffs request, but not to a position of his choosing, could violate the
Constitution. See id. at 1346-47.
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least obviously right, answers," officials cannot fairly be blamed for
stepping over the line between permitted and forbidden conduct
unless that line "ha[s] been marked in advance."3 2  Moreover,
"[d]ifferences in the nature of the competing interests from case to
case make it difficult for a governmental official to determine, in the
absence of case law that is very closely analogous, whether the bal-
ance he strikes is an appropriate accommodation of the competing
individual and governmental interests."303 As one court has framed it:
"[When] the existence of a right or the degree of protection it warrants
in a particular context is subject to a balancing test, the right can
rarely be considered 'clearly established'" for purposes of qualifiedimmunity.3 04 Given these uncertain constitutional lines, it is easy to
see why courts have virtually unanimously agreed that qualified im-
munity in the First Amendment context has especially broad scope.30 5
Thus, qualified immunity protects from liability an official
whose only error was in failing to predict how courts would evaluate
the relevant competing interests.06 If, however, an official can be
302. Id. at 1346; see Gregorich, 54 F.3d at 414-15 ("We must remember that governmental
officials are not expected to be prescient and are not liable for damages simply because they
legitimately but mistakenly believed that the balancing of interests tipped in the State's
favor.").
303. Gregorich, 54 F.3d at 414 (emphasis added); see Rakovich v. Wade, 850 F.2d 1180,
1213 (7th Cir. 1988) (noting that immunity protects "all but the plainly incompetent or those
who knowingly violate the law" and concluding that lilt cannot be said that an imperfect bal-
ancing resulting, in hindsight, in a decision on the wrong side of the scales shows plain incom-
petence or total disregard, unless, of course, the proper balance was clearly illuminated by the
light of existing law") (citations omitted); Myers v. Morris, 810 F.2d 1437, 1462 (8th Cir. 1987)
(opining that a denial of qualified immunity requires "closely corresponding factual and legal
precedent"); Azeez v. Fairman, 795 F.2d 1296, 1301 (7th Cir. 1986) (holding that clearly
established rights are supported by case law that is "sufficiently particularized to put potential
defendants on notice that their conduct is unlawful").
304. Myers, 810 F.2d at 1462.
305. See Benson, 786 F.2d at 276 ("With Harlow's elimination of the inquiry into the actual
motivation of the officials . . . qualified immunity typically casts a wide net to protect
governmental officials from damage liability whenever balancing is required."). At least eight
circuits have concluded that because the Pickering-Connick test requires fact-specific balancing,
the law governing any particular case will rarely be "clearly established" for purposes of
qualified immunity. See, e.g., DiMeglio v. Haines, 45 F.3d 790, 806 (4th Cir. 1995); Hansen v.
Soldenwagner, 19 F.3d 573, 576 (11th Cir. 1994); Medina v. City and County of Denver, 960
F.2d 1493, 1498 (10th Cir. 1992); Guercio v. Brody, 911 F.2d 1179, 1183-85 (6th Cir. 1990);
Melton v. City of Oklahoma City, 879 F.2d 706, 728-29 (10th Cir. 1989), overruled on other
grounds by 928 F.2d 920 (10th Cir. 1991) (en banc); Dartland v. Metropolitan Dade County, 866
F.2d 1321, 1324 (11th Cir. 1989); Noyola, 846 F.2d at 1024-25; Borucki v. Ryan, 827 F.2d 836,
848 (1st Cir. 1987).
306. Qualified immunity "relieve[s public employees] from having to decide, at their finan-
cial peril, how judges will balance these interests." Greenberg v. Kmetko, 922 F.2d 382, 385
(7th Cir. 1991); see, e.g., Rogers v. Miller, 57 F.3d 986, 991-92 (11th Cir. 1995) (holding that a
sheriff was entitled to qualified immunity in a suit alleging that he transferred plaintiffs, with
no change in rank or pay, in retaliation for their support of his opponent in the local election
because no case law clearly prohibited defendant's conduct); Guercio, 911 F.2d at 1185
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charged with "knowledge of the law" via the surrogate of "previously-
decided case[s] with clearly analogous facts," that official will be
deemed blameworthy and qualified immunity will be denied.307 This
"particularity" requirement is, of course, not peculiar to qualified
immunity in the First Amendment context. It applies over the range
of constitutional claims to limit damages liability to situations where
officials could fairly be expected to know that their particular conduct
would violate the Constitution by requiring the plaintiff to point to
previously decided, factually-similar cases. 08 As courts have framed
it, however, the requirement of factually-analogous cases is more
protective-leads to less liability-in the First Amendment context
than, for example, in Fourth Amendment cases. That is because
plaintiffs in Fourth Amendment cases are more likely to be able to
identify factually-analogous precedent in the litigation-rich environ-
ment of search and seizure, where fact patterns tend to recur,
whereas in the First Amendment context the law will only infre-
quently be found to be clearly established at the level of factual-speci-
ficity that will defeat qualified immunity. 0 9 As one court has
explained, because of the case-by-case approach required in First
Amendment retaliation cases, "[tihere will rarely be a basis for [an] a
priori judgment [based on prior case law] that the termination or
(extending qualified immunity to a bankruptcy judge who terminated his confidential secretary
for circulating newspaper articles critical of a judicial nominee because "[officials] of reasonable
competence in the position of [defendant] ... could have disagreed upon whether her right to
exercise her first amendment right to free speech without being terminated from her
employment was outweighed by the public interest in restoring morale, cooperation, dignity,
public respect and confidence to the [workplace]"); Schalk v. Gallemore, 906 F.2d 491, 499 (10th
Cir. 1990) (holding that the issue for qualified immunity is whether "the protected nature of
[plaintiffs] speech was sufficiently clear that [the defendant] should have been on notice that his
asserted interest in preventing disruption would not survive a balancing inquiry"); Noyola, 846
F.2d at 1026 (extending qualified immunity to state officials who terminated a welfare services
technician in retaliation for complaints to his supervisor about the size of individual caseloads
because neither the protected status of plaintiff's speech nor his right to remain employed "could
have been facially apparent" to defendants under clear law).
307. Borucki, 827 F.2d at 848. The qualified immunity inquiry, however, is not whether a
reasonable public official would have known it was unlawful to retaliate against an employee on
the basis of her speech but "whether plaintiff's rights were so clearly established when she was
terminated that (the defendant] should have understood that his conduct at the time he ordered
her discharge violated her first amendment right to free speech." Guercio, 911 F.2d at 1183
(emphasis added).
308. See supra notes 159-64 and accompanying text.
309. See supra notes 200-05 and accompanying text. Unlike police officers, governmental
employers are much less likely to be repeat players in First Amendment or other constitutional
litigation and they lack the repeated exposure and opportunities for training by which law
enforcement officials develop the ability to predict with some accuracy the boundaries of Fourth
Amendment law.
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discipline of a public employee violated 'clearly established'
constitutional rights."3 0
To take a concrete example of qualified immunity in the First
Amendment context, in DiMeglio v. Haines, the Fourth Circuit con-
sidered whether a local zoning commissioner was entitled to qualified
immunity in a suit by a zoning inspector who was allegedly reas-
signed to a different enforcement territory in retaliation for state-
ments made to a citizens group.31' The court held the employer
immune on several grounds: First, the law at the time the events
occurred was unclear as to whether an employee's speech is protected
when he speaks as an employee rather than as a citizen.3 2 Second,
under the Pickering balancing test, the employer could reasonably
have believed that the plaintiffs statements "made seemingly with
the imprimatur" of the zoning office, yet in contradiction to his man-
ager's position on a disputed issue, were sufficiently disruptive to
outweigh the plaintiffs interest in speaking.33 Finally, the court
noted that it was not clearly established in existing case law that a
reassignment to a subset of plaintiffs original enforcement area
(without change in duties, salary or perquisites of office) amounted to
a constitutional deprivation.3 4 The court noted that only a few years
prior to the events in the instant case had a "sharply divided Supreme
Court" held that something less than action equivalent to dismissal
could violate a public employee's First Amendment rights.3 15
Moreover, although the Court had acknowledged that a failure to
rehire, a denial of a promotion, or a denial of a transfer, might
constitute a deprivation,3 6 neither the Supreme Court nor the Fourth
310. Noyola, 846 F.2d at 1025. The Eleventh Circuit noted that:
Because Pickering requires a balancing of competing interests on a case-by-case basis,
our decisions tilt strongly in favor of immunity by recognizing that only in the rarest of
cases will [a] reasonable governmental official[ truly know that the termination or
discipline of a public employee violated 'clearly established' federal rights [in the
particular sense] that 'what he is doing... violate[d] plaintiffs rights.
Hansen, 19 F.3d at 576; see also Medina, 960 F.2d at 1498 ("In determining whether the law was
clearly established, we bear in mind that allegations of constitutional violations that require
courts to balance competing interests may make it more difficult to find the law 'clearly
established' when assessing claims of qualified immunity.").
311. 45 F.3d 790 (4th Cir. 1995).
312. The court noted that the Fifth Circuit had interpreted Connick to hold that whether
speech is protected depends upon the distinction between employee speech and speech as a
private citizen. See id. at 804-05; see also Terrell v. University of Tex. Sys. Police, 792 F.2d
1360, 1362 (5th Cir. 1986) (considering the issue of whether the speech was made in plaintiffs
role as a citizen or as an employee).
313. DiMeglio, 45 F.3d at 806.
314. See id. at 806-07.
315. See id. at 806 (citing Rutan v. Republican Party, 497 U.S. 62, 75-76 (1990)).
316. See Rutan v. Republican Party, 497 U.S. 62, 73-76 (1990).
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Circuit had held that some less onerous employment action could
violate the First Amendment. 317
Similarly, in Melton v. City of Oklahoma City, the plaintiff
police officer sued law enforcement officials for allegedly firing him in
retaliation for testifying in court and communicating with the defense
attorney in connection with the trial of a longtime friend.318 The
plaintiff, who was considered a potential defense witness, disclosed
information to the federal prosecutor that plaintiff had gained during
his work as a police officer, including some exculpatory evidence he
believed to be "Brady" material.3 19 The plaintiff later discussed the
content of the interview with defense counsel. After the trial of his
friend, at which the plaintiff testified, the police department began an
investigation of the plaintiff and ultimately fired him, alleging that
plaintiffs disclosures to defense counsel constituted a breach of confi-
dentiality in violation of the Police Code of Ethics.3 20
On the merits the court agreed with the plaintiff.3 2' Turning to
qualified immunity, however, the inquiry was whether "[a]t the time
these events took place.., the protected nature of [plaintiffs] speech
[was] sufficiently clear that defendants should have been reasonably
on notice that the City's interest in [regulating plaintiffs speech]
would not survive a balancing inquiry."322 The court cited two lower
court cases in concluding that the defendants should have known that
plaintiffs trial testimony was protected.323 As to plaintiffs
communications to the defense attorney, however, the court held that
although plaintiffs interest in fact outweighed the interest of the
City, the balancing would not have been so clear to a reasonable offi-
317. SeeDiMeglio, 45 F.3d at 806.
318. 879 F.2d 706, 711 (10th Cir. 1989), rev'd in part on other grounds, 928 F.2d 920 (10th
Cir. 1991) (en banc).
319. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (holding that upon request by the de-
fense, the prosecution in a criminal trial may not suppress evidence favorable to the accused).
320. See Melton, 879 F.2d at 711-12.
321. The court reasoned that the First Amendment interest in testifying truthfully at trial
was so strong that any disruption of the work environment would have to be "extreme" to justify
governmental regulation. Id. at 714. The court found plaintiffs communications to defense
counsel to be a "closer case" because of their potential impact on cooperative relations between
local and federal law enforcement personnel. The court noted, however, that neither plaintiff
nor the local police had any role in the federal investigation and the defendants had presented
no evidence that this particular alleged breach of confidentiality had caused or posed a serious
risk of disruption. See id. at 714-16.
322. Id. at 729.
323. See id. at 729-30.
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cial that it constituted "clearly established law" for purposes of qual-
ified immunity.324
As the Melton court noted, qualified immunity is most likely to
provide a defense "where supervisors, in a reasonable and good-faith
exercise of their duties, discipline employees without the direction
that would come through analogous cases."325 If, on the other hand,
there are cases that have struck the balance under analogous (though
not necessarily identical) facts, "government officials will be deemed
'on notice' that their actions will be measured according to clearly
established law and qualified immunity may not be available to
them."326 For example, in Marshall v. Allen, the court rejected the
defendant's invocation of qualified immunity, citing cases clearly
establishing that the subject of the speech at issue-sex
discrimination in a public agency-touched on a matter of public
324. Id. at 730; see also Dartland v. Metropolitan Dade County, 866 F.2d 1321, 1322-23
(11th Cir. 1989) (holding the Dade County Manager entitled to qualified immunity for firing the
Dade County Consumer Advocate for "rude and insulting" statements questioning County
Manager's policy choices because a reasonable person in the employer's position could have
thought the firing was constitutionally permissible).
325. Melton, 879 F.2d at 729. There are many other examples of this line of thinking. The
court in Gregorich v. Lund held that a judge who fired an attorney for union-organizing
activities was entitled to qualified immunity because "the state of the case law afforded [the
defendant] a reasonable basis for concluding that someone with [the plaintiffs] responsibilities
to the court had an obligation to refrain from taking such an adversarial role to the court." 54
F.3d 410, 418 (7th Cir. 1994). The court in Hansen v. Soldenwagner held that defendants who
allegedly investigated and suspended a police officer for critical statements made at a deposition
were entitled to qualified immunity because it was not clearly unconstitutional to discipline an
officer for "vulgar, insulting, and defiant criticisms" of the police department, citing precedents
holding that the manner of the employee's speech is relevant to the Pickering balance. 19 F.3d
573, 575 (11th Cir. 1994). In Rakovich v. Wade, the court held that defendant police officers who
investigated plaintiff for possible illegal activity, suggested a charging conference to the district
attorney, and informed a newspaper reporter of the pending charging conference allegedly in
retaliation for plaintiffs criticism of the police department were entitled to qualified immunity
because "their resolution of the contradictory factors before them showed neither plain
incompetence nor total disregard of [plaintiffs] first amendment rights" and there were no
factually-similar cases condemning such behavior. 850 F.2d 1180, 1213 (7th Cir. 1988). Finally,
the court in Benson v. Allphin held that a defendant who fired an employee for critical in-house
statements and statements to the press was entitled to qualified immunity because prior to
Givhan v. Western Line Consolidated School District, 439 U.S. 410 (1979), handed down after
the events in question, it was still an "open question whether on-the-job expressions of public
employees" were constitutionally protected and because there were no cases describing the
factors relevant to the Pickering balance under factually analogous circumstances. 786 F.2d
268, 277 (7th Cir. 1986).
326. Melton, 879 F.2d at 729 n.36 (emphasis added). As the court in Melton explained,
"governmental entities," through their legal counsel, can reasonably be expected to "remain
abreast of the decisional law and periodically update responsible government officials so that
their actions will be informed by, and will comport with, the law." Id.
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concern and concluding that the employer had presented no evidence
of workplace disruption resulting from plaintiffs speech. 27
2. Balancing and "Bad" Conduct
In addition to cases in which factually-analogous precedent
forecasts the likely illegality of defendant's actions, there may also be
situations in which "the defendant's actions are so egregious that the
result of the balancing test will be a foregone conclusion, even though
prior case law may not address the specific facts at issue."328 That is
another way of saying that some conduct that violates the First
Amendment is so far off the mark that it carries indicia of its own
wrongfulness. For example, in Stough v. Gallagher, the court
considered a claim of immunity by a newly-elected sheriff who de-
moted two ranks, from captain to sergeant, a deputy sheriff who had
been with the department for thirteen years allegedly in retaliation
for statements in support of defendant's opponent.3 29 In analyzing the
strength of the plaintiffs interest, the court noted that comments on
the qualifications of candidates for public office lie at the very heart of
First Amendment protection: Plaintiffs speech was "more than self-
expression;" it was the "essence of self-government," occupying the
"highest rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment values." 30  In
addition, the time (during off-duty hours before the election), place (on
a public platform in front of potential voters), and manner (not rude
or insulting) of plaintiffs speech weighed heavily in favor of
constitutional protection. 33 ' The employer, on the other hand, had
failed to make any showing that the plaintiffs speech had adversely
327. 984 F.2d 787, 795, 797 (7th Cir. 1993). Similarly, in Conner v. Reinhard, the court
denied summary judgment to defendants who fired the plaintiff for statements she made at a
Board of Ethics meeting of the local comptroller's office. 847 F.2d 384, 393 (7th Cir. 1988). The
court reasoned that based on case law illustrating the application of factors relevant to the
Pickering balance in similar circumstances, the defendants "should have been on notice that
their conduct was probably unlawful." Id. In making that determination, the court considered
whether: the speech affected discipline and harmony in the workplace, the statements breached
confidentiality, the speech resulted in disruption of the employee's duties, or the statements
undermined the employer's confidence in the employee's loyalty. See id. at 389-93. In addition,
the court considered the nature of the context in which the statements were made. See id.
328. Benson, 786 F.2d at 276 n.18; see Dartland, 866 F.2d at 1323 ("[Blecause no bright line
standard puts the reasonable public employer on notice of a constitutional violation, the
employer is entitled to immunity except in the extraordinary case where Pickering balancing
would lead to the inevitable conclusion that the discharge of the employee was unlawful."
(emphasis added)).
329. 967 F.2d 1523 (11th Cir. 1992).
330. Id. at 1529 (quoting Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 145 (1983)) (citations omitted).
331. See id.
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affected the workplace or that plaintiff had acted disloyally after the
election. The court concluded that the Pickering balance led to the
"inevitable conclusion" that the defendant's action was unlawful and
that no reasonable public official in the employer's place could have
believed otherwise.32 Similarly, in Roth v. Veteran's Administration,
the court denied qualified immunity to defendants who allegedly
demoted the plaintiff in retaliation for reporting wastefulness,
mismanagement, unethical behavior, regulatory violations, and
incompetence at the Alcohol Inpatient Unit at the Veterans
Administration.333 The court opined that certain topics, such as
charges of racial discrimination or misuse of public funds, have been
recognized by courts as "inherently of public concern."3 34 The court
further concluded that the defendants' showing of disruption was not
adequate to merit qualified immunity, given the importance of
plaintiffs interest and the fact that whistle blowing, "by its very
nature" is likely to produce some hostility and disruption.33 5
3. Qualified Immunity and Due Process
The above-described analysis of qualified immunity in First
Amendment cases serves as a paradigm for qualified immunity in
other contexts in which the underlying constitutional right is defined
as a balancing of interests. Take, for example, procedural due process
claims. The fundamental principle of due process-that deprivations
of life, liberty, or property be preceded by notice and an opportunity to
332. Id. at 1528-29.
333. 856 F.2d 1401 (9th Cir. 1988).
334. Id. at 1405. Both the content-plaintiff alleged that defendant's behavior put patients
at risk-and the context-plaintiff had no personal employment dispute with defen-
dants-supported the conclusion that plaintiffs speech was protected. See id. at 1406. The
court also noted that its conclusion was supported by a factually-analogous case in which similar
speech was found to be protected. See id. (citing Schwartzman v. Valenzuela, 846 F.2d 1209
(9th Cir. 1988)).
335. "'[It would be absurd,' reasoned the court, 'to hold that the First Amendment gener-
ally authorizes corrupt officials to punish subordinates who blow the whistle simply because the
speech somehow disrupted the office.'" Id. at 1407-08 (quoting Czurlanis v. Albanes, 721 F.2d
98, 107 (3d Cir. 1983)); see also Gorman v. Robinson, 977 F.2d 350, 356 (7th Cir. 1992) (holding
that any reasonable public official would have recognized that plaintiffs interest in disclosing
criminal activities of Chicago Housing Authority employees clearly outweighed the agency's
interest in maintaining "organizational harmony"); Wulf v. City of Wichita, 883 F.2d 842, 867
(10th Cir. 1989) (opining that the case was "very close" but concluding that "a reasonable police
chief should have been on notice that it would be a violation of the First Amendment to termi-
nate a police officer who wrote a letter alleging... anti-union animus on the part of the police
chief, particularly where the letter caused no significant disruption of police department opera-
tions").
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be heard-is, at a general level, quite clearly established.336 But the
exact requisites of due process in any particular case vary with the
nature of the deprivation: Due process, the Supreme Court has
opined, is not like some other legal rules that have a "technical con-
ception with a fixed content unrelated to time, place and circum-
stances[;]" 37 it is "flexible and calls for such procedural protections as
the situation demands."33 8 Thus, even when the Supreme Court has
held that a predeprivation hearing is constitutionally required in a
particular context, the Court has spoken sparingly about the exact
requisites of constitutionally adequate process.33 9 Instead, the Court
has directed that procedures are to be "tailored, in light of the deci-
sion to be made, to the capacities and circumstances of those who are
to be heard, to insure that they are given a meaningful opportunity to
present their case."3O As in First Amendment cases, required pro-
cedures must be determined by a case-by-case balancing of interests:
The "private interest that will be affected by the official action," must
be balanced against the "risk of an erroneous deprivation of such
interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any,
of additional or substitute procedural safeguards." Then this initial
balancing must be considered in light of the "[g]overnment's interest,
including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative
burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement
would entail."341 This kind of "ad hoc" weighing, of course, means that
"[elvery different set of facts will present a new issue on what process
was due"342 and thus the law will rarely be "clearly established" at the
particularized level required to defeat qualified immunity.
Consider for example, Williams v. Kentucky, in which the court
considered a claim by a tenured employee who had been demoted
allegedly without due process.343 The court opined that the law was
clearly established in Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill34
336. See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 542 (1985) (stating that an es-
sential principle of due process is that these deprivations must be preceded by notice and oppor-
tunity for hearing).
337. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319,334(1976).
338. Id. at 334.
339. See id. at 333-34 (listing examples). A rare exception is Goldberg v. Kelly, in which the
Supreme Court held that a predeprivation hearing approximating a judicial trial is required
prior to termination of welfare benefits. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
340. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 349 (quotation marks omitted).
341. Id. at 335.
342. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 562-63 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dis-
senting).
343. 24 F.3d 1526 (6th Cir. 1994).
344. 470 U.S. 532 (1985).
1998] 657
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 51:583
that a pretermination hearing is required before a tenured employee
may be fired.3 41 The court reasoned, however, that Loudermill cannot
be "mechanically applied to demotion cases."346 The particular
requisites of due process prior to terminating a tenured employee
were determined by balancing the interests specific to that situation,
including the employee's interest in retaining her employment, the
obvious value to an employee of the opportunity to present her side of
the case, the administrative burden imposed by additional proce-
dures, as well as the employer's interest in immediate termination of
the employee.4 7 The court reasoned that although Loudermill's
analysis applied to the demotion setting, there was no clear law pre-
dicting how the "analysis would come out in [that] setting as opposed
to the discharge setting."m Because there were no cases that had
specifically considered the requisites of due process in the demotion
context and because the balance of competing interests could compel a
different result for demotions, the court concluded that the law was
not sufficiently clear to defeat defendant's claim of qualified
immunity.34 9 By contrast, in cases where existing case law has
345. See Williams, 24 F.2d at 1538-39.
346. Id. at 1539.
347. See id. (citing Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 542-46).
348. Id. at 1541.
349. See id. The court distinguished two Sixth Circuit cases that had not specifically con-
sidered whether the requisites of due process were the same in demotion and termination cases.
See id. at 1539-40. The court also rejected as not dispositive two cases in other circuits indicat-
ing, in dicta and without discussion, that they would apply Loudermill to demotions. See id. at
1541. Finally, the court identified only two district court opinions (from other jurisdictions) that
had recognized the right to a pretermination hearing in demotion cases, which the court found
insufficient to alert a reasonable officer that failing to provide notice and a hearing prior to a
demotion would violate the employee's due process rights. See id. For other examples of
qualified immunity in due process cases, see, for example, White Plains Towing Corp. v.
Patterson, 991 F.2d 1049, 1064 (2d Cir. 1993) (extending qualified immunity to state police
officers who terminated a towing company's status as the exclusive assignee of state towing
rights because it was not clearly established that loss of noncontractual towing rights combined
with nonpublic statements between police officers deprived the company of a liberty interest);
Collins v. School Bd., 981 F.2d 1203, 1205-06 (11th Cir. 1993) (holding school board members
immune in suit by a suspended teacher for 19-month delay in postdeprivation hearing because it
was not clearly established at what point a delay in the post-termination hearing would become
a constitutional violation); FDIC v. Henderson, 940 F.2d 465, 477 (9th Cir. 1991) (extending
qualified immunity to state supervisor of banking for terminating a bank president without a
pretermination hearing because it was not clearly established that an "employment contract
containing both for-cause and at-will termination provisions created even a limited property
interest"); Arcoren v. Peters, 829 F.2d 671, 673 (8th Cir. 1987) (extending qualified immunity to
federal officials in a suit alleging that without adequate notice they repossessed and sold
plaintiff's cattle, in which the Farmers Home Administration had a security interest, because
there is no clearly established right to a predeprivation hearing when the government acts as a
commercial lender); Howe v. Baker, 796 F.2d 1355, 1360 (11th Cir. 1986) (extending qualified
immunity to state officials who allegedly transferred and suspended a police officer without
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identified the requisites of due process under facts sufficiently
analogous to provide notice of the likely illegality of the officer's
actions, courts have held that qualified immunity is not available.350
There are, of course, many other examples of constitutional
rights that have been defined in terms of a balancing of interests. 51
In these contexts qualified immunity's requirement of fact-specific
precedent may mean that the law will rarely be deemed clearly
established for purposes of qualified immunity.
E. Excessive Force-Balancing or "Bad" Conduct?
Fourth Amendment excessive force claims provide a good final
example of the intersection between qualified immunity and the un-
derlying constitutional standard. In Graham v. Connor, the Supreme
Court specifically reserved the question of the proper application of
qualified immunity to excessive force cases. 52 A number of courts and
commentators, however, have concluded that qualified immunity
should not apply to excessive force claims. An implicit assumption
underlying this conclusion is that these claims tend to involve conduct
that contains indicia of its own wrongfulness. As I argue below, while
some applications of force can be deemed inherently wrongful, in
other cases the illegality of the force as determined by an ex post
balancing of interests will not have been obvious at the time the
events occurred. In the latter case, qualified immunity will be neces-
sary to ensure that only blameworthy defendants are subject to liabil-
ity.
adequate process because it was not clearly established that the plaintiff had a property right in
being transferred or suspended only with cause).
350. See, e.g., Cotnoir v. University of Me. Sys., 35 F.3d 6, 11 (1st Cir. 1994) (denying
qualified immunity to state officials who fired a tenured professor without giving him prior
notice that they were considering termination for academic misconduct and without providing
any explanation of the evidence against him because the "dictates of Loudermill squarely
control [this] case"); Langley v. Adams County, 987 F.2d 1473, 1480 (10th Cir. 1993) (denying
qualified immunity where local officials agreed to reschedule a pretermination hearing and then
on the original hearing date rescinded the agreement to reschedule and terminated the plaintiff
at close of business the same day); Calhoun v. Gaines, 982 F.2d 1470, 1475-76 (10th Cir. 1992)
(denying qualified immunity to college officials who did not advise a professor until after the
finalization of his yearly contract renewal that his employment was in jeopardy of termination);
Runge v. Dove, 857 F.2d 469, 474 (8th Cir. 1988) (denying qualified immunity to local school
officials who fired a janitor without giving him any opportunity to tell his side of the story).
351. See supra note 282. For a different view of the relationship between qualified immun-
ity and constitutional balancing, see generally Chen, supra note 174, which discusses the
interaction between qualified immunity, understood as a standard, and various constitutional
rules and standards.
352. 490 U.S. 386, 399 n.12 (1989).
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Prior to Graham, allegations of excessive force could give rise
to both Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process claims, and
Fourth Amendment claims of unreasonable seizure. Because exces-
sive force in the Fourteenth Amendment context was understood to
require "egregious" conduct,353 the finding of a constitutional violation
arguably negated any claim of reasonableness and qualified immunity
was unavailable. 354  Courts that "borrowed" the Fourteenth
Amendment analysis and applied it to Fourth Amendment excessive
force claims tended to conclude that qualified immunity was not
available as a defense to those claims for similar reasons. 5 5 Even
after Graham held that the Fourth Amendment standard rather than
the Fourteenth Amendment standard governed excessive force claims,
a number of courts have held to the view that qualified immunity does
not apply. They reason that the constitutional standard is the same
as the immunity standard and thus there is no need to consider im-
munity apart from the merits of the claim. The Fourth Amendment
inquiry is whether the force applied was reasonable under the cir-
cumstances.3 56  Similarly, qualified immunity depends upon the
objective legal reasonableness of the governmental official's action.
According to this view, if the "scope of qualified immunity [is] evalu-
ated using the same 'objective reasonableness' criteria with which
Graham directs [the courts] to scrutinize an officer's actions under the
[F]ourth [Almendment," 57 then that test provides the standard for
evaluating both the merits of plaintiffs claim and defendant's
qualified immunity defense. Thus, the two issues simply collapse into
one another.35 8
353. See, e.g., Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1033 (2d Cir. 1973) (applying the "shocks
the conscience" test from Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952)).
354. See generally Kathryn R. Urbonya, Problematic Standards of Reasonableness: Quali-
fied Immunity in Section 1983 Actions for a Police Officer's Use of Excessive Force, 62 TEMPLE L.
REV. 61, 90-114 (1989) (discussing pre-Graham analysis of qualified immunity in excessive force
cases).
355. See id. at 97-98.
356. See Graham, 490 U.S. at 396-97.
357. Wardlaw v. Pickett, 1 F.3d 1297, 1303 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
358. Some courts have rejected a separate immunity inquiry for excessive force claims.
See, e.g., id. at 1302-03 (concluding that objective reasonableness is the standard for evaluating
both the scope of the officer's qualified immunity and the plaintiffs claim of excessive force);
Hopkins v. Andaya, 958 F.2d 881, 885 n.3 (9th Cir. 1992) (stating that in excessive force cases,
the qualified immunity inquiry is the same as the inquiry on the merits); Street v. Parham, 929
F.2d 537, 540-41 & n.2 (10th Cir. 1991) (noting that in excessive force cases, once a factfinder
has determined that the force used was unnecessary under the circumstances any question of
objective reasonableness has also been foreclosed). See generally Urbonya, supra note 354
(discussing separate immunity inquiry).
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The prevailing view, however, is that qualified immunity may
be asserted against Fourth Amendment excessive force claims.359
There are good reasons for thinking this view is the correct one.
First, there is no persuasive reason to distinguish Fourth Amendment
excessive force claims from other Fourth Amendment claims to which
qualified immunity indisputably does apply.360 The rationale for
rejecting qualified immunity in excessive force cases follows the rea-
soning of the dissent's argument in Anderson: Because the Fourth
Amendment standard already involves a reasonableness inquiry,
qualified immunity would entail an unnecessary, second reasonable-
ness analysis.361 That argument can be refuted partly on semantic
grounds.362  But more importantly, qualified immunity-providing
some room for error at the constitutional level-is necessary in the
excessive force context, as in other contexts, because governmental
officials are not blameworthy if their only error was in failing to pre-
dict how the courts would view the balance of interests that defines a
constitutional use of force.
As the Supreme Court explained in Graham v. Connor, the
determination of whether a particular application of force by a public
official violated the Fourth Amendment "is not capable of precise
definition or mechanical application."363 The inquiry requires a
"careful balancing of the nature and quality of the intrusion on the
individual's Fourth Amendment interests against the countervailing
governmental interests at stake," and "its proper application requires
careful attention to the facts and circumstances of each particular
case."36 The level of force that is permissible will vary according to
such factors as "the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect
poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and
whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest
by flight."365 Moreover, the inquiry is not limited to the particular
359. See generally 1A SCHWARTZ & KtKiiN, supra note 12, § 3.16, at 277 & n.596 (3d ed.
1997) (citing cases).
360. See supra notes 177-79 and accompanying text.
361. Compare Wardlaw, 1 F.3d at 1303 (rejecting a separate immunity inquiry for excessive
force claims), with Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 659-61 (1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(arguing that granting qualified immunity to Fourth Amendment violators affords them a
"double standard of reasonableness").
362. See supra notes 180-82 and accompanying text.
363. 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
364. Id. (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
365. Id. The Court also emphasized that:
The 'reasonableness' of a particular use of force must be judged from the perspective of a
reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with 20/20 vision of hindsight .... The
calculus of reasonableness must embody allowance for the fact that police officers are
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factors identified in Graham; courts must "look to whatever specific
factors may be appropriate in a particular case, whether or not listed
in Graham, and then must consider 'whether the totality of the cir-
cumstances justifies a particular sort of seizure.' "366 This fact-specific
balancing test presents the same kinds of difficulties that are
inherent in the balancing tests described in Pickering3 7 and
Loudermill. 68 Although it is clearly established that law enforcement
officials may not use excessive force when arresting suspects, it is not
at all clear what level of force will be justified by the balancing of
private and governmental interests in any particular situation. And
officials who cannot anticipate when their behavior is likely to lead to
liability are not blameworthy. 69
My thesis would predict, however, that when the underlying
conduct is egregious-in other words it contains indicia of its own
blameworthiness-qualified immunity will be denied regardless of
whether there is factually-analogous precedent. This prediction is
borne out in the cases. For example, in McDonald v. Haskins, suit
was brought against a police officer who held a gun to the head of a
nine-year-old child and threatened to pull the trigger. 70 The child
posed no threat to the safety of the officer or others, was not fleeing or
actively resisting arrest, and was not engaged in assaultive behav-
ior.3 71 The court denied qualified immunity without requiring "a
precisely analogous case," reasoning that "i]t would create perverse
incentives indeed if a qualified immunity defense could succeed
against those types of claims that have not previously arisen because
the behavior alleged is so egregious that no like case is on the
books."372 Another court expressed a similar sentiment: "The easiest
often forced to make split-second judgments-in circumstances that are tense, uncer-
tain, and rapidly evolving-about the amount of force that is necessary in a particular
situation.
Id. at 396-97.
366. Franklin v. Foxworth, 31 F.3d 873, 876 (9th Cir. 1994) (quoting Graham, 490 U.S. at
396). For a general discussion of the factors courts consider in analyzing excessive force claims,
see Kathryn R. Urbonya, Dangerous Misperceptions: Protecting Police Officers, Society, and the
Fourth Amendment Right to Personal Privacy, 22 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 623 (1995).
367. See supra notes 292-305 and accompanying text.
368. See supra notes 339-41 and accompanying text.
369. See, e.g., Slattery v. Rizzo, 939 F.2d 213, 215-16 (4th Cir. 1991) ('There is no principled
reason not to allow a defense of qualified immunity in an excessive use of force claim .... [The
critical issue is whether] under the undisputed facts a reasonable police officer could have had
probable cause to believe that the [plaintiff] posed [an immediate and] deadly threat.").
370. 966 F.2d 292 (7th Cir. 1992).
371. See id. at 292-93.
372. Id. at 295. One Ninth Circuit judge noted a particularly egregious incident:
"[W]hether or not there is a case on point declaring such actions unconstitutional,"...
officers who removed a seriously ill, visibly incapacitated, and semi-naked man from his
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cases don't even arise. There has never been a section 1983 case ac-
cusing welfare officials of selling foster children into slavery; it does
not follow that if such a case arose, the officials would be immune
because no previous case had found liability in those circum-
stances.373
IV. THE ROLE OF INDIVIDUAL FAULT IN CONSTITUTIONAL
DAMAGES LIABILITY
Viewing qualified immunity through a lens derived from cri-
minal law where notice functions as a surrogate for fault explains how
the defense has been applied by the courts in section 1983 cases. It
leaves unanswered, however, a puzzling feature of constitutional
damages liability. On the one hand, section 1983 jurisprudence is
animated by a commitment to individual liability based on individual
fault. The Supreme Court has not embraced pure entity liability even
though it would enhance the goals of compensation and deterrence
and help to mitigate the overdeterrence effects of individual capacity
suits.374 The current legal regime based on individual liability, how-
ever, contrasts sharply with the reality that officials are unlikely
personally to bear the financial burden of damages and litigation costs
even if they lose in court. Unlike in the criminal context where con-
victed defendants pay their own fines and serve their own sentences,
constitutional defendants are ordinarily indemnified by their govern-
mental units.375 Section 1983 law could be described as a system of de
facto entity liability, in which individuals nonetheless remain legally
bed-a man who was suspected of nothing and presented no threat to the officers-and
placed that man on a couch in his living room, uncovered, with his genitals exposed, and
then subsequently kept him there for more than two hours, should have known that
their conduct was unconstitutional.
Franklin v. Foxworthy, 31 F.3d 873, 879 (9th Cir. 1994) (Reinhardt, J., concurring) (quoting
Chew v. Gates, 27 F.3d 1432, 1474 (9th Cir. 1994)).
373. K.H. ex rel. Murphy v. Morgan, 914 F.2d 846,851 (7th Cir. 1990).
374. Significantly, in Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 651-52 (1980), the Su-
preme Court declined to extend qualified immunity to governmental entities explicitly on the
grounds that preserving broader entity liability would further the goals of compensation and
deterrence, and encourage increased monitoring by supervisory officials. What is quite interest-
ing about the policy justifications the Court embraced in Owen is that these very arguments
were rejected in Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 693-94 (1978), as
arguments for municipal vicarious liability even though such liability would have achieved
those policy goals even more completely. See Jeffries, supra note 8, at 86-90 (discussing Owen
as discontinuous with other section 1983 cases in elevating the goal of compensation). See
generally Christina B. Whitman, Government Responsibility for Constitutional Torts, 85 MICH.
L. REV. 225, 263-64 (1986).
375. See supra note 12.
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vulnerable to damages liability and to the label "constitutional
wrongdoer." Significantly, even when the government itself is liable
on the ground that the entity authorized the unconstitutional con-
duct-in other words, the official was carrying out a governmental
policy or customS76-the individual officer is not necessarily absolved
from liability in her individual capacity.377
Most scholars have assumed that the Supreme Court has sim-
ply gotten it wrong in failing to increase the scope of governmental
liability for constitutional harms.378  Proponents of expanded entity
liability have argued that it would be more efficient than the current
regime,379 provide a more reliable source of victim compensation,380
and better promote the goal of deterring official misbehavior 38' with-
out overdeterring socially useful conduct.382 Professor Whitman also
criticizes the current regime's single-minded concentration on
"personal behavior and personal wrongdoing" for having blinded the
Supreme Court to injuries that "cannot be traced to particular behav-
ior, but are attributable to institutions, or to communities or cultures
within institutions."383 She observes that the current regime, even
376. Municipalities are subject to liability only if the constitutional injury resulted from an
official "policy or custom" of the entity. Monell, 436 U.S. at 695. States and state officials in
their official capacities are immune from section 1983 damages liability under the Eleventh
Amendment. See Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332 (1979).
377. Authorization by the entity does not automatically immunize the individual from
liability. For example, there is a split of authority as to whether a defendant can escape liability
on the ground that she was 'just following orders" from governmental superiors and many
courts have rejected this defense. See generally 1B SCHWARTZ & KIRKULIN, supra note 12, § 9.19,
at 368 & n.666 (citing cases). Some courts have held that advice of government counsel is a
relevant-though not dispositive-factor in determining whether the official's action was
reasonable for purposes of qualified immunity. See generally id. § 9.18, at 363-67 (citing and
discussing cases). For the distinction between official-capacity (entity) suits and personal-
capacity (individual officer) suits, see generally Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21 (1991) (discussing the
significance of this distinction).
378. See supra note 15. For a notable exception see Jeffries, supra note 8, at 96-103, and
Jeffries, supra note 12, at 68-82, in which Professor Jeffries describes and defends the current
regime as one based on fault rather than on respondeat superior.
379. See Kramer & Sykes, supra note 15, at 301 (arguing that respondeat superior would
be most likely to maximize the net economic value of municipal activity by creating the correct
level of deterrence).
380. See, e.g., Mark R. Brown, Correlating Municipal Liability and Official Immunity
Under Section 1983, 1989 U. ILL. L. REV. 625, 630-31 (urging a system in which the entity is
liable whenever the official is immune); Lewis, Jr. & Blumoff, supra note 15, at 761 (arguing for
a "modified" respondeat superior liability); Oren, supra note 15, at 1000-07 (defending entity
liability whenever a citizen is harmed by wrongful government action).
381. See, e.g., Kramer & Sykes, supra note 15, at 280.
382. See generally SCHUCK, supra note 10, at 100-21.
383. Whitman, supra note 374, at 228 (emphasis added). Whitman urges consideration of
the "institution as a unit distinct from the separate individuals who compose it." Id. at 226.
She notes that the individually focused system does not address injuries brought about "through
the working of institutional structures-through the massing or fragmentation of authority, or
664
QUALIFIED IMMUNITY
when evaluating suits against governmental entities, is relentlessly
focused on "the individual conduct of individual [officials]" and the
question of whether the governmental defendant was "at fault."384
Moreover, she argues, due to the various immunities available to
individual officials and the availability of indemnification there are
"many cases in which individuals as persons will not be held person-
ally liable" or will not pay the damages "but the discussion is still cast
in terms of personal behavior and personal wrongdoing."38
There is an air of unreality about both the Court's discussions
of its holdings and academic reactions to those holdings. The Court
"talks the talk" of individual liability, discussing its benefits and
weaknesses, without much considering that indemnification may
transform individual liability into a kind of entity liability.386 There
seems to be a disconnection between the Court's focus on fault-based,
individual liability and the reality that most of the time the individual
probably does not pay. Academic proponents of expanded entity
liability, on the other hand, either argue that individual liability is
inadequate (often ignoring the effects of indemnification) and urge
that it be replaced or augmented by enterprise liability, or recognize
the ubiquity of indemnification and implicitly assume that de jure re-
spondeat superior liability is only a small step from there.
Suppose, instead, one were to take seriously both the commit-
ment to individual liability based on individual fault, and the fact of
indemnification. In this Part, I offer a possible explanation for the
seeming incongruity between the rhetoric of personal liability and the
reality of indemnification: I argue that personal, fault-based liability
may serve an important function that is unaffected by who ultimately
by the creation of a culture in which responses and a sense of responsibility are dis-
torted--rather than through the actions of individual officials. Id. I cite Professor Whitman
for her accurate (in my view) description of the system's focus on individual fault. I do not,
however, address the important issue she raises about the likely inadequacies of section 1983
jurisprudence in addressing systemic misbehavior.
384. Id. at 232, 236, 238.
385. Id. at 230.
386. See, e.g., Board of the County Comm'rs v. Brown, 117 S. Ct. 1382, 1404 (1997) (Breyer,
J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority for failing to consider that indemnification statutes
"appear... in effect, [to] mimic respondeat superior by authorizing indemnification of
employees" but conceding that "the [actual] pattern of indemnification: how often, and to what
extent, States now indemnify their employees, and which of their employees they indemnify"
remains unclear); Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 641-42 n.3 (1987) (opining that the
Court is not prepared to conclude that indemnification is "certain or generally available"). I call
indemnification, even if widely available, only "a kind" of entity liability because the individual
official remains legally liable and governmental entities ordinarily retain the option to
reimburse or not depending upon the circumstances of the case and the particulars of the
applicable indemnification statute. See supra note 17.
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pays the judgment. This argument also provides a normative
underpinning for my analysis in Parts II and III.
My argument builds from the parallel between criminal law
notice and notice in qualified immunity analysis. The Supreme Court
explicitly embraced this connection in the recent case of United States
v. Lanier,387 in which a state judge challenged his conviction on mul-
tiple counts of sexual assault and rape under 18 U.S.C. § 242, the
criminal analogue of section 1983.388 The government's theory was
that Judge Lanier violated the victims' substantive due process rights
to "bodily integrity."39 The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit,
sitting en banc, overturned the conviction on the ground that the
statute was unconstitutionally vague as applied to the due process
claim.390 According to the court of appeals, the statute foundered on
grounds of vagueness and lack of fair notice because the right alleg-
edly violated had not been "made specific" by "fundamentally similar"
Supreme Court precedent.3 91 The en banc court reasoned that the
"made specific" standard demanded by due process in criminal cases
was "substantially higher" than the "clearly established law" standard
in qualified immunity analysis.3 92 A contrary answer, the court
opined, would mean that "[c]riminal liability [is] much easier to estab-
lish for the same wrong than civil liability."393
The Supreme Court disagreed.39 The Court not only embraced
the analogy between "clearly established law" in constitutional
damages actions and the requirement of fair notice in criminal cases,
but also concluded that the two standards serve precisely the same
role in their respective contexts:
In the civil sphere... qualified immunity seeks to ensure that defendants
"reasonably can anticipate when their conduct may give rise to liability," by
attaching liability only if "[t]he contours of the right [violated are] sufficiently
387. 117 S. Ct. 1219 (1997).
388. For the text of 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1994), see supra note 249.
389. The incidents giving rise to the prosecution took place in Judge Lanier's chambers
(sometimes while the judge was wearing his judicial robe) and all the victims were either
employees, potential employees or individuals with business pending before the judge. See
United States v. Lanier, 73 F.3d 1380, 1403 (6th Cir. 1996) (Daughtrey, J., dissenting).
390. See id. at 1384.
391. Id. at 1391-94.
392. Id. at 1393.
393. Id.
394. The Supreme Court rejected the Sixth Circuit's conclusion that only Supreme Court
cases can provide the required warning. Lanier, 117 S. Ct. at 1226-27. The Court also
disagreed with the lower court's view that only "fundamentally similar" precedent-a standard
the Sixth Circuit suggested was more stringent than the qualified immunity standard-
satisfies the requisites of fair notice. Id.
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clear that a reasonable official would understand that what [she] is doing
violates that right." So conceived, the object of the "clearly established"
immunity standard is not different from that of "fair warning" as it relates to
law "made specific" for the purpose of validly applying [section] 242. The fact
that one has a civil and the other a criminal law role is of no significance; both
serve the same objective, and in effect the qualified immunity test is simply the
adaptation of the fair warning standard to give officials (and, ultimately,
governments) the same protection from civil liability and its consequences that
individuals have traditionally possessed in the face of vague criminal statutes.
To require something clearer than "clearly established" would, then, call for
something beyond "fair warning."395
The question at issue in Lanier was whether the constitutional
right that gave rise to the criminal conviction was sufficiently clear
that a defendant would have had fair warning that her conduct could
lead to criminal sanctions.96 Because Lanier involved a criminal
prosecution for violation of constitutional rights, it illustrates the
connection between fair notice in criminal law and clearly established
law in qualified immunity analysis. Lanier is both Anderson v.
Creighton397 and Lambert v. California,398 cases from two very dif-
ferent contexts that are joined by the commonality that notice or
knowledge of illegality was determinative for the imposition of liabil-
ity. The Lanier Court concluded that the requirement of "clearly
established law" provides the "same protection" from civil damages
liability that the requisite of fair notice guarantees to criminal defen-
dants. Fair notice, explained the Court, ensures that an official will
not be labeled a "criminal [under section 242] though his motive was
pure and... his purpose was unrelated to any disregard of any
constitutional guarantee."39 Similarly, qualified immunity ensures
that an official will not be mulcted in damages unless the existing
case law "made it reasonably clear at the relevant time that the
defendant's conduct was [unconstitutional.]"400
The Lanier Court's reasoning supports my thesis that notice
functions as a surrogate for fault in both criminal law and the law of
qualified immunity. The explicit parallel between penal law and
section 1983 law also suggests that looking to the role of fault in the
criminal context may provide clues to understanding the persistence
of fault-based liability in constitutional damages actions. Why is
395. Id. at 1227 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added).
396. See id. at 1225.
397. 483 U.S. 635 (1987); see supra notes 154-60 and accompanying text.
398. 355 U.S. 225 (1957); see supra notes 56-64 and accompanying text.
399. Lanier, 117 S. Ct. at 1227.
400. Id. at 1225.
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blameworthiness considered essential to the imposition of criminal
liability? The answer that is ordinarily given is that a criminal con-
viction signals moral condemnation of the offender and, therefore, it
would be "unjust" to subject to the "stigma of a criminal conviction
[one who is not] morally blameworthy."401 Indeed, one of the most
important distinctions between civil and criminal law is precisely that
"[c]riminal liability signals moral condemnation of the offender, while
civil liability does not."402
The moral condemnation entailed by a criminal conviction is
one reason why public welfare offenses have engendered so much
controversy and debate.403 Recall that criminal regulation often
targets conduct that is not inherently "wrongful" in the sense that
common law crimes such as homicide or rape are wrongful and, in
addition, such statutes may lack sufficient mens rea to provide a sig-
nal of the likelihood of criminal sanctions. Thus, a defendant who is
convicted of violating a criminal regulatory statute-at least without
actual or constructive notice of its content 4°4--may not be sufficiently
blameworthy to justify the moral condemnation signaled by criminal
liability. The tendency of courts at all levels to find ways to avoid
regulatory convictions under such circumstances is testament to the
401. Packer, supra note 42, at 109. The thesis that punishment is justified only when
defendants deserve it is a retributive (deontological) rationale for the requirement of fault in
criminal law. As criminal law scholars have framed it, retributive theory holds that "moral
culpability" is a necessary-and according to some scholars, a sufficient-condition of liability
for criminal sanctions. See Moore, supra note 34, at 180-82. Utilitarian arguments have also
been offered to explain fault-based limitations on criminal liability. See, e.g., H.L.A. HART,
PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY: ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 18-20 (1968) (discussing
and rejecting Jeremy Bentham's argument that punishment of defendants who are without
fault is ineffective because such liability cannot deter crime). The debate between retributive
and utilitarian justifications for criminal liability is obviously beyond the scope of this paper. At
the end of the day, moreover, the best conclusion is that our system of criminal liability is a
"mixed" regime in which courts and legislatures draw on both retributive and utilitarian
principles to justify criminal punishment. See BONNIE ET AL., supra note 40, at 30. For
purposes of this Article, I observe that fault has generally been deemed a prerequisite for
criminal liability. See supra notes 40-54 and accompanying text. To my mind, retributive
arguments provide the primary explanation for the requirement of blameworthiness in criminal
law. Thus, I begin with the retributive rationale in seeking to understand what fault in
criminal law has to teach us about fault in constitutional damages law. As will become
apparent, however, I also draw on related utilitarian arguments for limiting liability to
blameworthy defendants. See infra notes 449-50.
402. Paul H. Robinson, The Criminal-Civil Distinction and the Utility of Desert, 76 B.U. L.
REV. 201, 206 (1996). While breaking a contract or making a defective product may be conduct
society wishes to discourage by allowing the victims to recover damages, civil liability does not
carry the moral stigma that is implicit in a criminal conviction. See id.
403. See supra notes 71-83 and accompanying text.
404. See supra notes 102-32 and accompanying text.
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strength of the principle that only blameworthy defendants should be
subject to criminal liability.405
To turn the point around, the stigma of a criminal conviction is
also an important part of the power of the criminal law to shape be-
havior. Citizens avoid criminal conduct not only-and perhaps not
primarily-because of the threat of official sanctions. They are also
motivated by a desire to avoid conduct that would disrupt important
interpersonal relationships or violate the dictates of their own inter-
nalized norms of acceptable behavior.406  Conversely, criminal law
plays an essential role in creating and maintaining societal consensus
on what constitutes appropriate conduct.407 As one scholar has ar-
gued, "criminal law's most important real world effect can be its abil-
ity to assist in building norms and thereby harness the compliance
power of interpersonal relationships and interpersonal morality."40 8
From this perspective, public welfare offenses are also objectionable to
the extent they criminalize conduct that most people would consider
innocent because such "overcriminalization" undermines the moral
authority of the penal law.409
Turning to section 1983 law, I contend that individual dam-
ages liability for constitutional violations serves a role that is analo-
gous to the moral blaming function of criminal law.410 Recall that
405. See supra notes 82-83, 102-32 and accompanying text.
406. See Robinson, supra note 402, at 212-13; Kahan, supra note 38, at 128-30 (arguing
that law is "suffused with morality and, as a result, can't ultimately be identified or applied []
without the making of moral judgments").
407. See id. at 212.
408. Id.
409. See generally HERBERT L. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 68-69, 273
(1968) (arguing that "t]he more indiscriminate we are in treating conduct as criminal, the less
stigma resides in the mere fact that a man has been convicted of something called a crime" and
noting that the power of the criminal law to shape conduct resides in its being seen as "fair" in
the sense of making culpability a necessary precondition for criminal liability); Michael B.
Metzger, Corporate Criminal Liability for Defective Products: Policies, Problems, and Prospects,
73 GEO. L. REV. 1, 11 (1984) (noting ways in which overcriminalization can undermine the
utilitarian goal of preventing crime); Robinson, supra note 402, at 212-13 (arguing that a
utilitarian calculus would take into account the power of criminal stigma in deterring crime and
find greater utility in a "desert distribution of criminal liability"); Louis Michael Seidman,
Soldiers, Martyrs, and Criminals: Utilitarian Theory and the Problem of Crime Control, 94
YALE L.J. 315 (1984) (arguing that the power of moral condemnation entailed in a criminal
penalty is weakened when the "rhetoric of blame" is used to justify distributional goals).
410. An award of injunctive relief does not entail the same level of stigma as an award of
damages. First of all, most suits for equitable relief are filed against the governmental entity
rather than against the individual official. Moreover, even when injunctive relief is technically
sought against individual officials-for example in a suit naming state officials in their official
capacities in order to avoid Eleventh Amendment immunity-everyone understands that such a
suit is functionally against the governmental entity. See, e.g., Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123
(1908). A suit that is only nominally against individual officials and that orders those officials to
"act constitutionally" has neither the personal nor the stigmatizing quality of a damages suit.
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qualified immunity protects from liability all but the "plainly
incompetent" official 4"i or the official who could not reasonably have
believed that her actions were lawful.412 This means an official who is
found personally liable in a section 1983 suit is, by definition, a
"wrongdoer." I propose that there is significant independent
value-apart from who actually pays the damages award-in
attaching the label "wrongdoer" to an individual official rather than to
a faceless governmental entity. Were constitutional damages liability,
with its implication of fault and blameworthiness, to attach in the
first instance to the governmental body rather than to an individual,
the meaning and power of the designation "wrongdoer" would be
significantly reduced. Entities don't engage in malfeasance, the
people who run them do. Something would be lost in a regime in
which impersonal entities were the identified perpetrators of the
constitutional harm rather than the blameworthy individuals.413 The
label "wrongdoer" simply does not have the same moral significance
as applied to governmental entities or institutions as it does when
applied to individuals. Notions of fault and blameworthiness are
understood to be personal, and individual liability attaches the label
"malefactor" to officials with names and faces. Thus, important moral
and societal interests are vindicated by a regime that makes
blameworthy officials personally liable for their unconstitutional
behavior,414 even if they do not ultimately pay the judgment.
Not surprisingly, qualified immunity does not apply to suits for injunctive relief. See Wood v.
Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 314-15 n.6 (1975) ("[I]mmunity from damages does not ordinarily bar
equitable relief as well."). See generally 1B SCHWARTZ & KIRLI, supra note 12, at 342 (listing
cases).
411. Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986).
412. See Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 638 (1987) (stating that qualified immunity
obtains "as long as [the officials'] actions could reasonably have been thought consistent with
the rights they [were] alleged to have violated").
413. See JOHN H. GARVEY, WHATARE FREEDOMS FOR? 235 (1996) (decrying the deficiency of
a theory of constitutional liability that "speaks to the state in its corporate capacity" and "takes
no account of the morality of freedom").
414. Scholars have made similar arguments about the special value of individual liability
as compared to entity liability in connection with criminal enforcement against corporations.
Under certain circumstances, such as when a crime apparently on the corporation's behalf is
committed or approved at the level of management or the board of directors, the corporation
may be held criminally liable. See generally LAFAVE & SCOTT, JR., supra note 91, § 3.10, at 360-
69 (discussing corporate criminal liability). Although corporate liability does not shield officials
from individual criminal liability, "often ... the corporation is convicted while individual
[officials] are acquitted, even where proof of individual guilt is strong." PACKER, supra note 409,
at 361. A number of scholars have questioned, however, whether corporate criminal-
ity-especially if unaccompanied by individual criminal liability-can serve the ordinary func-
tions of the penal law. Corporate criminality raises difficult conceptual questions because it
conflicts with traditional, common law notions of the "personal nature of guilt." Metzger, supra
'note 409, at 53. While "[liabeling something criminal [ordinarily] send[s] a message to society
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There are good reasons for thinking that the label
"constitutional violator" carries with it a level of societal condemna-
tion that is more akin to criminal liability than to ordinary, private
civil liability.415 One piece of evidence supporting this view is that
constitutional violations are often described as "different" from or
"worse" than other kinds of civil law-breaking. Consider, for example,
Justice Harlan's concurring opinion in Monroe v. Pape,'416 the case that
essentially created the constitutional damages remedy.417 The issue
in Monroe was whether unauthorized actions-actions that violate
state law-satisfy the "under color of law" requirement of section
1983.418 The Monroe Court held that unauthorized actions by indi-
vidual governmental officials can give rise to section 1983 liability
that the activity is undesirable ... citizens might find imposing criminal liability on fictional
entities farcical." V.S. Khanna, Corporate Criminal Liability: What Purpose Does It Serve?, 109
HARV. L. REV. 1477, 1531 (1996). Thus, because the average person has difficulty "[clonceiving
of corporations as 'criminals'" convicting the corporation is unlikely to effectuate the moral
blaming function ordinarily associated with a criminal conviction. Metzger, supra note 409, at
64. Moreover, if society fails to ascribe stigma to corporate criminality, this response may
decrease the power of the criminal label for other types of crime. See Khanna, supra, at 1531.
Important retributive values are also compromised to the extent that corporate criminality
tends to displace criminal liability against identified individuals. Corporations only act through
their officers, and corporate criminality suggests that one or more officials involved in the
corporation acted wrongfully. Yet "[w]hen a corporation is convicted there is no 'specific, visible
defendant to stand shamefacedly before the awesome judge who is issuing a verdict on his
character and fitness to live in society.'" Metzger, supra note 409, at 64 n.453 (quoting Leo
Davids, Penology and Corporate Crime, 58 J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 524, 529
(1967)). These arguments have led some scholars to question the ability of corporate criminal
liability either to stigmatize or to deter misbehavior. See, e.g., PACKER, supra note 409, at 360-
61 (doubting whether corporate criminality has much effect on the reputation or economic
position of a corporation).
415. John Garvey has made a similar (though narrower) argument for the moral dimension
of constitutional law. Professor Garvey notes that the very language we use to describe
constitutional illegality--'violation," "responsibility," "disrespect," "infringe," and
"wrong"-reflects the idea that unconstitutional conduct bespeaks a moral judgment. Garvey,
supra note 413, at 160. He argues that constitutional freedoms protect citizens' rights to engage
in certain activities that are deemed valuable or "good," for example, speech or religious
expression. Just as these freedoms have a moral dimension, they impose a correlative moral
obligation on the government not to interfere. Thus, governmental officials are "subject to
criticism and condemnation for imposing constraints," id. at 198, and injured citizens are
entitled to money damages "to right the wrong" and to punish the offending official. Id. at 160,
198.
416. 365 U.S. 167, 192 (1961) (Harlan, J., concurring), overruled on other grounds by
Monell v. Department of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
417. In 1961, the year Monroe was decided, fewer than 300 suits were brought under
section 1983 and all the other civil rights statutes combined. By 1981 some 32,000 suits were
brought under the civil rights acts, the vast majority under section 1983. See Low & JEFFRIES,
JR., supra note 145, at 16. This virtual explosion has been explained by Monroe's liberal
construction of "under color of law" to include unauthorized acts just at a time when a panoply
of new rights were being made available against state officials by the incorporation of the Bill of
Rights into the Fourteenth Amendment.
418. For the full text of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, see supra note 7.
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even if there is a remedy under state law, reasoning that the federal
remedy is "supplementary."419 While Justice Harlan, like the
majority, found no evidence that the enacting legislature intended to
treat authorized and unauthorized actions differently, he defended
the new supplemental federal remedy on the ground that federal
constitutional rights should be treated differently from violations of
other kinds of rights:
[Section 1983] becomes more than a jurisdictional provision only if one
attributes to the enacting legislature the view that a deprivation of a
constitutional right is significantly different from and more serious than a
violation of a state right and therefore deserves a different remedy even
though the same act may constitute both a state tort and the deprivation of a
constitutional right .... There will be many cases in which the relief provided
by the state to the victim of a use of state power which the state either did not
or could not constitutionally authorize will be far less than what Congress may
have thought would be fair reimbursement for deprivation of a constitutional
right .... It would indeed be the purest coincidence if the state remedies for
violations of common-law rights by private citizens were fully appropriate to
redress those injuries which only a state official can cause and against which
the Constitution provides protection.42
In accord with the idea expressed in Justice Harlan's concur-
rence that constitutional rights are especially important, the Monroe
Court took the view that adequate protection of constitutional rights
requires a federal remedy in federal court. According to the majority,
whatever remedies the state already provided were irrelevant; the
plaintiff could go directly to federal court with the constitutional
claim. This view that federal courts are the preeminent protectors of
federal constitutional rights has been reiterated many times in post-
Monroe section 1983 opinions.421
419. 365 U.S. at 183. The Court supported its conclusion by noting that one reason section
1983 was passed was to ensure a federal remedy in federal court when "because, by reason of
prejudice, passion, neglect, intolerance or otherwise, state laws might not be enforced and the
[constitutional] claims of citizens ... might be denied by the state agencies." Id. at 180. The
Court did not explain why that reasoning requires a federal remedy in cases where state law is
both adequate and available to injured plaintiffs through state enforcement. Justice Frank-
furter, in dissent, argued for a distinction between unconstitutional actions taken without state
authority, which in his view only the state should remedy, and unconstitutional actions author-
ized by state law or custom, which would give rise to a federal remedy. See id. at 224-26
(Frankfiter, J., dissenting).
420. Id. at 196 & n.5 (Harlan, J., concurring).
421. See, e.g., Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 285 (1994) (Kennedy, J., concurring)
(recognizing the "important role federal courts have assumed in elaborating vital constitutional
guarantees against arbitrary or oppressive state action"); Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police,
491 U.S. 58, 66 (1989) (noting that the "principal purpose behind the enactment of section 1983
was to provide a federal forum for civil rights claims"); Patsy v. Board of Regents, 457 U.S. 496,
500 (1982) (noting the "'paramount role [of the federal courts] in protecting constitutional
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The idea that constitutional rights are different or special is
also evident in the Court's handling of a class of due process claims.
In a series of cases beginning with Paul v. Davis, the Court con-
sidered section 1983 claims alleging deprivations of liberty or prop-
erty under the Due Process Clause.422 The claims in this line of cases
involved tort-like injuries such as loss of a $23.50 hobby kit,423
destruction of a pillowcase,424 injury to a prisoner who tripped over a
pillow left on the floor by a guard,425 and failure to prevent the assault
of a prisoner by a fellow inmate.426 An important objective in the
rights'" (quoting Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 472-73 (1974))); Mitchum v. Foster, 407
U.S. 225, 242 (1972) (stating that '[t]he very purpose of § 1983 was to interpose the federal
courts between the States and the people as guardians of the people's federal [constitutional]
rights"); McNeese v. Board of Educ., 373 U.S. 668, 672 (1963) (holding that requiring litigants to
exhaust administrative remedies before asserting a claim in federal court would conflict with
the notions that section 1983 is a supplementary remedy and that the federal courts are the
'chief... tribunals for enforcement of federal rights"). In particular contexts, the Court has
exhibited a willingness to trust state courts with the enforcement of federal constitutional
rights. For example, the Court has held that normal rules of res judicata apply to section 1983
cases even when, as in the Fourth Amendment context, other avenues of federal review are
foreclosed and the section 1983 claim would offer the only possibility of a federal forum. See
Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 105 (1980) (holding res judicata applicable to section 1983 claims
and rejecting the view that state courts cannot be trusted to "render correct decisions on
constitutional issues"); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 493-94 & n.35 & 494 (1976) (barring
habeas re-litigation of a Fourth Amendment claim if the state has provided an opportunity for
"full and fair litigation" of the claim). In addition, although the Supreme Court has affirmed the
"no-exhaustion" rule implicit in Monroe, see Patsy, 457 U.S. at 516, certain tort-like, procedural
due process claims never reach federal court if existing state postdeprivation remedies are
available and adequate. See Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981), overruled on other grounds,
Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986). Although as a formal matter Parratt announced a
constitutional rather than a statutory rule-holding that there was no constitutional violation if
postdeprivation process was adequate-it has the functional effect of circumventing Monroe's
no-exhaustion rule in a category of procedural due process claims. But see Albright, 510 U.S. at
285 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (noting that the Court has been cautious in invoking the rule of
Parratt in recognition of the federal courts' "important role" in protecting constitutional rights);
Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 136-38 (1990) (holding that Parratt is not applicable where
deprivation was predictable, predeprivation process was possible, and defendant's conduct was
not unauthorized); Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 435-36 (1982) (holding that
Parratt does not apply when the state procedure itself destroys the plaintiffs entitlement
without procedural safeguards). I argue that the Court's refusal to recognize tort-like claims in
constitutional damages suits actually preserves the special status of constitutional rights. See
infra notes 451-54 and accompanying text.
422. 424 U.S. 693 (1976). In Paul, the plaintiff claimed that he had been deprived of a pro-
tected interest in his reputation when the local police department posted his name on a list of
"active shoplifters." Id. at 695. The plaintiff had been arrested but never prosecuted for shop-
lifting, and the charge against him was ultimately dismissed. See id. at 696. The Court held
that the right to reputation was not a protected interest within the meaning of the Due Process
Clause. See id. at 711-12.
423. SeeParratt, 451 U.S. at 529.
424. See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984).
425. See Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 342 (1986).
426. See Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 353 (1986). Although Paul v. Davis arguably
looked less "tort-like" and more like an abuse of governmental power than other claims in this
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Court's handling of these cases was to prevent the Due Process Clause
from being invoked to turn every simple tort in which the government
happened to be the tortfeasor into a federal constitutional claim. The
Court was troubled not only by a federalism concern that the
Fourteenth Amendment not be construed to create a "body of general
federal tort law."427  The Court also wished to avoid "trivializing"
constitutional rights by equating them to ordinary state law rights.428
As the Court stated in Daniels v. Williams, "lolur Constitution deals
with the large concerns of the governors and the governed;"429 when
governmental officials cause injuries "in ways that are equally
available to private citizens, constitutional issues are not raised."430
These statements reflect the view that constitutional damages actions
should be reserved for certain kinds of harms, specifically harms that
involve "real abuses by [governmental] officials in the exercise of
governmental powers."431
If constitutional rights are especially valued in comparison
with other kinds of rights, it follows that constitutional violations
would be viewed by society as especially serious and deserving of
opprobrium. There is reason to think this is so. Constitutional viola-
tions, especially those that are likely to give rise to section 1983 suits,
involve abuses of power by governmental actors. The implications of
official misconduct go far beyond the concrete harm to persons or
property suffered by any one individual. Public officials are, after all,
charged with upholding and enforcing the law and acting for the pub-
lic good. When officials use their public offices to engage in law-
breaking, there is a betrayal of trust that is experienced not only by
the individual, but by the entire community. 432 Consider, for example,
line of cases, the Courts analysis in Paul has been attributed to judicial concern that allowing
the defamation claim would invite tort-like claims, transforming section 1983 into a "font of tort
law." Paul, 424 U.S. at 701. See generally Henry Paul Monaghan, Of "Liberty" and "Property",
62 CORNELL L. REv. 405 (1977) (arguing that the Court's purpose was to limit the reach of the
section 1983 remedy but the Court did so by narrowing the scope of the underlying right). I do
not suggest, however, that the Court's holding in Paul was the only way, or indeed the best way,
to address the Court's concerns about tort-like claims. See generally id., at 423-29 (analyzing
the difficulties inherent in the Court's approach to liberty in Paul).
427. Paul, 424 U.S. at 701.
428. Parratt, 451 U.S. at 549 (Powell, J., concurring in the result).
429. 474 U.S. at 332.
430. Parratt, 451 U.S. at 552 n.10 (Powell, J., concurring in the result).
431. Id. at 549 (Powell, J., concurring in the result); see Michael Wells, Constitutional
Torts, Common Law Torts, and Due Process of Law, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 617, 650 (1997)
(arguing that "[clonstitutional protection should be available only when the state's acts impinge
on a value of constitutional dimension").
432. I do not mean to suggest that the kind of stigma attached to liability for constitutional
violations is precisely the same kind of stigma that is associated with a criminal conviction. I do
argue that when officials are found liable in damages for governmental misbehavior that
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the public outcry that was engendered by the beating of Rodney King
by Los Angeles police officers. The image of a circle of uniformed law
enforcement officials beating an unarmed man lying crumpled on the
ground is troubling in a way that a private beating is not. Similar
reactions accompanied recent allegations that New York City police
officers openly beat and sodomized (with a toilet plunger) a young
Haitian immigrant in the bathroom at the police station.4 3 When the
malefactor is a governmental official whose injurious conduct was
made possible by her official authority and position, "ordinary injury
is augmented by the abuse of governmental power."434 In such cases
wrongdoing that could "be described as trespass, assault and battery,
false imprisonment, or defamation take[s] on new urgency."435 If the
law-enforcers cannot be trusted to conduct themselves according to
the law, then who can? Governmental abuse of power creates a sense
of indignation on the part of the governed, and special opprobrium is
reserved for abusers of the public trust.436
If individual liability for constitutional violations entails
wrongdoing and signals societal condemnation, then it would make
sense to retain such liability even if the financial burden is ultimately
borne by the governmental employer rather than by the individual
official.43 7 Indeed, in the criminal context it has been argued that the
reaches constitutional dimensions, such liability has a moral component that does not inhere in
ordinary civil liability.
433. See, e.g., Eleanor Randolph, Brutality Focus Now on NYPD, L.A. TnMs, Aug. 30, 1997,
at Al ("More than six years after a grainy videotape showed Los Angeles police beating Rodney
G. King, the focus on how a city deals with police brutality has shifted east to New York.").
434. Whitman, supra note 374, at 250; see Michael Wells & Thomas A. Eaton, Substantive
Due Process and the Scope of Constitutional Torts, 18 GA. L. REV. 201, 229 (1984) (arguing that
torts by governmental officials are different from private torts because of the "special role of
government as the keeper of public order"); see also Steven L. Winter, The Meaning of "Under
Color of' Law, 91 MICH. L. REV. 323 (1992) ("When 'the state' is unfaithful, when the actors who
embody it do not conform to the law, the harm is greater [than a private harm] because it is
experienced as the most basic form of betrayal.").
435. Whitman, supra note 374, at 250 (citations omitted). Ms. Whitman notes that the
"inclination, found in some early lower court opinions... to resolve section 1983 disputes solely
by reference to the elements of common-law causes of action has virtually disappeared." Id. at
250 n.114. For a discussion and critique of the influence of tort law on section 1983
jurisprudence, see Symposium on Section 1983, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 613 (1997).
436. See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
(stating that when the "[glovernment becomes a law-breaker, it breeds contempt for law; it
invites every man to become a law unto himself; it invites anarchy").
437. The aim of this section is to provide an explanation for the persistence of fault-based,
individual liability in section 1983 jurisprudence. I do not purport to explain the existence of
indemnification or to suggest that entity liability has no role to play. The puzzle I confront is
not why has the law gone part of the way toward entity liability-by embracing
indemnification-but why has the law gone only part of the way, by retaining individual liability
with indemnification rather than moving to respondeat superior liability. It is quite likely that
section 1983 law reflects a trade-off between policies that argue for individual liability-such as
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moral blame entailed by a criminal conviction is more important in
discouraging antisocial conduct than the threat of official sanctions. 438
One need not go that far to accept that the human desire to avoid
societal opprobrium plays an important role in gaining compliance
with the criminal law.439  Similarly, the societal condemnation
accompanying damages liability for constitutional violations enhances
the law's power to reduce unconstitutional conduct and reinforce
constitutional norms. Moreover, the stigma entailed in such liability
plays an important role in communicating those norms, not only
through final verdicts in courts but through public reaction to re-
ported allegations of clear constitutional impropriety.
V. CONCLUSION
This Article has argued that there is much to be learned from
the comparison of qualified immunity analysis in section 1983 law
with the fair notice inquiry in criminal law. The recognition that
qualified immunity is about notice and that notice functions as a sur-
rogate for fault-in much the same way that fair notice in criminal
law acts as a proxy for fault-helps to explain the courts' analyses in
constitutional damages cases. The fault/notice connection explains
why knowledge of illegality is sometimes required in constitutional
damages suits in order to ensure against liability without fault, spe-
cifically when governmental officials would have received no signal
that their actions could be unconstitutional. Conversely, it explains
why qualified immunity essentially drops out of the analysis when the
underlying conduct is inherently blameworthy. Finally, seeing notice
as a proxy for fault provides a way of thinking, more generally, about
the interaction between qualified immunity and the underlying intent
standards of the various constitutional rights that give rise to consti-
tutional damages claims.
Important differences between the regimes of criminal law and
constitutional damages law also suggest fruitful lines of inquiry that
the moral blaming function I have identified in this Article-and those-such as compensation,
avoiding overdeterrence, encouraging entity monitoring, and addressing systemic harms-that
would argue for imposing some level of liability on governmental units.
438. See generally Robinson, supra note 402, at 212-13 (arguing that the "real power" of the
criminal law derives from its role in creating and enforcing social norms rather than from the
threat of sanctions).
439. See, e.g., Hart, supra note 37, at 404-05 (arguing that the "judgment of community
condemnation which accompanies [a criminal sanction]" is the "essence of punishment for moral
delinquency").
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could provide additional insights into the role of qualified immunity in
section 1983 suits. For example, the knowledge of illegality question
is decided by a jury in criminal cases,"0 while qualified immunity is a
question of law decided by a judge preferably on summary
judgment." 1 Moreover, unlike qualified immunity, the ignorance of
law defense in criminal law involves a subjective inquiry: The
question for the jury is whether the defendant actually knew that her
actions were illegal; even honest but unreasonable mistakes as to
illegality will exonerate the defendant." 2 The qualified immunity
inquiry, by contrast, is an objective one: Was the law governing the
official's actions sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would
have known that what she was doing was unconstitutional? The
clarity of the law is a proxy for the official's subjective state of mind.
If the law was clear, a reasonable official would have known and
obeyed it; conversely, if the law provided inadequate guidance, an
official cannot be charged with bad faith for failing to comply.
Another important difference is in the kinds of cases that will come to
the point of a notice inquiry: In the criminal context prosecutors tend
to weed out "weak" cases in which the defendant was truly ignorant of
the law, sending cases to trial when circumstantial evidence suggests
the defendant knew she was acting illegally." 3  There is no
comparable weeding out process for constitutional damages actions,
which are brought by private parties.4" The ignorance of law inquiry
440. The question of whether in any particular case the prosecution is required to demon-
strate knowledge of illegality or the defendant is permitted to raise a defense of ignorance of law
is, of course, a legal question. But see generally Pilcher, supra note 37 (proposing that juries be
allowed broad discretion to consider claims of "apparent innocence" where a defendant can put
forth sufficient evidence to support the claim).
441. See Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 228 (1991) (holding "immunity ordinarily should
be decided by the court").
442. See Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 202 (1991); see also supra notes 107-13 and
accompanying text (discussing the Cheek case). It should be noted, however, that in responding
to a "knowledge of illegality"-mistake of law-instruction in a criminal case, the jury may infer
actual knowledge of the law from circumstantial evidence suggesting that the defendant knew
her conduct was illegal. See supra note 113. Thus, although the criminal law analysis is
formally a subjective one, in practice it may be more similar to the objective, "clearly established
law" inquiry of qualified immunity than it first appears. Moreover, in contexts involving
criminal regulation of dangerous activities and instrumentalities-where ignorance of law is not
a defense-defendants are deemed on notice if they knew or should have known that they were
likely to be subject to criminal regulation. See supra notes 92-101 and accompanying text. This
standard for "knowledge of illegality" is quite similar to the objective standard of qualified
immunity. See supra notes 153-58 and accompanying text.
443. Dan Richman, an Associate Professor of Law at Fordham University School of Law,
provided this insight from his experience as an Assistant United States Attorney.
444. There may, of course, be some screening of cases by plaintiffs' attorneys in deciding
whether or not to bring a particular case. As qualified immunity does not apply to governmen-
tal entities, however, evidence of a strong immunity defense will not deter the bringing of an
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
itself-in the guise of qualified immunity-acts as the primary
screening mechanism at the summary judgment stage."5 These
differences of substance and procedure surely affect the functional
scope of the ignorance of law defense in these two contexts.
The Lanier Court's equating of qualified immunity in section
1983 cases with fair notice in criminal constitutional cases raises an
additional, potentially troubling procedural issue in the criminal
context. Recall that qualified immunity was recast in Harlow as a
purely legal question in order to spare officials the burden and incon-
venience of defending themselves in a full-blown trial. Importantly,
when there are factual disputes on issues material to the qualified
immunity question, courts will permit limited discovery, again with
the goal of disposing of non-meritorious cases at the earliest possible
stage." 6 When a constitutional claim could give rise to criminal
liability, it would seem even more important to dispose of non-merito-
rious cases quickly."4 Yet, it is unclear exactly how the clearly es-
tablished law inquiry, designed for the civil context, would function in
the criminal context if the unavailability of discovery means that most
criminal constitutional cases end up going to trial. Thus, even if the
substantive analysis is the same, as the Lanier Court suggested, dif-
ferences in the way civil and criminal cases are handled may create
significant differences in the way the ignorance of law defense actu-
ally plays out." 8
Finally, understanding the connection between notice and fault
tells us something important about constitutional rights. I have ar-
gued that section 1983 liability brings with it a level of societal oppro-
entity-liability suit and, if so, the plaintiff will likely name the individual officials even if that
claim is vulnerable on immunity grounds.
445. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 814-19 (1982) (opining that an important
purpose of qualified immunity is to weed out insubstantial suits on summary judgment and
concluding that the objective, "clearly established law" inquiry furthers that purpose).
446. See id Limited discovery may be necessary prior to summary disposition on qualified
immunity grounds if plaintiff's and defendant's stories differ on material issues, and defendant's
story, if true, describes conduct that a reasonable official could have believed lawful. See Ander-
son v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 646 n.6 (1987) (remanding the case and directing the lower court
to determine if the actions the Creightons alleged are ones a reasonable officer could have
believed were lawful). If limited discovery still leaves unresolved issues of material fact, the
case would go to trial, and qualified immunity could then be invoked again in a motion for
directed verdict.
447. If civil litigation against governmental officials raises serious fairness and overdeter-
rence concerns, a criminal prosecution against those officials would be even more troubling. See
United States v. Lanier, 73 F.3d 1380, 1393 (6th Cir. 1986) (suggesting that it should not be
"easier" to establish criminal liability than civil liability for the same wrong).
448. I am indebted to The Honorable Jerome Turner for a series of fruitful conversations
about the procedural issues that may be raised by equating fair notice in constitutional criminal
cases with qualified immunity in section 1983 cases.
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brium that correlates with the notion that constitutional rights are
"special." This explains why section 1983 liability, like criminal liabil-
ity, will be imposed only on defendants who were at fault; only such
defendants merit the stigma that accompanies the designation
"constitutional violator." The notion that section 1983 liability entails
some level of moral stigma also suggests an argument against the
conventional view that more constitutional damages liability is neces-
sarily better: As a number of scholars have argued in the criminal
context, the fact that a criminal conviction is accompanied by societal
opprobrium argues for restricting liability to conduct that the com-
munity actually perceives as condemnable. Criminal law, in other
words, will be most effective in enhancing compliance with its com-
mands if it "gains a reputation as a reliable statement" of the commu-
nity's expected norms of behavior.4 9 This argues for less rather than
more criminal liability; it argues, for example, against extending
criminal liability to cover regulatory and other minor offenses.450
Similar considerations would argue for sensible limitations on
liability in constitutional damages actions. The Supreme Court
seemed to have something like that in mind when the Court opined
that accepting due process claims premised on merely negligent dep-
rivations would "trivializ[e] the right of action provided in [section]
1983."45, The Court's immediate concern was to prevent section 1983
from becoming what it called a "font of tort law."452 But a deeper,
implicit concern was to avoid devaluing the constitutional currency:
to avoid federal damages liability for harms that do not clearly reach
constitutional dimensions. For similar reasons, the Court's qualified
immunity jurisprudence eschews liability except when an official's
conduct violates well-established constitutional law. Just as "the
criminal law's unique power derives from its ability to marshal the
moral condemnation of the community" and avoiding
449. Robinson, supra note 402, at 212; see also supra note 409.
450. See, e.g., PACKER, supra note 409, at 359 ("If we make criminal that which people
regard as acceptable, either nullification occurs or, more subtly, people's attitude toward the
meaning of criminality undergoes a change."); Hart, supra note 37, at 421 (arguing that crimi-
nalizing conduct that is not blameworthy by community standards "dilutes the force of the
threat of community condemnation as a means of influencing conduct in other situations where
the basis of moral condemnation is clear"); Pilcher, supra note 37, at 34 (arguing that "[1]egally
authorizing government coercion in areas beyond those delineated by commonly understood
social responsibilities leads the governed to question the moral authority of the legal system and
diminishes their respect for the power of criminal law in general, thus diluting its distinctive
force as a mechanism of social control"); Robinson, supra note 402, at 214 (arguing that
extending criminal liability to regulatory violations "may undercut moral credibility").
451. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527,549 (1981) (Powell, J., concurring in the result).
452. Daniels v. Williams, 451 U.S. 327, 332 (1986).
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overcriminalization preserves the "moral authority for visiting
community condemnation on... violators,"453 so too limiting
constitutional damages liability to cases involving truly blameworthy
conduct may best preserve the moral force of such liability. In short,
limiting rather than expanding the scope of liability for constitutional
violations-by authorizing its use only against clearly and "genuinely
threatening"4" conduct-may be the best way to reinforce the special
place of constitutional rights in our jurisprudence and maintain the
special status of constitutional rights in the public consciousness.
453. Pilcher, supra note 37, at 35.
454. Id. at 35 (quoting Sanford Kadish, The Crisis of Overcriminalization, 374 ANNALS AM.
AcAD. POL. & SOC. SC. 157 (1957)).
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